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2ABSTRACT
MODELS OF NON-STEADY-STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND A DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM
Harvey E. Lapan
Submitted to the Department of Economics on July 26, 1971 in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The paper investigates the behavior of a growing economy for
cases in which the steady-state conditions are not fulfilled. The
first chapter, which deals with one-sector models in which the
steady-state conditions are not met, investigates how the economy
behaves as the aggregate effective capital-labor ratio for the
economy tends to zero or infinity. Similarly, Chapter 2 investigates
two-sector models in which the steady-state conditions are not
fulfilled either because there are different rates of Harrod neutral
technical progress in each, sector, or because some capital-augmenting
technical progress is present in the investment sector. It is found
that these non-steady-state models parallel the steady-state growth
paths in that the rates of growth of the variables tend (in most
cases) to constant limits. However, differences arise between the
non-steady-state models and the steady-state model when factor shares
and the marginal product of capital are considered. Finally, each of
these chapters investigates how factor-augmenting technical progress
should be allocated within the economy, and considers under what
circumstances the steady-state path is found to be optimal.
In Chapter 3 the results of the first two chapters are briefly
summarized, and then the behavior of the non-steady-state economy is
compared and contrasted to the characteristics of an economy in which
the steady-state conditions are met. Though there is some similarity
between these cases, it is found that these non-steady-state economies
cannot replicate some of the major characteristics of the steady-state
path. Since it is seen that the occurrence of a steady-state is quite
unlikely, and since the non-steady-state economy does not generate all
the accepted characteristics of a growing economy, it must be concluded
that there is a basic dilemma facing the branch of economic theory that
attempts to replicate the stylized facts of economic growth.
The final chapter approaches the topic of growth from a
different perspective by investigating how an isolated firm in a
growing economy decides what growth rate and initial size to choose.
Subsequently, the chapter considers how changes in technical progress
or in cost parameters affect the decisions made by this isolated
firm.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Solow
Title: Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Chapter 1. The Bertrand-Vanek Model of Disequilibrium Growth -
A Synopsis and Extensions
I. Introduction
The modern theory of economic growth has progressed a long
way since the razor-age instability that characterized the so-called
Harrod-Domar model 16, 21]. Professor Solow's classic 1956
article 45], which showed how, by allowing smooth substitutability
in the production function one could replace the instability of the
Harrod-Domar model with the stability now characteristic of the neo-
classical growth models, opened the flood-gates for a seemingly end-
less stream of papers modifying and extending the basic one-sector
model. These extensions included the introduction of labor-augmenting
technical progress into the one-sector world, so that the model could
explain the increasing output per worker that seemed characteristic of
the real world [48]. Further modifications were pursued by allowing
the smooth substitutability of the Solow model to be replaced by
putty-clay or clay-clay models in which the capital-labor ratio was
(at least ex post) a technologically given datum [5, 24]. These models
showed that, assuming that Harrod neutral technical progress was
embodied in new machinery, the stability of the one-sector Solow model
prevailed, and all the fundamental results of this model held for the
vintage models.
Other extensions of the one-sector model included attempts to
explain the occurrence of this technical progress by resorting to the
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notion of learning-by-doing [2], as well as models that explored how
these one-sector models should be "controlled" in order to maximize
society's welfare [34, 37, 38]. While the one-sector model was being
extended, two-sector models arose. These models, for the most part,
emulated the convenient stable behavior that the one-sector models
possessed [57, 58]. Though it is true that stability is not guaran-
teed in these two-sector models, various conditions were developed [7,
57, 58] that provided for their stability. Consequently, the stability
of the model being assumed, extensions were made by allowing for the
presence of very special cases of factor-augmenting technical progress
[15, 54], and papers were produced that explored optimal behavior in
these models [43, 51].
Needless to say, a complete review of the growth literature
would be both exhaustive and unnecessary (for the most recent, and in
our opinion, best coverage of the various growth models, see Burmeister
and Dobell [9]). Yet, even with a cursory glimpse of the literature,
one is struck by one concept that runs through all these models - the
notion that a steady-state must exist. Consequently, all the extensions
1Broadly speaking, a steady-state may be defined as that state
of the world in which the effective capital-labor ratio tends to a
positive, finite limit. As a result of the constancy of the effective
capital-labor ratio, the output-factor elasticities and the marginal
product of capital all tend to positive, finite limits, and consequently
output and capital grow at the same constant rate. Also, output per
person is either constant in this steady-state, or else it grows at a
constant rate if some labor-augmenting technical progress is present.
In addition, for the two-sector models, the effective capital-labor ratio
in each sector is constant, as is the proportion of labor allocated to
each sector. While these results seem to comply well with reality, the
conditions needed for a steady-state to occur are quite stringent ones.
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of the one- and two-sector models are made within this constraint.
This is not to say that the economists producing these models
were unaware of the possibility of non-steady-state models - rather,
they chose to expand the steady-state models rather than to investigate
the "darker" side of the growth model that would occur if the steady-
state conditions were not fulfilled. The works of Kennedy [27],
Samuelson [42], and more recently, Chang [11] show the implicit concern
of economists about the possibility of non-steady-state models.
However, rather than investigate what would happen if the steady-state
did not occur, these models concentrated on developing mechanisms that
would assure the occurrence of the steady-state path. As is well-known,
these models assumed that a transformation curve between capital- and
labor-augmenting technical progress existed, and they attempted to show
under what conditions society (through individual entrepreneurial
decision-making) would choose the steady-state path. Though these
models are both interesting and informative, it is not clear to us that
either a transformation curve as postulated exists, or that entrepreneurs
behave as is assumed by these models.
Where, then, do all these new growth models leave us? Surpris-
ingly, they are not very far removed from the instability of the
original Harrod-Domar model. The steady-state condition for a one-sector
model (under the usual assumption that the aggregate production function
exhibits constant returns to scale) is a rather singular one indeed -
there can be no capital-augmenting technical progress (or else the
aggregate production function must be Cobb-Douglas). If any capital-
augmenting technical progress occurs, there is no steady-state, and the
14
effective capital-labor ratio rushes away to infinity (for constant
returns to scale and positive capital-augmenting technical progress).
The steady-state conditions for a two-sector model are even more
stringent - there can be no capital-augmenting technical progress in
the investment sector, and Harrod neutral technical progress must occur
at the same rate in each sector (there can be Hicks neutral technical
progress in the consumption sector). If Cobb-Douglas production
functions occur in either sector, these conditions can be weakened;
if both production functions are Cobb-Douglas, then a steady-state
will occur.
The singularity of the conditions needed for a steady-state
(barring some guiding hand, as in the Kennedy-Chang models) is quite
apparent, and it was to this problem that Professor Vanek turned his
attention. In two earlier papers, Vanek 60, 61] considered the
behavior of a one-sector growth model, assuming that capital-augmenting
technological change did occur (though he maintained the assumption of
constant returns to scale). In a subsequent paper, Bertrand and Vanek
[4] further extended this model by allowing the aggregate production
function to assume any (constant) degree of homogeneity.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the basic one-sector
Bertrand-Vanek model and to consider two-sector models in which the
steady-state conditions are not fulfilled. As we shall see, the
fundamental problem in the one-sector model (when the steady-state
conditions are not fulfilled) is that the effective capital-labor ratio,
instead of tending to some finite limit, rushes away to either zero or
infinity. Thus, for example, if constant returns to scale prevails, the
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presence of any capital-augmenting technical progress causes society
to produce machinery faster than its effective labor force is growing
(unless the savings rate declines at a very special rate over time), so
that continual capital-deepening occurs. Consequently, the effective
capital-labor ratio (in this case) tends to infinity, and what happens
to the economy depends upon how effectively the new capital can be used.
Therefore, as one would expect, the aggregate elasticity of substitution,
since it indicates how effectively society can absorb this new capital,
plays a fundamental role in determining how this economy will behave.
In the two-sector model, our troubles are twofold. First of all,
if capital-augmenting technical progress occurs in the investment sector,
a problem equivalent to the one-sector case occurs in that society is
producing capital faster than its effective labor force is growing, so
that continual capital-deepening occurs. Consequently, the aggregate
effective capital-labor ratio tends to infinity, and the elasticities of
substitution in each sector (for reasons already explained) become
important in determining the asymptotic behavior of the economy.
Secondly, however, the two-sector model has an additional problem that
is unique to it (compared to the one-sector model), since it entails
continual reallocation of factors between the sectors. This problem
arises if Harrod technical progress occurs at different rates in the
two sectors (assuming that all technical progress is factor-augmenting,
and is classified as Harrod and [or] Hicks neutral technical progress),
so that, under competitive pricing (or efficient allocation of resources),
a continual shifting of factors between the sectors occurs even if the
aggregate effective capital-labor ratio were to remain constant.
Consequently, as we have already observed, the likelihood of a
steady-state solution is quite small. On the other hand, as we shall see
in Chapter 3, although the asymptotic equilibrium does meet some of the
stylized facts of a growing economy, it fails to satisfactorily explain
either the distribution of income within the society or the motivation
for continuing investment. This seeming paradox should be kept in mind
when reading the three chapters that deal with aggregate growth models,
for it necessitates, in our opinion, the disaggregation of the growth
model and a closer inspection of the micro-economy that is -implicitly
embedded within this aggregate model. Our fourth and final chapter
attempts to take a small step in this direction by considering how a
single, isolated firm determines both its optimal size and growth rate.
Our basic approach in this thesis will be to ask two separate
questions. First, we shall inquire how an aggregate economy would behave
if the steady-state conditions were not met, and how this economy would
differ (at an empirically observable level) from a steady-state economy.
Secondly, we investigate the different question that asks how a central
planner should allocate factor-augmenting technical progress (to
maximize certain criteria), assuming that a trade-off exists between
various types of factor-augmenting technical progress ( la Kennedy).
Our main interest in this latter question is to ascertain under what
conditions a central planner (or the invisible hand, as in the cases of
Kennedy-Chang) would choose to place the economy in a steady-state path.
In this first chapter we shall present the basic Bertrand-Vanek
model, we shall consider the steady-state possibilities that they
suggest, and we shall extend their analysis by considering the asymptotic
17
growth rates of the variables if a steady-state does not occur. In
addition to considering how factor-augmenting technical progress should
be allocated within this economy, we shall present a model that, due
to the relationship between the "degree of homogeneity" of the
production function and the effective capital-labor ratio, causes a
steady-state (in a special sense of the word) to exist in the long-run.
Our second chapter investigates the asymptotic behavior of a
two-sector model, assuming that the steady-state conditions are not
fulfilled. Since, as explained earlier, the two-sector model faces two
distinct problems, our approach is to consider each of these problems
separately. First, we consider how the one-sector analogue of continual
capital-deepening effects the two-sector model. Subsequently, we
temporarily assume away the problem of capital-deepening, and we ask
instead what would happen if Harrod neutral technical progress occurred
at different rates in the two sectors. Finally, we combine these two
separate problems and show how any combinations of factor-augmenting
technical progress can be analyzed. In doing this we exhibit the
asymptotic growth rates for all variables in this two-sector model, and
we consider how a central planner should allocate various types of
factor-augmenting technical progress.
Our third chapter briefly summarizes the results of our first
two chapters and then proceeds to detail the ways in which the
asymptotic equilibrium differs (at an observable level) from the steady-
state path. Though we present some suggestions that might enable the
asymptotic equilibrium to duplicate the stylized facts of growth,
persistent doubt remains a  to the likelihood of a steady-state solution
or as to the ability of the asymptotic equilibrium to duplicate these
stylized facts. Consequently, we suggest that further investigation
into the microeconomic characteristics of the economy, particularly in
so far as factor-pricing and investment decisions are concerned, is
essential.
Our last chapter then attempts a small step in this direction
by analyzing an isolated firm in a growing economy. In this partial
equilibrium model, which is based upon a paper by Professor Solow [49],
we investigate how various types of technical progress (and changes in
factor costs) effect the decisions made by the firm.
Let us now turn our attention to the basic Bertrand-Vanek model.
II. The Basic Bertrand-Vanek Model
As previously indicated, most one-sector growth models have
clung to the assumption that there is no capital-augmenting
technological progress and that the production function is homogeneous
of degree one everywhere. The Bertrand-Vanek model, which we plan to
discuss in this section (and which is more general than Vanek's two
earlier papers), relaxes both of these assumptions, though it does
assume that the degree of homogeneity of the production function is a
constant (but not necessarily equal to one). With their model, they
show that the existence of a steady-state is a rather singular affair,
and thus that growth theory (in this respect) has not come as far as one
might at first presume from the razor-edge instability of the Harrod-
Domar model.
In this chapter we plan to follow the basic Bertrand-Vanek
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model, elaborating on it in certain areas. For example, we extend
somewhat their discussion of the singular cases in which a steady-state
can exist. Also, we discuss in more detail the asymptotic growth rates
of the variables, and we also consider what would happen if the degree
of homogeneity of the production function were not constant.
Let us now outline the basic Bertrand-Vanek model:
a) All technological progress is assumed to be factor-
augmenting, and the production function is
assumed to have a constant degree of homogeneity.
1) Q = F(Ke bt,Leat ) = (Leat)hf(u) ; h = degree of homogeneity
u (Kebt)/(Leat ) (z)/(x) ; (L/L) = n
b) Factors are paid proportionally to their marginal product.
2) W (aQ/aL)/h ; R = (aQ/aK)/h
$n - [(aQ/aL)(L/Q)] ; Ok - [(aQ/aK)(K/Q)l ; $k + n = h ;
k ' On 
c) Capitalists and Workers save at constant rates (skasnl0):
If hl, this obviously represents competitive pricing.
However, for hl, it is more difficult to rationalize this pricing
assumption. One possible explanation for this assumption, based on
the presence of externalities that account for the non-constant
returns to scale, is presented in a paper by John Chipman, "External
Economies of Scale and Competitive Equilibrium," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, August 1970, pages 347-385.
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3) S = sQ= [(Sk k)/h + (nfn)/h]Q ; sk > s s n ;
S is the gross savings of the community
d) Capital depreciates at a constant rate c:
4) S = K+ cK ; (K/K) = [(sQ)/K] - c
Equations 1) - 4) are the basic ingredients of the Bertrand-
Vanek model. Consider the rate of change of the effective capital-
labor ratio:
(a+n)ht5) (u/u) = (K/K) + b - a - n = se f(u)]/K + b - a- n - c}
{[{se [(a+n)h-(an-b)]tf(u)}/u] + b - a - n - c}
A steady-state path implies that we can find a solution such
that [(u/u) = 0], or else that we can redefine the effective capital-
labor ratio so that, in those new units, the system will approach a
constant, finite, non-zero effective capital-labor ratio. Two
possibilities immediately occur (Bertand and Vanek, pages 750-1):
i) Cobb-Douglas production function - all technological
change reduces to the special case of labor-
augmenting technical progress
ii)3 The parameters are such that: (a+n)h = (a+n-b)
3For h=l, this reduces to the standard neoclassical steady-
state condition that there be no capital-augmenting technical progress
(b=O); otherwise, it implies: [b = (l-h)(a+n)]. Essentially this says
that a steady-state can occur only if the rate of capital-augmenting
technical progress is Just enough (and no more) to offset the decrease
in the effective capital-labor ratio that would occur as the economy
grows (due to decreasing returns to scale). For increasing returns to
scale, the interpretation is comparable, except that the capital-
augmenting technical progress must be negative (technical regression).
21
After we discuss the Bertrand-Vanek model in which there is no steady-
state, we shall briefly consider these steady-state possibilities. At
that time we shall find that, while these constitute necessary conditions
for a steady-state, they are not sufficient. However, let us first
present the basic Bertrand-Vanek model before we discuss this problem
in more detail.
Following their analysis (their equations 8, 11, 12, 13,
and 14):
6) k (K/K) = (sQ)/K - c
7) (k/k) = [(k+c)/k][(a+n)h - k + (k+b-a-n)T]
8) T - k + E*n[(a-l)/(ah)] ; E [(ds/dk)(fk/s)]
1 > E 0 ; sk a sn > 0
9) k = [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)T]/(l-T) ; T 1;
k is the value(s) of k such that (k/k) =0 .
10) (k/k) [(k+c)/k(l-T)(k-k)
Bertrand and Vanek's procedure is to consider changes in the
rate of growth of capital and to study the locus of k (call it k ) such
that [k=0]. Equation 10) indicates that if T < 1 (and k > -c, as it
must be for s > 0 and non-zero, finite u), then whenever k < k, k
increases; and whenever k> k, then k decreases. Therefore, the k
locus is, for T < 1, similar to an asymptote; and if k tends to a
constant value as u , then k will tend to k (assuming that u > 0).
If T > 1, then k will diverge from the i locus.
These five equations are really the essence of the Bertrand-
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Vanek analysis; the rest of the task is merely to see what type of
behavior these equations imply. As we have seen, k is important in
determining the behavior of k; and k, in turn, depends only upon T
(and the various parameters). From the definition of T, we can place
limits on its potential values:
11) Min[O,(a-l)/a] s T s Max[h,(a-l)/a]
Since whether T 1 or T < 1 is obviously important, it
follows that the value of the parameter h is quite important (that is,
it is important whether there is increasing, constant, or decreasing
returns to scale). However, we have seen that it is also critical
whether:
12) h [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] . Therefore, let us write:
13) h* - [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] ; h h* + 6 . Then we find:
14) k {(a+n-b) + [(a+n)6}/(i-T)]}
Clearly, we can not say much more about k or T unless we
are willing to make some assumption about the production function or the
savings assumption.4
4Bertrand and Vanek briefly discuss this in a footnote on pages
748-9. They state that T is monotonic in u if: h > E[(a-l)/a]; this,
we believe, is not necessarily true. They apparently fail to consider
the changes in E caused by changes in u in arriving at the above
condition. Secondly, they state that k (the actual rate of growth of
capital) is monotonic in T - we are sure that they meant to say that k ,
the so-called "stationary locus", is monotonic in T. It is clearly
possible for k to first increase, then decrease - or vice versa. We
shall discuss the time path of k later in this chapter.
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(dk/dT) = {[(a+n)6]/(!-T) 2 } 0 as 6 > o .
Therefore, k is monotonic in T (though it is discontinuous at T=1).
Considering T, if sk sn (and hence, E=O), we find:n
T k ; (dT/du) 0O as a > 1 .
Consequently, T
substitution is
If sk
assume that the
definition of T
is monotonic in u if sk-Sn and if the elasticity of
everywhere bounded from unity.
> s > 0 , the problem is more complicated. For simplicity,
production function is a C.E.S. function. From the
and E we can demonstrate the following:
17) T = %k + En[(a-l)/(ah)] ; E = [(sk-Sn) k]/[(Sk-Sn) k + hsn ] ;
n= (h-k)
If sn = O, then E = 1, and therefore:
18) T = k{ - [(a-l)/(ah)]} + [(a-l)/a] ,
which is monotonic in *k (or constant if h = [(a-l)/a]); note that
this result differs from the Bertrand-Vanek condition for the monotonicity
of T - see footnote 4). Therefore, T varies between h and [(a-l)/a]
in this case.
Finally, if sk > sn > 0 , we can show:
19) T = + {(h-$k)[(a-l)/(ah)][(sk-sn)k]/[( skn) + hsn]
If we take the derivative of this expression we find that T is
monotonic in k unless:
15)
16)
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20) s k > sn > 0 and h< [(Sk-sn)/sk][I a-ll/] (+ h < 1)
which differs from the Bertrand-Vanek criteria (page 749) unless
a > 1, and = h .
Since k is monotonic in T, and k is monotonic in u (if a is
bounded from one or else the function is a C.E.S. function), it follows
that k is monotonic in u unless condition 20) is fulfilled. However, if
h > 1, k is not continuous in u - there is a point of discontinuity at
T = 1 (it is possible that h> 1 and that T < 1 everywhere ,
provided that a is not everywhere bounded from one).
If the production function is of the C.E.S. variety, and if
equation 20) holds, then there will be a single interior extreme point
in k as a function of u.
Armed with this knowledge, we only need to know the behavior
of k as u+O or as u-s in order to complete the graph of k. Since
we have assumed a C.E.S. function (or else sk=s and that a is bounded
from one), sky 0 or Sk h as u-*O or as u- . Thus:
21) k- 0 implies k - (a+n)h if s # 0;
k k implies k [(a+n-b) +a{(a+n)h - (a+n-b)}] if sn = 0
22) 9k h implies k + [(bh)/(l-h)]
These values hold regardless of the nature of the function, and
they determine the asymptotic behavior of k, assuming that a is bounded
from one as u-+O and as u- .
Figures I-III exhibit the path of k, assuming that either
s= s and a bounded from one, or else that the function is a C.E.S.k n
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function, and that condition 20) is not fulfilled.5 If the function is
of the C.E.S. variety, but condition 20) is valid, then the curves will
look basi6ally the same except that there will be one interior extreme
point; the boundary values will be the same. (In the figures, the dotted
lines represent the path of (k,u) for given initial conditions.)
From equation 10), given the k curves, we can depict the path
of k in the (k,u) plane:
10) (k/k) = [(k+c)/k](l-T)(i-k)
As previously noted, whenever k < k, if T < 1, then k will
increase; and when k > k, T < 1, k decreases. Thus, we can see that
for h 1, whenever 6 > 0 (implies h > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)], u+- , and
for 6 < 0, u - 0. Similarly, the growth rate k approaches the
"stationary rate" k as u -+ 0 or as u-s , providing that k is
finite. If k is inifinite (h=l, a> 1), k tends to infinity. For h=l,
a < 1, 6 < 0, k tends to minus infinity, and k, the asymptotic growth
rate, tends to its lower bound, [-c]. Thus, in these cases the
asymptotic growth rate is independent of initial conditions, and depends
only upon the various parameters of the problem. We note that in all
cases the asymptotic growth rate is larger for a > 1 than for a < 1,
given the values of the other parameters.
When we consider the case h > 1, the result is slightly
5If sk > s = O, then the asymptotic value of k as 0k + is
{(a+n-b) + a[(a+n)h - (a+n-b)l] , instead of ust [(a+n)h] , as we have
seen in equation 21). Otherwise, the diagrams can represent that case
as well.
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different - the asymptotic growth rate of the system may depend upon
the initial conditions. For example, we see that for 6 > O, h > 1,
a > 1, then ke-; however, if 6 > O, h > 1, a < 1, the asymptotic growth
rate tends to -c (as u+O) or to (a+n)h (as uno-), depending upon the
initial conditions (see Figure III). It would seem that u-s is the more
likely result, though the other result is possible (providing that
[(bh)/(l-h)] > -c ).
Similarly, if 6 < O, h > 1 (implies b < 0), for a 1 there is
a unique asymptotic growth rate to which the system tends -c]. However,
if a > 1, it is possible that either k-+ or k + (a+n)h [o in the
former case, and u 0 in the latter case].
Since, given the initial effective capital-labor ratio, s, the
aggregate gross savings rate, determines the initial rate of growth [k(O)],
it is possible in these two cases [6>0, h>l, a<l or 6<0, h>l, a>l] that
a larger savings rate could lead to a larger asymptotic growth rate -
contrary to the normal neoclassical result. This relation, though, is
a step function - there might exist a critical savings rate [given u(0)]
such that below that critical savings rate the system would tend to the
smaller growth rate, whereas for larger savings rates the system would
tend to the larger growth rate. Of course, for initial values of u, the
savings rate might not be sufficient to alter the growth rate of the
system (asymptotically).
In summary, if the function is a C.E.S. function, or if sk = sn
6Bertrand and Vanek noted this possibility (page 746) for the
case h>l, 6>0. However, they did not elaborate on the elasticity
condition, and they did not consider the case h > 1, < 0, a > 1
(because they assume b 0).
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(and a is bounded from one), then there is a unique asymptotic growth
rate to which the system tends for h 1; and this growth rate will,
in general, depend upon all the parameters of the model. For h > 1, it
is possible that initial conditions may effect the asymptotic growth
rate. These asymptotic growth rates are finite except for h 1, a> 1,
6 >0 and perhaps h > 1, a > 1, 6 < 0. Also, if > 0, u, the effective
capital-labor ratio, tends to infinity except perhaps in the case 6 > 0,
h > 1, a < 1. Similarly, for 6 < 0, u + 0, except perhaps if 6 < 0,
h > 1, a> 1.
A. Asymptotic Growth Rates - General Case
Now that we have completed our study of the special case
discussed above, we can turn our attention to the more general case in
which no restrictions are placed upon the production function (or the
savings parameters).
As we have seen from equation 14):
14) k = (a+n-b) + [(a+n)6]/(l-T) ; 6 = h - [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]
As long as T < 1, k must always either be greater or less than (a+n-b).
But we know that T < 1 if h < 1; therefore, for h < 1, we know that k
always lies above or below (a+n-b) [we are excluding the case 6= 0].
Similarly, from equation 10):
10) (k) =(k [(k+c)/k(l-T)(-k)
As long as T < 1, then k increases when below i, and decreases
when above k. Suppose 6> 0; then k > (a+n-b). Whenever k < (a+n-b),
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it increases (though u decreases); since the growth rate (k/k) is
positive (if k < O, it is still true that k > 0), k must increase
and eventually reach and surpass (a+n-b). When this occurs, u begins to
increase; but since k > (a+n-b), it follows that k will remain above
(a+n-b), and thus u-+. If k approaches a limit as u-+ (as it will if
a is bounded from, or tends to, one), then k will approach k. Should k
fluctuate between two limits, then k similarly will fluctuate between
those limits.
Similarly we can show that if 6 < 0, h < 1, then eventually u 0,
and k approaches the limiting value of k as u+O, or else it fluctuates
between the limits of k should a fluctuate between being greater than
and less than one.
In summary, when h < 1, 6 > 0, then u, and k approaches the
asymptotic value of k (determined by Ok) as u-+; and when h < 1, 6 < 0,
then u -+ 0, and k tends to the asymptotic value of k as u + O. There is,
of course, no necessity that the path of k be monotonic.
If h = 1, the situation is much the same. It is now possible
that T = 1, but since we expect the output-labor elasticity to be
positive for non-zero, finite values of u (T=1 implies k=1 , n=0 for h=l),
T can only be one asymptotically. Therefore, k is again always either
larger or smaller than (a+n-b). The only real difference between this
case and the previous case is that the limit of k need not be finite.
Thus, if a > 1 as u, then the limit of k is unbounded and, for 6 > 0
(and a > 1), k tends to infinity since, from equation 7) with h=l:
(k/k) = [(k+c)/k][(a+n-k)(l-T) + bT]7)
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and for finite k, (k/k) -+ [(k+c)/k]b as T - 1. Thus, in this case,
k-s as u-, for h = , 6 > 0, a > 1.7
Similarly, for h = , 6 < O, a < l, k * -a as u - O. We
have already seen that for 6 < 0, u -+ 0; however, there is a lower
bound on the rate of growth of capital (due to depreciation) equal to
-c. Thus, in this case, k -+ -c.
For h > 1, however, the story is slightly more complicated. In
general, it is now possible for T to exceed one, and thus we can not say
that k > (a+n-b) when 6 > 0 and that k < (a+n-b) when 6 < 0. As an
example, suppose that 6 < 0 for h > 1 (this implies b < 0). Then:
7Though Bertrand and Vanek do not explicitly discuss the
growth rate of K, they find it implausible that (/K) shoud tend to
infinity since (pages 747-748): "The capital-labor ratio in efficiency
units will be increasing so that it could be expected that k would
eventually decrease, leading to a T less than unity (that is, this
would necessarily happen if the marginal product of capital eventually
became zero with increasing [x/z])." This statement is wrong on three
counts:
i) If a > 1, then k will increase, not decrease, as the
effective capital-labor ratio increases.
ii) Obviously, it is possible for the marginal product of
capital to tend to zero and for k to remain
greater than zero. If u (the effective capital-
labor ratio) tends to infinity and if a > 1, then
the marginal product of capital may tend to zero,
but k - h > 1.
iii) Even if u tends to infinity, the MPK may not tend to
zero (even if the Inada conditions hold) since:
MPK = etf(u)
(For sn=0, the MPK tends to a positive constant
[a<l], though k*O. For more information on the
asymptotic behavior of the MPK, see Chapter 3).
Consequently, they consider the case in which k [=(K/K)] +-
as an exceptional one; if they are speaking "empirically", we can
hardly disagree. However, as an a priori possibility, it is ust as
likely as the case in which k - 0 and K + (a+n)h.
14) k= (a+n-b) + [(a+n)61/(l-T)
10) (k/k) - [(k+c)/k](l-T)(k-k)
Consider the minimum value of k such that k > (a+n-b) :
23) Min k such that k > (a+n-b) , 6<0, = [(bh)/(l-h)] > (a+n-b)
If k(O) < [(bh)/(l-h)] , then k must decrease since, for T > 1, k(O) < k
and k < O, while for T < 1, k(O) > k , and again k < O. Thus, once
k < [(bh)/(l-h)], it must decrease, eventually fall below (a+n-b), and
hence u-+O. As u-O, the asymptotic growth rate tends to Max[lim(k), -c],
u+O
or else it fluctuates between the appropriate limits should a (and k)
fluctuate. However, if k(O) > [(bh)/(l-h)] , it is possible that k > k ,
T > 1; in this case, k would increase without bound, and uX. Note,
however, that T>l as u- implies a 1, so this case cannot occur if
a < 1 as u. (However, it may occur if a fluctuates between being
greater and less than one; the larger the intervals in u for which a < 1,
the more likely k is to fall, and hence stay, below [(bh)/(l-h)].)
Similarly, for 6 > 0, h > 1, it is now possible for k < (a+n-b).
This time we are interested in the maximum value of k such that
k < (a+n-b) :
24) Max k such that k < (a+n-b), 6> 0, = [(bh)/(l-h)] < (a+n-b)
As in the other case, if k(O) > [(bh)/(l-h)] and k(O) < k ,
T < 1, then k increases; and if k(O) > k , T > 1, again k increases.
Thus, once k > [(bh)/(l-h)] , it must become larger than (a+n-b), and
hence u--. However, if k(O) < [(bh)/(l-h)],and T > 1, then k decreases,
8If T=l, from equation 7) we can see:
(k/k) = [(k+c)/k][(a+n)(h-l) + b] < 0 since h < [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]
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approaching (-c) as its lower limit. For T > 1, as u-O, this implies
a < 1; thus this case cannot occur if a 1 as u+O.
in summary, if 6 > 0, then u except possibly for the case
6>0, h>l, a<l as uO. Similarly, if 6 < 0, then u-+O with the possible
exception of the case 6<0, h>l, a>l as u. The asymptotic growth rate
is determined by the value of k as u tends to infinity or zero, depending
upon which case we are considering.
As we have seen, there is no difference between the general
case and the case in which the production function is a C.E.S. function
when we are considering the asymptotic behavior of the system. However,
should we allow a to fluctutate between being asymptotically greater and
less than one, a difference would emerge. Finally, we see that there is
no need for the time path of k to be monontonic. Also, in our two
;perverse" cases it is possible, as explained earlier, for the savings
rate to alter the asymptotic growth rate of the system (though only two
growth rates are possible if a does not fluctuate between being greater
and less than one).
This completes our review of the basic Bertrand-Vanek model
(and our modifications of it). Before considering the two possible
steady-state cases, let us now consider the growth rates of the other
variables.
B. Asymptotic Growth Rates of Other Variables
Given the growth rate of capital, we are able to calculate the
growth rates of the other variables from their definitions:
25) u = [(Ke )/(Leat)] ; (u/u) = (k+b-a-n) ; k = (K/K)
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26) Q = e n)htf() ; (Q/Q) = (a+n) n + (k+b)$k
27) (C/L) = (l-s)(Q/L) ; (/C)- (L/L) = (Q/Q)- n since
s-O asymptotically, and we assume sk < 1 (hence, s < 1).
28) W = [(Q/L)/h] = e[(a+n)h-n]t[hf(u) - uf'(u)]
(W/W) = (a+n)h - n + k(u/u)[1 - (a-l)/(ah)]
29) R = [(aQ/aK)/h] = [e tf'(u)]/h , X [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)] ;
(R/R) = + [*k{(h-l)/h} - { n/(oh)}](u/u)
In some cases (for example, h=l, 6>0, a>l) we are faced with an
expression for (R/R) involving: [0-a]. In these cases we can use
l'HSpital's rule to evaluate the expression. In most other cases, the
results are quite straightforward. Table I summarizes the growth rates
for the above variables. In some cases, the asymptotic growth rates
depend upon which savings assumption is used - these cases are so
indicated in the Table. Also, for 6 < O, it is possible that k would
tend to some finite value, which might be either greater or less than
[-c] - the rate of depreciation of capital. Naturally, capital cannot
decrease at a rate faster than [-ci (barring direct consumption or
disposal of capital) - again, these cases are so indicated in the Table.
From Table I we can study the asymptotic behavior of the
various variables. As an example, suppose we are interested in per
capita consumption. From Table I we can readily see that whenever 6>0,
ab is sufficient to guarantee that per capita consumption is always
increasing (assuming a>O). However, for decreasing returns to scale it
is possible that per capita consumption actually declines over time if
capital-augmenting technical progress occurs more rapidly than labor-
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TABLE I - Asymptotic Values and Growth Rates of Variables
Asymptotic Values Asymptotic Growth Rates
a u Ok On
k__n____
6[h-(a+n-b) >0
(a+n) Limit as u -+ X 
= [(a+n)h - (a+n-b) 
h<l [-*b>O] >1 h o [X/(1-h) [(bh)/(l-h)]
[(a+n)(h-O)+bO*]k kt
s > 0
n
s = O
n
2) h- [Eb>O]
(a+n)h<1 0 O
<1
>1
0o o
co 1
h Xo
0
(a+n-b) + a
co
s > 0
n
-l
s = 
n
3) h>l
co f*<l 1-· [b/(l-0J) kk k k
co 0
<1 c 0
>1 h
1 b
1 ob
[(a+n) + (b4*)
k
(a+n)
[(a+n-b) + b]
0 0
co 0>l h-l)
1 (h-l)
OD f<l h-Ok k]k k k
h X
[(a+n)h - (a+n-b)4]
k
(1- *)k(
(a+n)h
<1 0 O h X [(a+n-b) + Xa]
PERVERSE CASE u+O AND k(O) < [(bh)/(l-h)]
<1 0 h 0
-1 0 f>l h-O*
(b-c-a-n) -c
(b-c-a-n)
Cases U
1)
K
I
s >0
n
<1 co O
s
n
= 0
--- 
-
+1
-1
4.1
+l
-C
c <h h-O*o )k k k
- Continued
Cases
6>0
1) h<l [b>O]
a>1
cal, 0*<h
c<l, s >0
n
C<1, s =0
n
2) hl [-+b>O]
c>1l
-+1l, 0*<1
0<l, sn>0
a<l, s =0
n
Q 
-
Asymptotic Growth Rates
(C/L) W= [(aQ/aL)/h]
Growth Rates as u - -
[bh/(1-h)]
Same as K
(a+n)h
(a+n)h
Same as
(a+n)
(a+n)
K
A/(l-h) + (a-b)
i/(-k) .+ (a-b)
A + (a-b)
+ (a-b)
a+[bf*/(l- *)]
a
a
A/[(1-h)o] +(a-b)
Same as (C/L)
A + (a-b)
+ (a-b)
Same as (C/L)
a
a
R=[ (aQ/aK)/h]
0
0
0
[(a-l)/a]b
0
3) h>l
a>1
a+l, * 1
0<1, sn>0
c<l, s =0
n
PERVERSE CASE
a<1
a+l, >l
0
o
Same as
(a+n)h
(a+n)h
K i/(1-k) + (a-b)
(h-l)n + a
(h-l)n + a
u-+O AND
h(b-c)<O h(b-c) - n
((a+n)h +
f(b-c-a-n)]
[(a+n)h -n I
*(b-c-a-n)]
Same as (C/L)
(h-l)n + a
(h-l)n + a
k(O) < [(bh)/(l-h)]
[((-l)/a][h(b-c)
-n-(b-c-a-n)]
P. Same as (C/L)
A
0
[(a-1)/a]
O
[bh+c(l-h) ]'<O
[(a+n)h +c +
0*(b-c-a-n) ]It
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TABLE I - Continued
Cases
6<0
1) h<l:
s >0
n
s 
n
Asymptotic Values Asymptotic Growth Rates
a u Ok On u K
Limit as uO
>1 0 0 -h
>1 0 0 h
41 0 O h-O #
Ac
[A/(l-ok)]
(a+n)h
t[(a+n-b) + Ao]
t[(a+n)h - (a+n-b)$*]
t[(bh)/(l-h)]<1 0 h 0 [A/(l-h)]
2) h=l [4-b<O]
s > 0
n
s = 0
n
3) h>l [-)b<O]
> 0
n
s = 0
n
>1 0 0
>1 0 0
-1 0 0<1
<1 0 1
>1 O 0
>1 0 0
1 0 O*>
-1 0  *<1
1
1
k
0
h
h
h-k 
h-
b
[b/(l-0*)]
(b-c-a-n)
Aa
(b-c-a-n)
(a+n)
t[(a+n-b) + b]
t[(a+n)+ (bf$)/(1-)]
-c
(a+n)h
t[(a+n-b) + Ao]
-C
t[(a+n)h - (a+n-b) *]
(-Wx)
PERVERSE CASE
<1
>1
-+1
0 h
u-* AND
h
= ~1
0
k(O)
0
h- #k
(b-c-a-n)
> [(bh)/(l-h)]
co
-c
t In these cases it is possible that the given rates of growth for K are
less than [-c]; in that case, [-c] becomes the growth rate for K,
and the other growth rates (for other variables) are correspondingly
modified.
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TABLE I - Continued
Asymptotic Growth Rates
Q (C/L) W = [(aQ/L)/h]
Growth Rates as u -+ 0
(a+n)h
(a+n)h
Same as K
[bh/(l-h)]
(a+n)h - n
(a+n)h - n
/( ~-nk) + (a-b)
[(b+n)h-n]/(l1-h)
(a+n)h - n
(a+n)h - n
Same as (C/L)
A/[(1-h)a] +(a-b)
R-[ (aQ/aK)/h]
[(a-1)/a]x
0
0
O
a
2) h=l [b<O]
>1, s >0O (a+n)
n
al, s =0 (a+n)
ol, k*<1 Same as
o<l (b-c)
a
K
a
a + [b(l--)]
(b-c-n)
a
Same as (C/L)
[(b-c-n)-a(1-a)]
(a)
[(a-1)/a]b
0
0
b
3) h>l [+b<C
c>1, >0n
a>1, s =0
o-L, *>1
oa1, *<1
a<l
(a+n)h
(a+n)h
[(a+n)h +
, (b-c-a-n)]
Same as K
h(b-c)
(h-1)n + a
(h-1)n + a
[(a+n)h -n +
9*(b-c-a-n)]
x/(-+k) + (a-b)
h(b-c) - n
(h-1)n + a [(a-)/o]X
(h-1)n + a 0
Same as (C/L) [(a+n)h +c +
* (b-c-a-n) ]k
Same as (C/L) 0
[h(b-c) -n - [bh + c(l-h)]
{(a-1)/a}(b-c-a-n)]
PERVERSE CASE
a>1
-1, k
u .- AND k(O) > [(bh)/(l-h)]
Cases
6<0
1) h<l
a>l, 
o>1, 
a+1, 
o<l
s >0
n
=0
n
k
· .,, . , , -
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augmenting technical progress.
Similarly, for 6 < 0, a b suffices to guarantee that per
capita consumption is declining in the long run. However, for a > b
it is possible (though not necessary) that per capita consumption would
be increasing over time. Thus, the value of 6 alone does not suffice
to determine how per capita consumption behaves; rather, we need to
consider all the parameters, and specifically whether capital- or
labor-augmenting technological progress is occurring at the faster rate.
(In this discussion we have ignored the two "perverse" cases mentioned
earlier in this chapter).
C. Steady-State Possibilities
Before considering how technical progress should be allocated
within this economy in order to maximize the discounted stream of
consumption (and welfare), let us briefly consider the two steady-state
possibilities mentioned by Bertrand-Vanek (pages 750-751):
i) a = 1 everywhere (Cobb-Douglas production function)
ii) [(a+n)h = (a+n-b)]
As we shall see, either of these conditions is merely a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for the existence and stability of the steady-
state path.
Consider case i) first:
30) Q = (Kebt)k(Leat)(h-k) ; ( ok constant)
Using Vanek's pricing assumption:
31) s = [skok/h] + [Snn/h] S ss ; s* is a constant, and defined
to be the average gross savings rate. If k 1, we can write:
32) Q = Kk[Loexp 1(a+n)h-(a+n-b)k)t/(l-k) } ] ( 1 - k ) k 
= Kk(L A)(1-k) ; L L ent0 0
Define w = [K/LoA] ; then:
33) (w/w) = s*Q/K - c - [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)4k]/(l-k)
* (kl) - c - [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)4k]/( k)
If k < 1 (or k < h < 1), a unique stable equilibrium to
equation 33) exists. However, if ~k > 1, then no equilibrium exists if:
34) -c + [(a+n)(h-%k) + bk]/(4k-l) _ 0 ;
If c=O and b O, then the expression in equation 34) will be positive, and
no steady-state equilibrium exists, despite the fact that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas. Otherwise, there exists a unique w* such that:
34') At w*, (w/w) = ; and (w/w) ~ 0 as w w*
Therefore, for k > 1 either no equilibrium exists, or else a unique
unstable equilibrium exists. Finally, if k = 1, we find:
35) Q K[L ])6 ; 6 = [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)]
K = s*K[LO]( h -l )e
and no steady-state exists (in which the MPK and Q/K are constant)
unless 6 = O, which is really ust case ii). (Even if 6 = 0, in general,
the effective capital-labor ratio will tend to zero or infinity. However,
the MPK and Q/K and the shares of each factor - under Vanek's pricing
assumption - will tend to constant values) Thus, in the case of Cobb-
Douglas production functions it must be that k<l or 6=0 (the latter being
our second special case) for a steady-state to exist and to be stable.
Consider now the second case:
ii) [(a+n)h =\(a+n-b)] + 6 = o
This case represents the other steady-state possibility proposed by
Bertrand-Vanek. Consider (u/u) :
36) (u/u) = s*f(u)/u + b - a - n - c ; [s* = (Sk k/h) + (s nn/h)]
For a steady-state to exist it must be true that:9
37) b c (a+n+c)
Since 6 = O, equation 36), which shows the rate of growth of the effective
capital-labor ratio, does not explicitly depend on time, and so it
would appear that we are in the traditional neoclassical world. However,
we must remember that for bO, the production function does not exhibit
constant returns to scale. From equation 36) we find:
38) d(u/u) [(sk-sn)f"/h] + [snf(k -1)/2
du
If < 1 everywhere, then this expression is never positive (assuming
k > Sn and f"<O; note that for h>l, it is possible that f">O,
especially for a C.E.S. function). Therefore, if the Inada conditions
hold, then a unique, stable steady-state exists.1 0
9This condition must be fulfilled since h [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]>O.
Therefore, h>O implies (a+n-b)>O, and thus [b < (a+n+c)] if c0.
1 0The Inada conditions are overly strong - it suffices that:
skf(O) > (a+n+c-b) and lim[f(u)/u] < (a+n+c-b)
us+
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However, suppose h>l (b<O), so that it is possible that k>l .
In that case:
39) d(u/u) > 0 for k > 1. (for simplicity we assume that Sk=sn).
du
Several possibilities now arise:
a) If [sf(u)/u] > (a+n+c-b) for all values of u, then u,
and no steady-state equilibrium exists.
b) A unique unstable equilibrium exists if ~k > 1 everywhere
and lim[sf(u)/u] < (a+n+c-b).
u-O
c) Many equilibria (stable and/or unstable) may exist.
For example, suppose that sk=sn, and that the production
function is a C.E.S. function. Then:
40) d(f/u) = (f/u 2)(k-1) ) , and therefore (f/u) has only one
du
interior extreme point, which is a maximum (minimum) for a<l (a>l), and
it occurs at u* such that *k(U*) = 1. In this case, there are
three possibilities:
i) No equilibrium exists and ue (u-*O) for a>l (a<l).
ii) There are two values of u such that (u/u) = 0, the first
value of u being a stable (unstable) equilibrium,
the second an unstable (stable) equilibrium for
a > 1 (a < 1).
iii) One equilibrium occurs at the tangency between (sf/u) and
the line (a+n+c-b). This tangency occurs at u* such
that 4k(U*) = 1, and it is stable (unstable) for
u<u* and unstable (stable) for u>u* if a>l (a<l).
Thus, the Bertrand-Vanek statement that a steady-state will exist
if either =l or [(a+n)h = (a+n-b)] proves to be a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for the existence and stability of the steady-state
path. Particularly, if h>l (as seems possible; however, b<O does not
seem too plausible), then no steady-state will result in case i) if $kl;
and in case ii), for h>l, it is possible that there are none, one, or
several equilibria, some of which may well be unstable.
D. The Savings Rate and the Bertrand-Vanek Steady-State
In the previous section we have seen that, even if the Bertrand-
Vanek conditions for a steady-state are fulfilled, there may not be a
steady-state equilibrium (or it may be unstable). For the case h<l, 6=0,
a steady-state will occur and the savings rate serves to determine the
effective capital-labor ratio, as in the traditional neoclassical growth
models.
However, if h>l (and 6=0), the savings rate may play an even
more influential role. We have seen in the prior section that in this
case several possible roots of [(u/u)= 0] may occur, some of which are
stable, others unstable. Particularly, if the function is a C.E.S.
function, there may be two roots to the (u/u) = 0 equation. For a< 1,
given s, if u is initially "too small", then u will tend to zero; other-
wise, it will tend to its steady-state value. Conversely, for a>l,
if u(O) is "sufficiently large", then u will tend to infinity; otherwise
it will tend to its steady-state value.
How does a change in the savings rate affect this system? In order
to answer this question, consider Figure 4 (page 44). If we consider the
case a< 1, we see that if u(O) < u , then u+O; if u(O) > u, then uu*;
FIGURE IV Effect of the Savings Rate on the Bertrand-Vanek
Steady-State Growth Model - Assuming Increasing
Returns to Scale
i) a < 1 [
(a+n+c-b)
ii) a >1 [1
(a+n+c-b)
u/u]
"I
II-
N-
is'f/u]
[sf/u'
I
u
U 0
u/u]
[s'f/u]/
//
I I
I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
u
44
f/u]
l
_ _ ,
-
I
I
i
_ - - X - - -
I',
45
and u(O) = u corresponds to the unstable equilibrium. As s increases,
u0 decreases an and u increases. If the initial u [u(O)] exceeds u, then
the only effect of an increase in the savings rate is to increase the
effective capital-labor ratio to which the system tends. However, if
u(O) < uo , it is possible that an increase in s may lower u sufficiently
so that the economy may tend to the stable root (instead of the
effective capital-labor ratio tending to zero). That is, for given u(O)
there may exist a s (it is possible that u tends to zero for all s 1)
such that:
u*
41) u u as s s
o0
Obviously, the role of the savings rate is potentially more important
in this model than in the normal steady-state model.
Similarly for a>l, there exists a u such that:
42) u as u(O) 
As we can see from Figure IV, an increase in s decreases u and increases
u*. Consequently, it is possible that, for given u(O), there may exist
a s such that:
43) u + u as s > s
U*
Therefore, assuming the Bertrand-Vanek steady-state exists, an
increase in the savings rate, in addition to increasing the stable
steady-state root, also increases the probability (for given initial
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conditions) that, for o<l, the system will converge to that locally
stable root; whereas for a>l, an increase in the savings rate increases
the probability that u-+. Consequently, a slight increase in the savings
rate may prove more rewarding in this system than in the conventional
11,12
steady-state models.
Now that we have considered the effects of the savings rate on
this steady-state model, let us investigate how technological progress
should be allocated between capital and labor in order to maximize
society's welfare.
III. Kennedy-Von Weizsgcker Revisited
A. Maximizing the Asymptotic Rate of Growth of Consumption
As has been done by others for the special case of constant
returns to scale, we can pose the following question:
"If a planner faces a transformation curve relating the rate of
capital-augmenting technical progress to the rate of labor-
augmenting technical progress, how should he allocate
technological progress within this society?"
Specifically, assume the following transformation curve exists:
llNote that, if desired, the increase in the savings rate need
only be temporary, until such time as u(T) is "sufficiently large" to
either approach u* (a<l) or to tend to infinity (a>l). Once this point
is reached, the savings rate could be decreased again, if that were
deemed desirable.
12If h>l, bO, then un (barring the perverse case). However,
if h<l, it is possible that successive increases in n (for given rates
of technical progress) may change the economy from an explosive one
(6>0, u), to a steady-state economy (6=0), to a decaying economy
(6<0, uO).
44) b t(a) ; ' s " < 0 ; R(A) = 0 and (0O) = B.
In equation 44), a represents the rate of labor-augmenting technical
progress and b the rate of capital-augmenting technical progress. 3
Before attempting to maximize the discounted stream of
consumption, let us attempt to answer a slightly easier question -
what should the planner do if he desires to maximize the asymptotic rate
of growth of per capita consumption? First, consider the case h<l.
Define:
45) h* = [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]
As we have seen, if h < h* (6<0), then u+O; if h > h*, u ; and if
h = h*, a steady-state exists, is unique and is stable (for b0). Given
h, the degree of homogeneity of the production function, there exists an
a, b(A) such that:
> < 1546) h > h* as a ; a. Also, define:
1 3Though this is not necessary, we shall suppose for simplicity
that neither a nor b can be negative. However, this assumption can
readily be relaxed. The assumption that there can be no "technical
regression" is implicitly adopted by Bertrand-Vanek; Kennedy, however,
does permit negative rates of factor-augmenting technical "progress".
14 If h>l (b-0), al, then the asymptotic rate of growth of
consumption may not exist - it will be unbounded. However, if k (=[/K])
tends to infinity, for a>l, then $k* h and T+ h. Therefore:
(k/k) -+ [(k+c)/k][k(h-l) + b]
In this case, in order to maximize the rate of growth of the rate of
growth of consumption (which is still unbounded for h>l) all technical
progress should be capital-augmenting.
1 5For h<l, aA, b=O guarantees that h<h*. However, it is
possible that if Bn, then h<h* - that is, if h[(n-B)/n], then
h<h*, u*O and no steady-state is possible. We shall ignore this
possibility; the proper behavior in this case is readily ascertainable
from examining Table I.
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47) = [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)] ; (a) 0 as a 
From Table I we can see that:
[d(C/L)]/[C/L] = [A/(1-%k)] + (a-b) for h<l, k = [(uf')/f]
dt
In equation 48), A depends only upon a (given the values of the other
parameters), whereas k depends upon , the elasticity of substitution,
as well as on the behavior of u ( and hence on [a-A]).
Therefore, we find:
49) Ok + h if a > , o
Ok c*, O<c*<h if
Ok + O if a > , a
< 1
> 1
or a < , a > 
or if a+l, u+0, a>A, or al41, un, a<a
or a < , a <1
Returning to equation 48), and letting Z = [(C/C) - n], we find:
(dZ/da) = [(h-%k) + b'(a)Ok]/(l-%k) ; b'(a) = (db/da)
From equation 50) we can determine how to allocate technical progress in
order to maximize the asymptotic rate of growth of Z. Thus, suppose
a < 1 as u-NO and as u-s :
a<l: a>a implies [kh] and thus
a<& implies [k -0] and thus
(dZ/da) [(b'k)/(l-4k)] < 
(dZ/da) -+ [h/(l-0k)] > O
From equation 51) we can see that if a<1 as uO, it does not pay to
increase a above ; similarly, if a<l as u-, it does not pay to
decrease a below . Thus, in this case we find that we do best to
choose a = , and hence to choose the steady-state solution.
If a>l, on the other hand, it always pays to move away from ;
50)
51)
48)
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in fact, if a>l as uO and as u+m, then the point a=& is a minimum,
and we must compare the two boundary solutions (a=A, b=O or a=O, b=B)
to see which gives the larger rate of growth of per capita consumption.
If a=l everywhere then, as previously discussed, a steady-state
exists (we are assuming h<l) and the rate of growth of consumption is
maximized when:
(db/da) = -[(h-$k)/ k] ; k a constant
Finally, we need to consider the case in which a-l as u-O or as
u-+. Let k+C* as u-+O, and let $k as u. The growth rate of per
capita consumption is:
52) [d(C/L)]/[C/L] = [A/(1-k)] + (a-b)
dt
For a given k (c* or c) there is a unique (a,b) which maximizes this
expression, determined by:
53) a*, b* such that b'(a*) = -[(h-c*)/c*] ; or
a , b such that b'(a) = -[(h-c)/c ]
Consider the following expression:
54) M = Max[{X/(1- k)} + (a-b)] = M($k)
{a}
Thus, M is a function of k alone. Consider how M changes as k changes:
55) (dM/d k) {[(b-a)/(l-Pk)] + [M/(1-k)] +
[(Ok(db/da) + (h-0k))(da/dk)]/(l-k)}
Since M is maximized over a, we can find from equations 53) and 55):
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56) (dM/d k) [(b-a) + M]/(l- k) = [2/(1-.k) ]
Thus, an extremum occurs at X = 0. For the second derivative we find:
57) (d2M/da2) {= [(b'-l)(da/dok) + (M/dok)]/(l-*k) +
[(b-a) + M]/(1-k)2 } = [(b'-l)(da/d k)/(l-pk)
since (dM/d4k) = 0 at an extremum.
However, from equation 53) it is clear that:
58) (da/d k ) < 0 ; (b'-l) < 0
In other words, the larger is the asymptotic value of the output-capital
elasticity, the more technical progress that should be allocated to
capital-augmenting technology. Therefore:
59) M = Max[{X/(1-4k)} + (a-b)] ; at k = k a a and
a
M is a minimum; 4k> ~k implies a < , (dM/dk) > 0 ;
0k< k implies a > , (dM/d k ) < 0
It is clear that no interior maximum exists for M (though it
is possible that aO for <k < $k < h, and a--A, b=O for ~k > k > 0);
boundary maxima occur at ~k = 0 and at gk = h.
60) M(O) = (A+n)h - n ; M(h) = [(Bh)/(l-h)] - n
M(O) > M(h) as h ; [(A+n-B)/(A+n)] ; h < 1
Figure V (page 51) exhibits the behavior of M. Note also that M(4k ) 0
as - > .
Suppose, as an example, that o+1 as u+O, and that a>l as u-e.
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FIGURE V - Graph of the Maximum Rate of Growth of Consumption as a
Function of the Output-Capital Elasticity
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Let k c* as u+-O:
61) c* > k implies a* < a (and uso). Hence, choose a = a
c* = *k implies a* = a (steady-state). Hence, choose a = a
c* < k implies a* > a (and u-+O). Hence, choose a = a*
That is, if c* is greater than 4k' the corresponding a* would be such
that u-, contradicting the assumption that uO. Therefore, the best
that we can do in this case is to choose the steady-state case, a.
However, for c*< *k we can do better by letting aa* (and uO).
We have already seen what we should do if a>l as u-+:
62) Choose: a=O, bB; [d(C/L)]/[C/L] = [(Bh)/(l-h) - n] = M(h)
dt
Therefore, if c* > k' and a+l as uO, but >l as u-, we
would do best by letting a=O, b=B since M(h) > M(ik). If c* < k'
A
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then M(O)>M(c*)>M(Ok);' if M(O)M(h), again we do better by choosing
a=O, b=B. However, if M(O)>M(h), then there exists a k such that:
63) M(Ok) = M(h) c < k <O implies M(c*) > M(h)
< c < k implies M(c*) < M(h)
Consequently, if c*>O*, again we do better by letting a=O, bB;
however, if c*<< , then we will obtain the larger growth rate by
choosing aa*, b=b* (and u+O).
We could consider the other cases in exactly the same way;
these results are summarized in Table II. It is obvious that quite a bit
of information is needed to make the proper choice (especially when o-l).
If h=l, then a steady-state is possible only for b=O. Otherwise,
(assuming b is non-negative) h > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)], and u+-. Therefore,
we need not worry about the asymptotic value of a as uO. In this case
it is rather easy to decide how to allocate technical progress. Once
again, Table II summarizes these results.
Finally, for the case of increasing returns to scale, a steady-
state is not possible under the assumption that b is non-negative unless
c - 1 - and we have discussed this case earlier. For a 1, it must be
true that u-+ (excluding the perverse case), and we can readily decide how
to allocate technical progress by looking at the growth rates in Table I.
Table II summarizes the decision rules under the criterion of
maximizing the asymptotic rate of growth of per capita consumption, 6
16Or, if the rate of growth is unbounded, we maximize the
asymptotic rate of growth of the rate of growth of consumption.
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TABLE II - Allocating Factor-Augmenting Technical Progress
1) Define
2) Define
A, such that: h = [(a+n-b6)/(6+n)] ; b'(a) = -[(h-k)/$ k ]
a*, a such that: b'(a*) = -(h-c*)/c* ; b'(a) -(h-c)/c
Limit a as
U-O U-*
I) hk< 
o>l o>l
0>1 aol
a>l 0<1
a-+l o>l
Decision Rule
I) h<_l
a=A, b=O or aO,b=B as h [(A+n-B)/(A+n)]
(If equality, then either a=A,b-O or a=O,b=B).
-k c as u + :
a) c <k - a=A, b=O
b) c > k h [(A+n-B)/(A+n)] + a=A, b=O
c) c > k h > [(A+n-B)/(A+n)] , then there exists
a , > k such that:
i) c < k < h + a=A, bO
ii) h > c > k a=-, bA
iii) c = 9k + choose either i) or ii).
a=A, b=O
~k * c* as u-O :
a) c* k a=O, b=B
b) c* < k h [(A+n-B)/(A+n)] a=O, b=B
c) c* < k ' h < [(A+n-B)/(A+n)] , then there
exists a fk such that:
i) c* > $k + a=O, b=B
ii) c* < * -~ a=a*, b=b*
iii) c* = * + choose either i) or ii)
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TABLE II - Continued
Limit a as
u+O U4.0
a -+1 a-l
~k c*
a)
b)
c)
d)
G-*-l a<l
c<l a>l
c<l ol
a<l a<l
II) h-l_
NOT
c-+l
RELE-
VANT
o<l
Decision Rule
as u+O and k c as u.
C* > km , c > k ~ a=a, b=b
*k c k -a=a*, bb*
QC < k 'c > k , then either a=a
[a*(h-c*) + b*c* + n(h-l)] > [a(h-c
(l-c*)
(If equality, either a=a* or aa ).
$k c* as u-O
a) c* < k 
b) c* > k 
a=O, b=B
k c as u-)k
a) c > k *
b) c c k +
a=a , b=b (Stei
ady-State)
I1
or a=a as:
) + c + n(h-1)]
(l-c )
a=a*, b=b*
a=- , bB
a=a , b=
a--a , b
ady-State )
II) h=l
a-O, b-B
*k ~ c as u
a) c > k aa,
b) c ' 'k - a=A,
a=A, b=O (Steady-State)
b=
b=O
(Steady-State)
(Steady-State)
(Steady-State)
. .
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TABLE II - Continued
Limit a as
U-__ Decision Rule
III) h>l III) h>l
a>l a=O, b=B
af+1 Ok c as u*
a) c >1 + a=a, b= (but k)
b) c <l1 a=a, b
<l a=A, b=O
assuming that a, b > O. As we can see from the above table, a steady-
state will be chosen if h 1 and a < 1 (as uO and as u, where
relevant). For h < 1, a steady-state solution is not desirable if
a>l either as uO or as u-*-; it may, but need not, be chosen if a*l
as u-+O or as u-0c. Clearly, for the case of increasing returns to
scale, a steady-state solution is not possible under our assumptions
If constant returns to scale prevails, and if the elasticity of
substitution tends to one as the effective capital-labor ratio tends to
infinity, then a steady-state is possible only if the (a,b) transformation
curve is not vertical at the axis (a-A, b=O) - that is, only if 1k > 0.
In general, then, under the assumptions of this model, and the
criterion for allocating technical progress that we have adopted, it is
possible that we may seek a steady-state solution. Whether or not such
a result is likely depends upon one's belief about the values of the
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relevant parameters. Let us now turn our attention to a more important
problem - that of maximizing the discounted flow of per capita
consumption.
B. Optimal Technical Change la Nordhaus [ 32]
In the previous section we have considered how technical progress
should be allocated in order to maximize the asymptotic rate of growth
of consumption, and we have discussed the circumstances that are likely
to lead the planner to choose a steady-state solution. In this section
we shall present and extend Prof. Nordhaus' model which demonstrates
how technical progress should be allocated between labor-augmenting and
capital-augmenting technological change. Since his paper considers
only the case of constant returns to scale, we must expand his model in
order to permit the production function to assume any (constant) degree
of homogeneity.
Not surprisingly, the results (of the model) are not greatly
changed by this modification. Naturally, in order to handle the case
of increasing returns to scale (and in order to permit a steady-state
solution), we must permit negative rates of capital-augmenting technical
progress. In fact, the permissible range of negative rates of capital-
augmenting technical progress must be unbounded if we are to "permit"
the existence of a steady-state solution.
As Prof. Nordhaus points out, his paper (and hence our
modification of it) shows that the steady-state is optimal only if
the system starts with the "proper" initial conditions. He has not
shown (and neither can we) that the steady-state is optimal for arbitrary
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initial conditions (assuming the elasticity of substitution is less
than one). Since this problem is not readily modified, it must be
considered a serious handicap of the analysis. Similarly, we shall see
that when the degree of homogeneity of the production function exceeds
one, a high rate of time preference is needed to guarantee convergence
of the integral and optimality of the steady-state solution. This
factor also raises questions about the usefulness of the following
analysis when increasing returns to scale are assumed.
The objective of Nordhaus' model (and of ours) is to maximize
the discounted stream of per capita consumption. Since our model is
essentially identical to his, we shall not repeat all of his equations,
but instead we shall list only those equations for which our model
differs from that of Prof. Nordhaus. The model is a simple one-sector
model with capital- and labor-augmenting technical progress. Adopting
his notation, we write:
64) Y = F(K,L) = (UL)hf(x) ; x [(AK)/(L)]
65) (X/X) = g(I/.) - g(s)
66) K = sY- K ; k (K/L) ; k = sE(h-l)f(x) - (6+n)k
These three equations represent the basic ones of the model; what
follows is the Hamiltonian, and the equations obtained from seeking to
optimize the Hamiltonian.
67) H = e-Pt[(-s)h L(h-1)f(x) + p{shL(h-1)f(x) - (6+n)k} +
P2emtg(B)X + p 3erti]
In the above equation, k, X, and are the state variables, s and B the
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control variables, and the pi's the conjugate variables. 7
From the Hamiltonian (Nordhaus' equation 12) we obtain the
.behavioral equations (his equations 13-17); as always, our formulation
reduces to his for the case of constant returns to scale (h=l).
68) Pi = (p+6+n)p1- V[(h)L(h-) )i]f'(x)
69) P2 = [p-m-g(8)]p2 - v[ L(h-l)-l]emtxf'(x)
70) P3 = (P-r-8)p3- ve- "(hl)L(hl)[hf xf']
71) v = (l-s+spl)
72) s(t) maximizes (l-s+spl) implies v = max(l,p)
73) (BH/a) = p2 emt '()+)A pert = 0; pe 0, g" < O +- (a2H/a2)<0
74) lim(e-Ptp(t)] = lim[e (m P)t2(t)] = lim[e(r)tp3(t)] 0
t-)-o t-)o to+aW
The last equation represents the transversality condition; as is well-
known, it is not a necessary condition (in the case of infinite time).
Also, of course, the initial conditions must be satisfied.
Following Nordhaus, we seek a stationary solution to the above
equations. Letting pi be constant and (x/x) = 0, we find:
75) (h-1)(+n) + g(B) = 0 determines 8, g(6) such that:
h = [ (O+n-g(8))/( B+n) 
This solution for is unique, given g', g" < 0, and corresponds to
our earlier results. Clearly, if h > 1, g(a) < 0; thus, in order to
17Actually, p2e and p3e are the original conjugate
variables; the values of m and of r are to be determined.
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allow a steady-state solution in the case of increasing returns to
scale, it is necessary to extend the transformation curve into negative
values of capital-augmenting technical change. From equations 69) and 70)
we obtain the stationary values of P2 and p3:
76) v u~ ; X *eg()t ; L = L e
0
77) P = [v(*)h(L )(h-l)(x*)lxf]/[p+g()] ; m = [ - 2g(¢)]
78) p = [v(u*L )(h-1)(hf - xf')]/[p-+g()] i r -g()
These equations are identical to those found by Nordhaus,
when h=l and B = h (the latter h, in his notation, does not
represent the degree of homogeneity of the production function),
g(R) = O. Clearly, the non-negativity of p, p requires:
79) p > [ - g(8)] . From equation 73):
80) g'() = -[(-)/a] or a = [l/(l-g'()) ; [(/K)(K/)/h
Equation 80) uniquely determines x* if a is everywhere bounded from one.
Again following Nordhaus, we can determine the values of the
other parameters. If P1 < 1, s=O, x < 0; and for p > 1, sl, and
consumption is zero (which must be a minimum if the integral converges).
Therefore, for a stationary-solution (which is optimal) we must have that
pl=l, and therefore from equation 68):
81) (*) (h-l)X* = [(p+6+n)/{(L )(h-l)f,(X*)}]
Equation 81) can be used to determine A* or *; note that one of them
is still undetermined (or both are undetermined, but mutually
constrained). For x=0O, using the above results, we find:
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82.) s* = ha(x*){[6+n+-g(B)]/[p+6+n]} ; a- [(xf')/(hf)]
Equations 75) - 82) are the basic equations of the model
(corresponding to Nordhaus' 23 - 29) that determine the stationary
state values that satisfy all the conditions imposed upon it. Note
that not everything is determined - for h=l, #* and L are free to be
determined by initial conditions. For hl, one constraint is imposed
upon three of the parameters (*, X*, ).8
Before following Nordhaus further and showing that this solution
is at least locally optimal for <l, let us ask what constraints must
be placed on p, the rate of time preference, in order to permit the
optimality of this solution.
First, consider the equation for s*; we know that it must be
true that the savings rate is less than one. Consider:
83) Z ha ={(h/[l-g'(~)]} = {[B+n-g(.)]/[(j+n)(l-g')]}
Therefore, Z depends only upon B., which depends upon h (and [dB/dh] 0).
84) (dZ/d ) = [(l-Z)/(+'n)] + [(Zg")/(l-g')]
For h 1, Z < 1; since Z is continuous in (the derivative exists
everywhere, > -n; there may, of course, be an upper bound on ),
Z > 1 implies Z = 1 for some . But, at Z = 1:
85) (dZ/dB) < 0 at Z = 1
18Earlier in this chapter we saw that for h>l, even if
h=[(a+n-b)/(a+n)] , there might be no steady-state solution. Equation 81),
and a sufficiently large value of p (so that s < 1) eliminate this
potential problem.
This implies that Z approaches one from above (since [de/dh] > 0),
contradicting the fact that Z < 1 for h ' 1. Thus:
86) ha < 1 and p > [ - g()] - s* < 1
Similarly, to guarantee the non-negativity of p and p we
also need p > [ - g()]. In the steady-state:
87) (C/C) = + nh ; therefore, [(C/C) - n] = + n(h-1)
Convergence of the integral thus requires:
88) p > [ + n(h-l)] = B + n[(-g)/(B+n)] = - [ng(O)/(+n)]
For g < 0 (h > 1), equation 86) is a stronger restriction on p; for
> 0 (and ~ > O), equation 88) is the stronger restriction. Finally,
for g > O, -n < < 0, equation 86) is again the stronger restriction
(but neither is important since p > 0 will suffice in this case).
Finally, if the transversality conditions are to be
satisfied, we need:
89) > Max[{ - 2g(8)}, -g(i)]
For h > 1 (g < 0), p > [ - 2g(8)] becomes the strongest condition
(though it does not necessarily have to be fulfilled). Thus, assuming
the transversality conditions must be satisfied, we must place the
following restrictions on p to guarantee the optimality of the
stationary state solution:
90) h > 1 + p > [ - 2g(8)] ;
h = 1 + p > where g(g) = O ;
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90) h<l (and , g > O) p > [{~ - (gn)}/(~+n)] - this is for
convergence of the integral
h<l (and g>O, 0 >>,-n) -+ p> -g
Thus, which condition is the strongest depends upon the value
of h; in general, the restrictions on p are not unreasonable for h 1.
However, for h > 1, the necessary value of p may be very large indeed,
depending upon the value of h and the shape of the transformation
curve. In general, for h > 1, the convergence of the integral (and the
feasibility of the stationary solution) becomes quite suspect indeed.
Let us now return to the question of the optimality of the
stationary solution; we shall assume that p is sufficiently large to
fulfill all the conditions discussed above. The method Nordhaus follows
is to linearize the transformation curve (between capital- and labor-
augmenting technical change) around the stationary solution and to
convert the problem into one which has only one state variable and two
control variables.
Since the process would be identical to what Nordhaus has
already done, with the exception of allowing for the fact that the
degree of homogeneity is not necessarily equal to one, we shall not
bother to redo his analysis. Suffice it to say that a < 1 is again
a necessary condition for a maximum.
Nordhaus shows that the Hamiltonian is concave in k, the state
variable, when it is maximized over the control variables - and this
suffices to guarantee the local optimality of the solution. For our
problem, the work is not quite so simple, but the result is the same.
We find:
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91) H* = Max[H] is concave if and only if [h - (A+1)] < 0
(control)
where A [-g'(')] > 0
But we have already shown:
92) ha(x*) = h/(1-g')] < 1 + [h - (l-g')] [h - (A+1)] c 0
Thus, Nordhaus' solution is equally valid for h 1 (except
that technical progress is no longer only labor-augmenting) - that
is, the stationary solution is optimal if:
a) a <'1
b) p is "sufficiently" large
c) The initial conditions coincide with the stationary
optimal solution.
Condition c) is a very strong one - it tells us nothing about
behavior away from the "optimal" solution. Similarly, condition b)
can prove quite strong (and quite myopic) for h > 1.
Before leaving this section, let us make one further
observation. We have already seen that when we considered maximizing
the asymptotic rate of growth of consumption, the stationary solution
was best for h 1, and a < 1 as x 0 and as x + a. From Table I we
can also readily see that for h > 1, the stationary solution is also
best under this criterion (assuming negative rates of capital-
augmenting technical change are permissible) if a < 1 as x + 0 and as
x . However, as noted earlier in this chapter, it is possible
that no steady-state solution occurs in this case. That is:
94) Q = F(Kegt,Let); if h = [(+n-g)/(B+n)] > 1, then it is
possible that: (x/x) = [s(f/x)-(+n+6-g)]<O for all xO, sl
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Obviously, in this case one could not move directly to the
stationary solution. However, if the planner could control the
allocation of technical progress, he could originally allocate more
technological change to capital-augmenting technical progress in order
to effectively change the initial conditions for the steady-state
problem. As an example:
95) t T; g = g*, * 0; therefore, = eg , = o = 1, t T
(x/x) = {se[(hl)n+g*]tf(x)}/x - (n+6-g*)
t > T; X (eg*T)(e [t - T ] ) ; = eh t - T ]=( g*X)[ [t-] ; eBttr] ; h = [(+n-g)/(+n)]
(x/x) = {[seg Tf(x)]/[en( h)Tx] } - [6+n+6-g] > 0
for some x.
In other words, by originally allocating more capital-augmenting
technical progress than would be allocated in the steady-state, the
planner can guarantee the existence of a steady-state solution. After
the initial adjustment period, the economy could then be placed back
into its stationary path. Of course, the determination of the optimal
T, of the rates of technical progress during the adjustment period, and
of the savings rate (if it is under the planner's control) is precisely
the ob of the Pontryagin problem. Nevertheless, this section should
serve to clarify our earlier remarks and should point out that a steady-
state solution exists (under the above assumptions) if the planner has
control over the allocation of technological progress (and if negative
rates of factor-augmenting technical change are feasible). If not, it
is possible (for increasing returns to scale) that no stationary
solution exists, even if we can find , g(A) such that h [+n-g)/(4+n)].
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IV. Factor Shares
In this chapter we have seen that if the steady-state conditions
are not fulfilled the economy will approach an asymptotic equilibrium in
which the growth rates tend to constant limits (if they are finite),
assuming that a is bounded from, or tends to, one. Since this result
corresponds to one of the characteristics of the steady-state model, it
would be interesting to determine how factor shares behave in this
asymptotic equilibrium. However, the determination of factor shares
obviously depends upon the pricing assumption that is made - and it is
this subject that we shall discuss in this section and, in more detail,
in Chapter 3.
One of the principal assumptions of the Bertrand-Vanek analysis
is that factors are paid proportionally to their marginal (value)
products, with the constant of proportionality being the reciprocal of
the degree of homogeneity of the production function. As a
consequence of this definition, the factor shares are proportional to
the output-factor elasticity for the respective factors (again, the
constant of proportionality is the reciprocal of the degree of
homogeneity). This definition for factor-pricing, plus Euler's theorem,
guarantee that factor shares will add up to one, in consonance with the
economic interpretation of these definitions.
It is well-known that when constant returns to scale prevails,
the above factor-pricing definition can be Justified by certain
reasonable assumptions on economic behavior (known as perfect
competition). However, if hil, these assumptions prove more dubious, and
we can not readily fall back on plausible economic behavior to confirm
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or lend credence to this factor-pricing definition.1 9
The reason why the factor-pricing assumptions are important
is obvious - in an asymptotic "equilibrium", in which the effective
capital-labor ratio tends to infinity (or zero), if the elasticity of
substitution of the production function is bounded from one, the
output-factor elasticity for one of the factors must tend to zero. If
we assume the "pseudo" competitive pricing. mechanism outlined above,
then one of the factor shares must tend to zero, an occurrence that
does not appear to be consistent with reality.2 0
However, as is clear, when the degree of homogeneity is not
equal to one, this assumption for factor-pricing no longer seems
particularly plausible. If we are interested in constant factor shares,
we can directly make this our assumption - by assuming that in the "real"
world labor is paid in proportion to its average, not marginal, product
(presumably this type of behavior could arise due to market imperfections,
such as collective-bargaining). If labor receives a constant fraction
of its average product, then constant (and non-zero) factor shares
follow by definition. Alternatively, it is possible to show that if
monopolistic practices exist, even if *k0 , capitalist's share will
approach some positive constant limit, due to monopolistic profits. For
1 9 See footnote 2, page 19, for one possible explanation of
this factor pricing-assumption.
It may not seem reasonable that the output-factor elasticity
(for some factor) tends to zero - however, the question is really what
is the empirical manifestation of this result. For example, *k+0 does
not necessarily imply that the MPK tends to zero (if s n=O, a<l, $k0,
but the MPK tends to some positive limit as u*+). If the output-factor
elasticities are not directly tied to factor shares, then we have no
direct observation of their values.
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more discussion on this subject, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Certainly there is no theoretical reason (at least, none
proven above) to adopt this postulate of average product pricing -
but neither does there appear to be a reason for postulating
"pseudo-competitive" factor pricing, as Bertrand-Vanek do. However, if
h 1, it is perhaps more plausible to assume that one factor (probably
labor) is paid its full marginal value product, while the other factor
(capital) is paid as a residual.2 1 If this were so, then it is possible
that both factors would have non-zero and asymptotically constant shares,
even if the effective capital-labor ratio tends to zero or infinity. As
an example, suppose that labor is paid its full marginal value product,
and that h ' 1. We find in that case:
96) 1 h > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] ; a > 1 Share Labor + 0
Share Capital + 1
a < 1 Share Labor + h
Share Capital + (l-h) 0
h < [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] 1 ; a > 1 Share Labor + h
Share Capital + (l-h) 0
a < 1 Share Labor + 0
Share Capital + 1
Although this definition does not guarantee non-zero factor shares, it
does admit of that possibility. And it is, we believe, a more plausible
assumption than the Bertrand-Vanek factor-pricing assumption.
21If increasing returns to scale prevails, this definition might
lead to a situation in which one factor received more than the total
output. Hence, the assumption h 1. For h > 1, it seems likely that
oligopolistic situations would arise - for more on this problem, see
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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The adoption of either the average-product pricing assumption
or the marginal-product pricing assumption in only one market would not
alter the basic results of the Bertrand-Vanek growth model. Under the
assumption of average-product pricing the factor shares are constant and
hence so is the aggregate savings rate (assuming k, sn are constants) -
thus, this case is equivalent to the Bertrand-Vanek case in which Sk=S 
Under the assumption of marginal-product pricing in only one factor
market (the labor market), the aggregate savings propensity is always
positive (assuming sk-sn 0, Sk>0, h<l) and depends upon only the
output-capital elasticity.
97) W = (aQ/aL) ; s = [n(h-~k) + Sk({k + (l-h))] > 0 ; sk sn
E - [(ds/dk)(k/S)] = [(SkSn)k /+[( S k-Sn)k + Sk(1-h) + nh]}
Therefore, 0 E h < 1
Since s, the aggregate savings rate, is always positive, and
since E, the elasticity of s with respect to k' is never greater than
one, the Bertrand-Vanek model is essentially unaltered by this
alternative pricing assumption. Furthermore, since s > (sk>sn, Sk >0)
always, this assumption is asymptotically equivalent to the Bertrand-
Vanek model with s > 0.
n
In summary, since there is (in general) no steady-state,
asymptotically the output-factor elasticity of one of the factors will
tend to zero if the elasticity of substitution is bounded from one. We
2 2In Chapter 3 we shall show that the basic Bertrand-Vanek
model is virtually unchanged by various factor-pricing assumptions.
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have seen that the Bertrand-Vanek pricing assumption implies that one of
the factor shares tends to zero, a result in conflict with reality.
However, we have also seen that if constant returns to scale does not
occur there is not a strong theoretical Justification for adopting the
Bertrand-Vanek pricing assumption. Consequently, we have considered two
alternative assumptions that might yield non-zero factor shares for each
factor. In general, it is possible to assume some combination of these
two assumptions:
98) W = al(Q/L) + a2(aQ/aL) ; a , a2 > o
[WL/Q =al+ + a2 (h- k) O (al+ a 2h) < 1
In this way we could guarantee that factor shares would be non-zero.
To determine what factor-pricing assumption is most plausible,
it is necessary to study the microeconomic behavior of the economy - it
certainly does not suffice to study the aggregate production function.
However, this constitutes a different direction than that which we
choose to follow - our major purpose in the preceeding discussion was
simply to illustrate that it is not a necessary (or even logical)
consequence of the Bertrand-Vanek model that one of the factor shares
must tend to zero.
V. Variable Degree of Homogeneity of the Production Function
In this chapter we have seen that the presence of capital-
augmenting technical progress makes a steady-state solution impossible
unless the degree of homogeneity of the production function (assumed to
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be constant) is equal to a very particular value. Since there is no
reason to believe that this singular case should occur, it would seem
that the a priori probability of a steady-state solution, assuming that
the rates of technical progress are exogenous, is virtually zero.
However, we shall show in this section that if the "degree of
homogeneity" of the production function is a decreasing function of
the effective capital-labor ratio, then the economy will tend to a
constant effective capital-labor ratio (barring perverse cases), and
that this long-run equilibrium will possess most of the characteristics
of a normal steady-state equilibrium. Let us now investigate why this
is so.
In a recent article KoJi Okuguchi [17] has shown, for a slightly
more general production function, that a steady-state will exist only
for very special values of the parameters. That is, Okuguchi assumes:
99) Q = F(Kelt , t) (eYtL) /b]f(x) ; x = [(KePt)/(Let)l/b] ;
(L/L) = n
For b=l, ah (h, the degree of homogeneity in the standard case), this
becomes the production function considered in this chapter. Okuguchi
shows that, for this production function, a steady-state can exist
only if:
100) [(l-a)/b] = [p/(n+y)]
2 3We have seen that if the production function is Cobb-Douglas
a steady-state may exist. Also, we have seen that if the savings rate
declines at ust the proper rate ( if 6>0), then a steady-state will
occur. Neither of these possibilities seems particularly likely to us.
71
which is analogous to the Bertrand-Vanek condition when bl, a=h.
Though this production function is (possibly) different from
the one assumed by Bertrand-Vanek, we see that again a steady-state
will not normally occur. The question then seems to be - is there some
ignored mechanism that promotes the steady-state, or should we abandon
the notion of a steady-state?
We have already discussed one possible mechanism - the notion
that a trade-off exists between the types of technical progress. If
technical progress is then allocated optimally a steady-state will be
chosen under certain (fairly plausible) conditions. Nevertheless, it
is not very apparent why technical progress would be so allocated in
a "free enterprise" economy - there is no microeconomic explanation
of this behavior, especially when we dispense with the assumption of
constant returns to scale.
Another possibility for promoting the steady-state is that the
production function need not be homogeneous, but rather that the degree
of homogeneity depends upon the effective capital-labor ratio. Thus:
101) = F(Kebt,Lea t ) = (Leat)h(x)f(x) ; x = [(Kebt)/(Le )]
This production function, while not a general one, includes
the homogeneous production function as a special case. Specifically,
suppose h decreases as x increases (as will soon be apparent, this is
not an innocent assumption, but rather it is a critical one). In this
2This assumption presents the possibility (likelihood) that
the marginal product of one of the factors might be negative, when that
factor is varied alone.
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case, assuming h(O) > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] and h(-) < [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] ,
there exists a unique x* such that:
102) h(x) [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] as x - x*
For simplicity, assume workers and capitalists save at the
same (constant) rate:
103) k (x/x) ={[se tf(x)]/xl - [(a+n-b)+c] ; X - [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)]
Depending upon the values of the parameters, it may be that:
104) k(x*) - 0 as {[sf(x*)/x*] - (a+n-b+c)} 0
Thus, even under this assumption, it is unlikely that x* is an
equilibrium in the sense that if we started at x(0) = x*, we would
probably not remain there for all time. However, suppose we follow
our earlier procedure and consider how (x/x) changes over time:
105) k = (k+a+n-b+c){[(a+n)h-(a+n-b)] + k[(Ok-l) + (a+n)hnt]}
where25 k = (xf'/f) , n [dh/dx][x/h] < 0; h > k > 0
Let us now investigate what happens to x (the effective
capital-labor ratio) asymptotically. In order to do this, we shall
divide the analysis into two parts:
i) x(0) < x* -+ h > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]
2 5Note that k is not the output-capital elasticity of the
entire production function since it does not include the changes in h
due to changes in x. k corresponds to the output-capital elasticity,
assuming h is constant. Thus k>0 does not imply that the MPK>0.
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ii) x(O) > x* + h.< [(a+n-b)/(a+n)]
where x(O) is the initial value of x. Consider the first case:
i) x(O) < x*
Again, there are several cases that need to be considered.
First, let us assume that k(O) > 0 (k(0) is the initial rate of growth
of x - naturally, it depends upon x(O), as well as on all the
parameters); if this is so, then x will initially increase. However,
from 105) we can see that once k > 0 (x < x*), it must remain positive
since, at k = 0:
105) k = (k+a+n-b+c)[(a+n)h-(a+n-b)] > 0 at k=O for x < x*.
Thus, if initially k > 0, it must remain positive (for x<x*), and hence
x -* x*.
Next, suppose k(O) < 0 - it is necessary to further subdivide
this case into two parts:
a) k < 1
b) > 1. 27
Suppose k < 1 - then, from 105) for k < 0, it is clear that k > 0
for x < x* (n < 0). Consequently, k increases (though x will initially
decrease); assuming Ok remains less than or equal to one (a > 1), k
remains positive, and hence k must eventually reach zero. But, as we
26For s > 0, x finite, from 103) we can see that (k+a+n-b+c) > 0.
2 7 Since k < h, it follows that for x near x*, h<l (assuming b>O).
Therefore, k>l is possible only for x "sufficiently small" (and less
than x*), and it implies that a < 1. We note that this case (a<l, h>l)
corresponds to one of the perverse cases discussed earlier in this
chapter.
have already seen, k > 0 at k=0 (x<x*); therefore, k becomes positive,
x increases, and we can return to the analysis of our previous
paragraph.
Finally, suppose *k > 1 initially (x small, a<l). From 105),
for k < 0:
105) k = (k+a+n-b+c){[(a+n)h-(a+n-b)] + k(a+n)hnt + k(Ok-l)}
Thus, it is possible that k < 0 for k > 1. If this occurs, k
decreases (towards its lower bound, -c), as does x (towards zero).
However, if n, the elasticity of the degree of homogeneity with respect
to x, is bounded below zero (n < e < 0), then eventually k must become
positive.28 Once this occurs, k increases, and it tends towards zero;
but, as before, k > 0 at k=O (x<x*), so k must become positive,
remain positive, and consequently x tends towards x*. Once again,
therefore, we can return to our prior analysis.
On the other hand, if TirO as xO, it is possible that k < 0
for all time, and consequently k + (-c) and x-O. Obviously, this
case corresponds to the perverse one discussed earlier in this chapter
since, if n0O, then for h>l, a<l, it is possible that xO (instead
28 k > 0 if [(a+n)h-(a+n-b) + k(a+n)hnt + k(%k-l)] > 0. For
x < x*, [(a+n)h-(a+n-b)] > 0, and therefore > 0 if:
[(a+n)hnt + (k-1)] < [(a+n)hnt + (h-l)] < 0 (for k<O).
But this last expression will be negative if:
t > [(l-h)/{(a+n)hn}] = [(h-l)/{(a+n)hlnI}] -+ k > 0
If Inl > 0 , it follows that such a t must exist, and eventually
i must become positive.
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of x-), as discussed earlier.
Therefore, barring this perverse case, we can see that if
x(O) < x*, eventually k [=(x/x)] > 0, and x must eventually increase.
Furthermore, for x < x*, k > 0 at k=O, and thus x must tend to x*.
Similarly, it can be shown that if x(O) > x*, then eventually x must
decrease and approach x*. 29
What happens as x + x*? Again, there are several possibilities,
depending upon whether k(x*) - 0. We have seen that (barring the
perverse case), for x(O) < x* , eventually k(x) > 0, and x -+ x*. If
k(x*) > O, it follows that x not only reaches x*, but eventually it
will exceed x. By continuity, for t sufficiently large, if k(x*) > 0,
there exists an x such that:
k(x) - 0 as x - x
< >
Furthermore, as to, it is clear that x -* x* (n 0). Therefore, x
must tend to x, which in turn tends to x*, and thus x tends to x*
asymptotically (barring the perverse case).
Similarly, if k(x*) < 0, for t large enough (so that nt
'dominates" [ -1]), there exists an < x* such that k(x) - 0 ask <
x - x , and again (after sufficient time has elapsed) x - x + x* ,
so that x converges to x* (again, barring the perverse case). Finally,
29If b 0, then h < 1 for x > x* , so from 105), x > x*
implies k<O for k>O (since k < h < 1) and no perverse case is
possible. However, if b < 0 and h[x()] > 1 and In -+ O, then a
perverse case may arise for a>l (%k>l), so that x-+. Again, this case
is equivalent to one of the perverse cases (6<0, h>l, a>l) discussed
earlier in this chapter.
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if by chance k(x*) = 0, then x coincides with x for all time. In this
case, if x(o) = x*, x remains at x* (barring any unforeseen shocks to
the system), and if x(O) < x* [x(0) > x*], then x -+ x* and never
x > X* [x < x*].
In summary, if h decreases monotonically as x increases, then
eventually x must approach the finite, non-zero effective capital-labor
ratio (x*) such that: h(x*) = [(a+n-b)/(a+n)] , assuming that
n [ = (dh/dx)(x/h) ] is bounded below zero. If x(O) < x*, then x x*
always, if k(x*) < 0, whereas if k(x*) > 0 then, for large t, x > x*.
Similarly, if x(O) > x*, then x x* always if k(x*) 0; whereas if
k(x*) < 0, eventually x < x*. Needless to say, the path of x need not
be monotonic.
Therefore, we have shown that if the "tdegree of homogeneity" of
the production function depends upon the effective capital-labor ratio
in the manner defined above, then the economy will approach a finite,
non-zero effective capital-labor ratio. Furthermore, all the growth
rates will approach constant, finite rates as x - x ( + x*). For
example:
106) Q = e(an)ht f(x) implies:
(Q/Q) = (a+n)h[l + n(x/x)t] + k(x/X)
From 105), as x - 0 (as it must, since x x*, x* constant), we find:
107) k = (x/x) - {[(a+n)h-(a+n-b)]/[(1- k) - ahnt]} 0 as x x*
Therefore:
108) kt = (x/x)t * {[(a+n)h-(a+n-b)]/[((l-$k)/t)-ahn]}* 0 as x x*
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Hence, [k(x/x)] and [t(x/x)] tend to zero as t tends to infinity and
x tends to x*, and consequently we find asymptotically:
109) (o/Q) (a+n)h ; [(C/C) - n] - [(a+n)h-n] = (a-b)
Therefore, in this asymptotic steady-state, consumption per capita will
be increasing, remaining constant, or decreasing as the rate of labor-
augmenting technical progress exceedsequals, or is less than the rate
of capital-augmenting technical progress. Similarly, we could readily
exhibit the growth rates of the other variables. Also, since kO and
h+h* (the "degree of homogeneity" will be asymptotically constant), the
marginal product of each factor will be positive, and consequently this
model will (asymptotically) exhibit almost all of the "normal" steady-
state properties (the output-factor elasticities are constant, as is
30the marginal product of capital, and so forth).
Clearly, if n > 0, then either this equilibrium is unstable
(if k(x*) = 0), or else no equilibrium exists, and the effective
capital-labor ratio will tend to either zero or infinity. Needless
to say, we have not demonstrated why h should behave in the "desired"
manner. However, it does not seem unreasonable to us to assume that h
is not constant everywhere, especially if some factor of production
(other than capital or labor) is fixed or else varies exogenously; ust
how the degree of homogeneity varies with the effective capital-labor
3 0Note, however, that the effective capital-labor ratio to
which the system tends, and hence the long-run value of the marginal
product of capital, is independent of the savings rate, unlike the
normal steady-state result. In this model, the savings rate only
effects how quickly the economy tends to its steady-state
equilibrium (barring the perverse cases).
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ratio is another question.
VI. Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the Bertrand-Vanek model, in
which factor-augmenting technical progress can occur for each factor,
and in which the degree of homogeneity of the production function is a
constant, though not necessarily equal to one. The basic conclusion
from this model is that a steady-state is very unlikely to occur, and
thus we must be content with considering the asymptotic growth path.
In this "asymptotic equilibrium" the elasticity of output with respect
to one of the factors must tend to zero if the elasticity of
substitution of the production function is bounded from one, and hence
so must the share of that factor tend to zero, if we adopt the Bertrand-
Vanek factor-pricing assumption. However, for the case of non-constant
returns to scale there appears to be no logical reason to choose
between the various possible pricing definitions (at least at the
macroeconomic level), and thus we could define (assume) a pricing
scheme in which both factor shares would remain non-zero.
Also, if we postulate a Kennedy-Von Weizsicker model in which
there exists a trade-off between capital- and labor-augmenting
technical progress, we find that for a<l a steady-state is a (or may
be a) desirable property that the economy should seek to obtain.
However, this approach presupposes the existence of a "central planner"
(or some invisible hand); in order to discuss this problem for a free
enterprise economy, it would be necessary to better define the
microeconomic properties of that system. When we do not have constant
returns to scale in the production function this task can become quite
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complicated (and indeterminate).
Finally, we have exhibited a special model in which a steady-
state will probably be achieved. If the "degree of homogeneity" of the
production function is a monotonically declining function of the
effective capital-labor ratio, then (excluding two perverse cases) the
system will tend to a finite, non-zero effective capital-labor ratio,
and the growth rates for the variable will be (asymptotically)
constant and finite. The ultimate equilibrium effective capital-labor
ratio is independent of the savings propensity, but it does depend
upon the parameters of the problem, including the rates of capital-
and labor-augmenting technical progress, the rate of growth of
population, and the relationship between the "degree of homogeneity"
of the production function and the effective capital-labor ratio.
We now leave our study of the one-sector model with
persistent doubts as to the likelihood of the occurrence of a steady-
state equilibrium. Let us now turn our attention to two-sector
models of economic growth.
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Chapter 2. Two-Sector Models of Unbalanced Growth
I. Introduction
In the past chapter we have followed Prof. Vanek's approach
and have investigated the asymptotic behavior of variables when Hicks
neutral (or any capital-augmenting) technical progress is present in a
one-sector model. In this chapter we plan to extend the analysis by
considering two related problems:
1) Hicks neutral technical progress in the investment sector
2) Harrod neutral technical progress in only one sector
It is well-known that if there is Hicks technical progress in
the consumption good sector then a steady-state does indeed exist (if
Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at the same rate in each
sector); the problem of Hicks neutral technical progress in the
investment sector is like (though more difficult than) the problem
studied in the first chapter. On the other hand, the problem of Harrod
neutral technical progress in only one sector (or at different rates in
the two sectors) is a different problem since it necessitates factor
reallocation between the two sectors, even if the aggregate capital-
labor ratio (or effective capital-labor ratio) were held fixed. At the
end of this chapter we shall show how, by using the analysis from Parts I
and II, any type of factor-augmenting technical progress can be treated.
Before turning to the analysis, let us make a few remarks. Just
as in the one-sector model, where the existence of a steady-state hinged
upon a very particular degree of homogeneity of the production function,
given the other parameters, the corresponding constraints for the two-
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sector model seem ust as unreasonable. That is, assuming both
production functions are homogeneous of degree one, then, for a steady-
state to exist it must be true that Hicks technical progress, if it
occurs at all, is restricted to the consumption goods sector; and that
Harrod neutral technical progress, if present at all, must occur at the
same rate in each sector. To us these assumptions seem quite strong
and unwarranted (until some mechanism can be shown to exist that
causes this pattern of technical progress). Therefore, we consider
it quite important to examine what happens to the economy if the
steady-state conditions are not fulfilled, and to consider how this
economy would differ from the textbook steady-state economy.
As we shall see, the non-steady-state economy will tend to a
state in which the growth rates of the variables (if finite) approach
constant limits, assuming that the elasticities of substitution are
bounded from, or tend to, one. However, this asymptotic equilibrium
deviates from the traditional steady-state results in several respects,
not the least of which concern factor shares in each sector (and for
the economy as a whole), and the asymptotic value of the marginal
product of capital. These differences of the asymptotic equilibrium
from the steady-state results, and the implausibility of the steady-
state path itself, seem to pose a difficult dilemma for modern
growth theory. We shall have more to say on this topic in Chapter 3.
Let us now turn to our analysis of the two-sector model. In
this first section we shall investigate the problem of Hicks neutral
technical progress in only the investment sector, a problem that is
quite similar to the one-sector model studied in Chapter 1.
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II. Hicks Technical Progress in the Investment Sector
In this section we shall attempt to determine what happens to
the economy if Hicks neutral technical progress occurs only in the
investment sector. To investigate this problem we shall use a
traditional two-sector model (such as Uzawa, [58], [59]), and we
shall employ the approach Vanek used in studying the one-sector
model [4]. As we shall see, our results in this case do not differ
greatly from those found in the one-sector model.
Specifically, we assume that there are two sectors - the
consumption good sector (C), and the investment good sector (M). The
production functions are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in
capital and labor, and Hicks technical progress is assumed to occur at
rate A in sector M (whether or not it occurs in the consumption good
sector is immaterial). Thus, using traditional notation:
1) C- F(KcLc ) Lcfc(kc ) Lyfc(kc)
2) M eAtF (KL) = eAt (k) a L(ly)eAtf(k)
m m m m mm
3) y (Lc/L) , (l-y) (Lm/L) ; ki = (Ki/Li) ; y = [(k-k )/(kc-km)]
Since the rewards to factors must be equated in each sector (under
competition), it is found that the capital-labor ratio in each sector
depends only upon the wage-rental ratio ():
4) ,= [( -k cf)/f] = [(f -k f)/f] > 0, f O
The Inada conditions are assumed to hold .(when possible; for a C.E.S.
function, aol, not all four conditions can be satisfied). Also, so that
we need not worry about uniqueness of equilibrium, the capital-intensity
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condition is assumed:
5) k > k for all w.
c m
As is well-known, it would suffice to postulate that the elasticity of
substitution in the consumption good sector (c) is greater than one
[17]; however, there are times when we wish to explore the case in
which c < 1 - hence we assume that the factor-intensity condition holds
(as becomes large, this implies that ac > a ).
Furthermore, we assume that the consumption good is the
numeraire, so that P, the price level, is the price of the investment
good in terms of the consumption good. Since the return on capital
must be the same in each sector, we find:
At6) p [( e-tf )/ f ] ; P P ; P = 1
c m m c
When it is not ambiLguous we shall omit the independent variable - thus,
[fc(kc)] - f 
c c
Finally, to complete the model we need a savings assumption.
It is possible to follow Vanek and assume that capitalists and workers
have different savings behavior; or, alternatively, we could assume
that they both save at the same rate. As we have seen in the one-
sector model, there is no asymptotic difference in these cases as long
as workers do some savings. Therefore, we shall investigate two cases:
a) Sk= 3n=s
b) sk > s =
n
We omit the case k>s n>0; the reason that this case is unimportant is
that, clearly: s, s s (where s is the average savings rate for
n
84
the economy), and as the capital-labor ratio tends to infinity, s will
approach some positive limit (given that the elasticity of substitution
is bounded from, or tends to, one). Consequently, this case is
asymptotically equivalent to case a). On the other hand, if case b)
pertains, then s may approach zero, and since the essential problem in
this model is that physical investment (for a constant s) tends to
increase forever, allowing s to approach zero may afford some new
behavior.
We could, if we wished to complicate the model, assume that
the owners of capital in the consumption goods sector have a different
savings propensity than the owners of capital in the investment sector
(for example, Stiglitz [52]). However, since in our model capital is
completely malleable, we really see no Justification for this
complicating assumption.
The savings rate allows us to complete our model, and
determines our basic equations - the market equilibrium equation and
the capital-accumulation equation. Under the two savings assumptions
(for the rest of this part of the paper, a subscript a denotes that
sk=s =s , whereas a subscript b denotes that sk>sn=0; naturally,
we assume that savings equals investment) we have the following
relationships (for simplicity, we assume that there is no depreciation):
7a) S = s(C + PM) = PM= PK
7b) S = (C + PM) = PM PK ; s = sk(share capital) = sk[k/(w+k)]
Using this equation, we find our market equilibrium equation, which
must hold at all times:
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8a) sy(w+kc) - (l-s)(l-y)(w+km ) 0
8b) skky(w+kc) - (+k-skk)(l-y)(w+k) = 0
These equations define w as a function of k (if they are monotonic -
kc k suffices); note that time does not appear explicitly inC m
either equation.
Assuming that investment equals savings, and that there is no
depreciation, we find the following equations:
9a) (K/K) = {[(l-y)eAtf ]/k}
9b) (K/K) = {[(l-y)eAtf ]/k}
These are the capital-accumulation curves; since s does not appear
explicitly, they appear to be the same. However, since s affects the
relationship between w and k, they are not, in fact, the same curves.
Following Vanek's analysis, we define:
X = (K/K) ; [(k/k) = X - n] ; we seek X such that (X/X) = 0.
In general, X will depend upon k. X is what Vanek refers to as a
'quasi-asymptote" for the rate of growth of capital.
10) (x/X) = {[d(l-y)][l/(l-y)] + A + a (k/) - (X-n)
dt
where a is the competitive share of capital in the investment sector.
m
From equation 8a) or 81), we can determine w as a function of k,
and hence we can calculate the total derivatives needed in 10):
11) (km/km) - [(dkm/dw)(w/k)][(dw/dk)(k/w)](k/k) = (a /a)(X-n)
m m] , is the aggregate elasticity of
a 2 [(dk/dw)(w/k)) , is the aggregate elasticity of
86
substitution for the economy as a whole.
Similarly, using the definition of (-y), we find its total
derivative:
11') {[d(l-y)]/(l-y)} = [{[yackc + (l-y)amkm](1/a) - k}(X-n)]/(kc-k)
dt
From equations 10) through 11') we determine (X/X) :
12) (X/X) = (TX - Tn + A) where:
13) T = [ackc + oa(1-y){k(1-a ) + km} - kca]/[a(kc-k)]
Defining X to be the locus such that (X/X) = O, we find:
14) X = n - (A/T) ; T 0 O
(If A=O, X=n, the normal steady-state case). Substituting back into
equation 12):
15) (X/X) = -T(X-X)
If T < 0, then whenever X > X, (X/X) > 0, and X increases; if X < X,
(x/X) < 0, and X will decrease. Thus, whenever T < 0, the X locus is an
asymptote in the sense that, whenever X > X , X decreases, and whenever
X < X , X increases. If T > 0 (as we shall see, this is not possible for
k k or a > 1), this relationship is reversed, and X moves away
C m c
from the X locus. Thus, the sign of T is critical. In order to find T,
we must first calculate a; since the values of T and a depend upon the
savings assumption, we shall get different results for our two cases.
[(1-s)sw(kc-km)2 + cc k(+k )2(1-s) + ask (+k ) 
16a) a = 
[s(k -km) + (+k )][kc(w+k ) - sw(k -km)]
c in m c m c m
87
[as (k-k) + ac(w+k )(w+k m-skk) + mk sk(w+kc)
16b) ab (+k )[(w+k m) + k(k km)
Clearly, a a > everywhere; this need not be true for ab (b < 0
implies that the market equilibrium curve "bends back" in the (k,w)
plane - that is, to each k, there may be more than one w satisfying the
market equilibrium conditions. In this case we can not express as a
unique function of k). However, clearly ab > 0 if (see Drandakis [17]
or Burmeister [7]):
i) k k or ii) a + a 1
ic m c 
(Since, as we shall see, for Ta < 0 it suffices that kc k or ac > 1,
we adopt the factor-intensity hypothesis so that we are free to study
different values of the elasticities). Note that if a = a = 1, then
c m
a = 1 in both cases; otherwise, the value of a will depend upon w.
With this information, we can now determine the value of T;
observe that T will appear as a function of , but since, from the
market equilibrium equation, depends upon k, T depends upon k.
{- (l+m(--s)k (w+k )(k -k )+(l-s)k c (+k )2o +
17a) T =c m m c m c
a sk (w+kc) ]1/{(+kc)(w+k )[k (+k) - sw(k-k )a 
mm c c m c m cm a
17b) T = [(-w)/{(w+k )ab}]
Since the sign of Ta is related to the condition that a unique
equilibrium exists (AO), Ta < 0 whenever:
i) kc - k or ii) c > 1
c m c
Clearly, Tb < 0 whenever ab > 0; and we have already seen under what
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conditions cb is positive (note that Tb may be negative while Ta
is positive).
Assuming the factor-intensity condition holds, we have:
Ta , Tb < 0 always, and hence X = [n - (A/T)] n (A > 0).
A. Special Cases
Before considering the general case, we shall consider three
special cases:
i) k =k ( c = a c i 1)
c m c m c
ii) k = k and a = a = 1
c m c m
iii) k # k , but a = a = 1
c c m
Case i) is comparable to the normal one-sector model except that
technological change occurs only for the investment good, so that
the price of this good will decline over time. On the other hand,
cases ii) and iii), in which both production functions are Cobb-Douglas,
are very special cases since steady-states will occur in each of these
two cases (for any type of factor-augmenting technical change). Let us
now briefly consider these special cases.
i) k = k (implies a = am)
c m c m
From 17a), by substituting in for aa, we find that whenever
k = k (and a = a ):
c m c m
18a) T = [(-w)/(w+k)] ; similarly,
a
18b) Tb = [(-,.)/{oc (+k)}]b ~C
since k = k = k and a = ac = a . For T we find:C m C m a
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19a) (dTa/dw) 0 as a- 1
The result for Tb is not readily ascertainable since, in general, it will
depend upon the third derivative of the production function. If we
assume that aoc(and am) is a constant, then the condition for Tb is
identical to 19a):
19b) (dTb/dw) - 0 as a - 1 for ac, a constant
However, we are more interested in the asymptotic behavior of
Ta, Tb (given that they are negative elsewhere). Clearly, under
competitive pricing:
20a) Ta = -(l-a) ; 20b) Tb = -[(l-a)/ac] , where (l-a)
is the aggregate share of labor in the economy. Since both Ta and Tb
are negative, but finite, everywhere it follows that X > n everywhere
(and hence k tends to infinity). Therefore:
21a) a > 1 -+ [X+ ]; a < 1 IX ' (n+A)]; a - 1 + i{n + A/(1-a)}]
21b) a > 1 -+ [X a]; a 1 [-* (n+Ao)]; a- 1 - [X {n + A/(1-a))]
(a is the asymptotically constant share of capital as a - 1).
Thus, for a > 1, X will grow without bound, whereas for a 1,
X has a finite limit to which it tends. For a 1, the asymptotic
growth rate is larger under the first savings assumption, while for
a + 1, the two growth rates are the same.
Note that this result corresponds to our one-sector result
that, for h = 1, X grows without bound whenever a > 1, whereas for
a ' 1, it approaches a finite limit.
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ii) k = k ; a a = 1
c m c m
The case a = 1 is a rather special case since
X = [n + A/(l-a)] is constant for all k, and consequently a steady-
state equilibrium exists, rather than Just an "asymptotic
equilibrium". Thus:
22) M = eAtKaL(- a) = KL e{At/(l-a)]( (l- a)
min m m
Note that the growth rate corresponds to the rate of growth of
population plus the rate of Harrod neutral technical progress in M.
Technical progress 'takes place only in M; however, for sector C we
can write (kc=km):
23) C = KaL(1 - ) e-AtKa[L e{At/(l-a)}](l- a)
c c C C
Therefore, we can envision the situation as one in which Harrod neutral
technical progress -takes place at the same rate in each sector, as well
as Hicks neutral technical progress at a negative rate in sector C
(and hence a steady-state exists).
Therefore, in this special case a steady-state exists, and in
that steady-state:
24) k = [K/(Le {A/(l-a)}t)] is constant
25) (K/K) = n + [A/(1-a)] ; (C/C) = n + [(aA)/(l-a)]
iii) kc 0 km cc am
26) C = KdL(l-d) M = eAtKfL( l- f ) d fcc mm
Once again, we can envision the technical progress in M as being Harrod
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neutral, and in C as being a mix of Harrod neutral technical progress
at the same rate as in M, plus a negative rate of Hicks neutral
technical progress in C:
27) M = Kf[L e[(At)/(l-f)]](1-f)mm
28) C = [e A(1d)/(l-f)]t]Kd[L e[(At)/(l-f)]](l-d)
A steady-state exists in which k = [K/(Le /( )] approaches a
constant value, so that:
29) (K/K) n + [A/(l-f)] ; (k/k) = (w/w) = [A/(1-f)]
30) (C/C) = n + (dA)/(l-f)]
Therefore, if a = m = 1, there is a steady-state equilibrium; and if
c m
k = k m am = a < , then there is a finite asymptotic rate of growthc m m c
for the economy, whereas if a > 1, the rate of growth is unbounded.
So far, we are not far from our one-sector world. Let us now turn to
our more general case.
B. General Case - k > k
c m
Even in our more general approach we shall maintain the factor-
intensity hypothesis to guarantee the non-positiveness of Ta and Tb.
Because of the complexity of the expressions for Ta and Tb it is not
possible to exhibit their path (and hence the path of X) for all k
(without assumptions on third derivatives of the production function).
However, since Ta, Tb -0 everywhere, we have:
31) x i n - (ATi) > n (Ti 0 0); i = a, b; and since:
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32) (X/X) = -T(X-X) , (k/k) = (X-n),
k tends to infinity. Therefore, we can be content with considering
the asymptotic values of Ta and Tb.
In order to calculate the asymptotic values of Ta and Tb we
first must calculate the asymptotic values of a and a b. Though we
are principally interested in the case k > k , w,, we also
C m
calculated the limits for k < k and as w + 0.
c m
From Table I (on the following page) we can see that
asymptotically ab > 0 in all cases, even if k < k or [ca +a ] < 1.
c m c m
Since:
lb) Tb -w/(w+k )[/a
we know that asymptotically Tb must be non-positive in all cases.
Also, from the Table we can see that as w-, then a ab in all
cases; whereas, as + O, b > a in all cases.
Given ab, it is quite clear that the asymptotic behavior of
Tb depends only upon a . If a > 1, then as kn, T 0; if a < 1,
Tb [-l/b]. Finally, if a + 1, then Tb - -[(1 -a)/a b ] , wherem b m b
(l-a*m) is the asymptotically constant share of labor in sector M.
Correspondingly, given Table I, we can calculate the value of
Tb as w + 0 and as w-. These results appear in Table II. (It
should be noted that as w+-, for kc .-k, it must be true that
ac a ; whereas, as -+ 0, for k · k , a < a . Hence, from
c m c m C m
Table I we can see that ob 1 as am 1, given k km)
Since, given k k and that k tends to infinity, it follows
that Xb tends to:
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TABLE I - Asymptotic Value of Aggregate Elasticity of Substitution
Value as war-
Ca ab
a
c
aC
Value as w+O
aa ab
a ac
> a
c m
a) > a > 1
b) a > a = 1
c m
c) a > 1,a < :t
c m
d) ac= 1, m < :
e) a < a <1
m c
a < a
c m
a) > a >1
m c
b) a > a = 1
m c
c) a > 1, a < 1
m c
d) o = 1, a < 1
e) a < a <1
C m
k >k
c m
a a
m m
1 1
1 1
1 1
a a
c c
k <k
C m
a a
c c
1 1
1 a
c
1 a
C
a a
m c
k <k
c m
a a
m c
1 a
c
1 a
1 1
a a
c C
k >k
c m
a a
c c
1 1
1 1
1 1
a a
m m
TABLE II - Asymptotic Values of Tb
Value as w - -
0
-[ i/a b]
-(l/°~b]
Value as w -* 0
-[l/ob]
0O
c m
1) a = 
c m
2)
3)
a > 1
m
a 1
m
a < 1
m
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33) am >1 Xb + 
a 1n + {A/(l-a)}]
a <1 a + [n + A{min(a ,l)}]
Thus, for a < 1, (k/k) asymptotically approaches a finite
rate of growth, whereas for a > 1, (k/k) will grow without bound. a
m c
is not very important in determining the asymptotic rate of growth
except that, for am < 1 and ac < 1, the larger a c, the quicker is the
asymptotic rate of growth. As in the traditional result, the savings
rate has no influence on the (asymptotic) rate of growth.
Returning to the case s = sk = n, we see that our task is not
quite so simple. In Table III (on the following page) we present the
asymptotic values of Ta, indicating, where applicable, the determinates
of the sign (as Ta+0, we indicate whether it approaches plus zero or
minus zero - as always, the assumption that k k suffices to
c m
guarantee the non-positiveness of T. ).
From the Table we see that, in most cases, Ta is negative (or
approaches zero from negative values); however, in some cases, T
a
approaches zero from positive values. If we maintain that kc km
then we see that Ta < 0; and, in fact, T a=0 whenever a > 1, and T <Oa a m a
whenever a 1. Thus, once again, the elasticity of substitution of
m
the investment good sector is critical. Using Table III we have:
34) w+: a >1 -l X aJ X n + {A/(l-am)}]m a m a m
a < 1 + X + [n + A]
m a
For a -+ 1 we see that labor's share enters the expression
m
for the asymptotic growth rate due to the (asymptotic) equivalence of
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TABLE III - Asymptotic Value of Ta
a
a , a
c m
1) c =o
c m
a) a = > 1
c m
b) a =a = 1
c m
c) a a c1
C m
Value as w -
-0
-(1-a)
-1
Value as + 0
-1
-(l-a )
±O as [(ac + (kc/km )-] 
c C m->
2) a > a
c m
a) a > a >1
c m
b) a >a =1C m
c) ac >1, m <1
d) ac = 1 mc
e)' a < a c <1
m c
3) a < a
C m
a) a > a > 1
m c
b) a > a =1
m c
c) a >l, <1
m c
d) a = 1, a c 1
m c
e) a <a <1
C m
k >k
C m
-0
-(i-a )
m
-1
-1
-1
k <k
C m
-0
-0
+O as [a +a C] 2
-(1-a )
-1
k < k
c m
-1
-(1-a )
m
-0
-0
+0
k > k
c m
-1
-1
-1
-(l-a )
m
-O
a denotes the (asymptotically) constant share of capital (under
m
perfect competition) in sector M.
_ _
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Harrod and Hicks neutral technical progress. Whenever a > 1, (k/k)
grows without bound., whereas for am < 1, (k/k) approaches the growth
rate A. Notice that for a 1, a > 1, the two savings assumptions
m C
yield the same asymptotic growth rate. However, for a < 1 and a < ,
the asymptotic growth rate is larger for the economy in which both
workers and capitalists save. And that growth rate is independent of
the savings rate.
In summary, given the capital-intensity condition (or the
appropriate constraints on the sectoral elasticities of substitution)
and that both the production functions are homogeneous of degree one,
the economy will approach a finite asymptotic rate of growth only if
the elasticity of substitution in the investment sector is not
asymptotically larger than one. The elasticity of the consumption
good sector is unimportant in determining the growth rate when both
workers and capitalists save at the same rate; however, if only
capitalists save, then the elasticity of substitution in the
consumption sector can effect the growth rate when a < 1 and a < 1.
m c
Let us now see what happens if we relax the factor-intensity
assumption.
C. Relaxing the Factor Intensity Assumption
Our analysis so far has been predicated upon the assumption
that k k . This assumption has simplified the analysis by
c m
guaranteeing the monotonicity of the market equilibrium curve and the
'stability"1 of the "equilibrium' capital-labor ratio (for a given
instant of time). As we shall see, the assumption is not necessary
in the case in which everybody saves at the same rate, so that, even
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without the factor--intensity assumption, the system will behave as
described above. However, if workers do no savings, the analysis is
more complicated since it becomes necessary to have information on the
third derivatives of the production functions (for sk > Sn = 0, there
is no guarantee of causality of the system unless k k; see
Burmeister and Dobell [9]). Let us now consider our growth model when
the factor-intensity assumption is relaxed.
Consider first the second savings assumption - if kc < k (and
[ac+am] < 1), it is possible that Tb > 0 (b < 0). But b < 0 implies
that the market equilibrium curve is not monotonic and w can not be
expressed as a function of k. Instead, we must treat w as the
independent variable:
22) (k/k) = (ob)(w/)
In order to follow our earlier analysis we must take the derivative of
this equation - and this, in turn, requires knowledge of third
derivatives of production functions. Since we are reluctant to make
such assumptions (even if the functions are C.E.S., the analysis is
quite complicated)., we shall ignore this problem, and examine the case
in which everybody saves at the same rate.
Employing our first savings assumption, we know that the
market equilibrium curve is monotonic. Returning to equation 12):
12) (X/X) = T(X-n) + A
We have already seen that, if T < O, k tends to infinity, and
X > n. Suppose that T > O; if X n, then k increases, as does X, and
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k tends to infinity. If T remains positive asymptotically, it will
tend to zero, and hence X tends to infinity. If T becomes negative,
then what happens to X depends on T's asymptotic value, as previously
discussed. Once X n, it can never become less than n, and
therefore only the asymptotic value of T (as k) matters.
Suppose X < n initially: k will decrease, but what happens to
X (X/X) depends on T as well as X itself (if T < 0, (X/X) > A > 0 ;
however, if T > 0 it is possible that (X/X) < 0). If (X/X) > 0, then
X must eventually reach n, in which case we return to the analysis of
the previous paragraph. Therefore, suppose (X/X) < 0; clearly, X=O is
a lower bound on X (we are assuming no depreciation or consumption of
capital). As k 0, either T becomes negative, or it tends to zero.
Therefore, there exists a k* such that, for k < k*, (X/X) > 0 (k < k*,
Ta < [A/n]). Though k may continue to decrease for a while, X must
increase, eventually reaching n. When X=n, k ceases falling, and then
begins to increase (as X > n), and once again we can return to the
analysis of our previous paragraph. Therefore, as long as T cannot
remain asymptotically greater than zero (and it cannot), k must eventually
tend to infinity. As k tends to infinity, X tends to infinity if T
approaches zero; otherwise, it approaches a finite rate of growth.
In summary, relaxing the factor-intensity condition (for
s=sk=sn ) does not affect the asymptotic behavior of the system, though
it may affect the time path (consequently, it appears possible for k
to first become arbitrarily small, and later to become arbitrarily
large). As long as am < 1, X approaches some finite growth rate; if
a > 1, X approaches infinity, and if a fluctuates between being
greater and less than one, X will fluctuate between its limits.
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Therefore, in the constant savings case we are prepared to drop the
assumption that k > km
c m
D. Growth Rates of Other Variables
As in the one-sector case, we are interested in the growth
rates of all variables, not Just in the growth rate of capital. In
this case, in which Hicks neutral technical progress occurs in sector
M (and there is no labor-augmenting technical progress) our results
are quite straightforward, and are quite similar to the one-sector
model. Later, when we consider different rates of Harrod neutral
technical progress in each sector, as well as Hicks neutral technical
progress in the investment sector, we shall see that the results
become more complicated, and the similarity with the one-sector
model disappears.
For the moment, consider the growth rates of the other
variables:
35) M = K = XK; therefore, (M/) = X + (X/X)
36) (w/w) = [(X-n)/a]
37) (P/P) = -A + (ac - a)(W/W)
c m
38) (R/R) = -(1-a )(W/W)
39) (C/C) = n + (R/R) + max[(w/w),(k/k)]
40) (W/W) = (w/) + (R/R) = ac(W/W)
Obviously, the values of these growth rates depends upon am;
some also depend upon the value of c , as well as which savings
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assumption is employed. For a 1,1 the analysis is straightforward
and consists of merely substituting the asymptotic values of X and a.
into the relations given above. However, for a > 1, the process can
be more complicated, and sometimes entails using l'Hopital's rule. For
example, if am > 1 and ac < 1, we find for (C/C):
39') (C/C) = n - (1-ac)(/w) + (w/w) = n + ac(W/W)
Clearly, (/w) tends to infinity and a tends to zero; in order to
calculate the limit, we can employ l'Hopital's rule2 (or else look at
the time derivative of the expression).
In Table IV (page 101) we present the values of these
asymptotic growth rates, as calculated from equations 35) through 40).
These values are given as depending upon the asymptotic behavior of ac
and am; should a fluctuate between (for example) being greater and
M m
less than one, then the growth rates should fluctuate between their
respective limits.
Several comments about the Table are in order. First of all,
whenever ac < 1, the per capita consumption is not increasing in the
ai < 1 means that asymptotically a. is bounded below unity;
a comparable interpretation holds for ai > 1. For ai = 1, this means
that ai asymptotically approaches one, and ai is the asymptotically
constant share of capital in sector i - assumed to be neither zero
nor one.
2When calculating these limits we needed to assume either:
i) ac' am were non-zero and finite, or :
ii) ac, am changed sufficiently slowly - for example, it
would suffice if the elasticity of a. with
respect to w tends to zero.
Neither of these conditions seems terribly unreasonable to us.
TABLE IV - Asymptotic Growth Rates of Variables
with H.icks Technical Progress in M
> 1
a 1
a 1
m
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c c
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c m
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a. represents the asymptotic share of capital in sector i; 1 > a. > 01L 1
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a
m
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asymptotic growth path. Since, for a < 1, ac - 0, this means that
the capital-deepening does not serve to increase consumption - all the
benefits of technical progress serve merely to lead to greater outputs
of machinery. Also, it can readily be seen that asymptotically the
rate of growth of consumption is independent of the savings rate, and
that per capita consumption grows at the same rate as the wage rate
(when finite). Finally, we note that when ac > 1, am - 1, the rate of
growth of the price of the investment good tends to zero (though P
tends to infinity), despite the presence of technical progress in
M. This occurs because sector C is better situated to utilize the
ever-increasing stock of capital.
When we consider the case a > 1, we can see that most growth
m
rates become infinite (positively or negatively). We know:
(X/X) = A + (X-n)T ; But T + 0, and XT + 0 (shown by
using l'Hopital's rule). Therefore:
41) (X/X) + A as t - , a > 1
Consequently, the capital stock (and the capital-labor ratio) grows
at an ever-increasing rate - as Nordhaus [32, page 61] says: "Robots
are making robots at an ever increasing rate."
In summary, if a is bounded below unity, or asymptotically
m
approaches unity, the system approaches the growth rates shown in the
Table, which also depend on the asymptotic value of c. If am is
bounded above unity, then most of the growth rates tend to infinity;
and if a fluctuates between these values, so will the respective
growth rates.
103
Before considering the case of Harrod neutral technical
progress in only one sector, let us examine one more question: If
a planner has a choice between allocating technical progress to
sector 1M or sector C, where should he allocate it?
E. Allocating Hicks Technical Progress Between the
Investment and Consumption Sectors
So far we have seen that, if am 1 asymptotically, the
economy will approach a path in which the growth rates of the variables
tend to constant limits. Obviously, this case is similar to the one-
sector model studied in Chapter 1, and, as in that chapter, we can ask
how a planner should allocate technical progress within the economy.
(Though we do not explicitly deal with the problem of allocating
research funds, this exercise can be considered as indicating how
research funds should be allocated within the economy). Our principal
interest in this problem is to determine under what conditions a
steady-state path is likely to be chosen by the planner.
Therefore, let us suppose we have the choice of either:
i) Hicks neutral technical progress in sector C at rate A
and none in sector M, or
ii) Hicks neutral technical progress in sector M at rate A
and none in sector C.
Also, suppose our goal is to maximize the steady-state (or asymptotic)
rate of growth of consumption. We would like to know, given this
objective, where to allocate technical progress. We know that if Hicks
neutral technical progress occurs only in sector C, then a steady-state
exists and C grows at rate (n+A). From Table IV we can find the
asymptotic rate of growth of C; comparing these, we show in Table V
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TABLE V - Allocating Hicks Technical Progress Between Sectors
All in One Sector Continuous Trade-Off
( >l +l a <1 a >1 ao a <1
m m m In m
a >1 M M Either M Both Both
c
a *1 M M or C as C M Both Both
c
[ +a 1C a <
a <1 C C C C C CC
how one should allocate technical progress (under the above criterion).
From Table V we see that it never pays to allocate technical
progress to sector M when ac < 1 - the consumption sector simply cannot
take advantage of the continual capital-deepening. On the other hand,
when ac > 1, you should always allocate the technical progress to M
(you are indifferent if oc > 1, am < 1) - the indirect route of
increasing consumption through capital-deepening is more effective.
Finally, if -+ 1., we need to consider more carefully the value of cam
C I m
Alternatively, suppose we postulate the existence of a
trade-off frontier between technical progress in the two sectors. Let:
a) - the rate of Hicks technical progress in C; and
b) g - the rate of Hicks technical progress in M
42) g g(); g', g < 0; g(O) = A, g(A) = O g, > 0. Thus:
43) (c/c) = Z + [(c/c){g}] - n(g) + ; c (C/L)
In the above equation, n(g) [the rate of growth of per capita
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consumption (asymptotically) due to Hicks technical progress in M is
to be determined from Table IV. From Table IV we find that:
If acc< n(g) 0, and (c/c) is maximized for I = A, g = 0
If ac>l, am 1l n(g) = [(ga)/(l-M)]
Maximizing equation. 43) with respect to yields:
h) 1 + [(g'ac)/(l-a)] 0 o; or g' -[(l-a)/a ]; g" < 
a > 0, a < 
c m
Thus, in this case the optimal solution is to allocate technical
progress until the slope of the transformation curve is ust equal
to the negative of the ratio of the share of labor in M to the share
of capital in C (for ac = am, this is equivalent to the one-sector
Kennedy condition [271). In general, you should allocate some
technical progress to each sector, though a corner solution is possible.
Finally, for am > , ac - 1, consumption grows at an ever-
increasing (and asymptotically infinite) rate if there is any Hicks
technical progress in M. As shown earlier:
45) (X/X)+g ; (c/c) + + (w/w) , a > 
c C
From 45) it is clear that maximization of (c/c) entails a corner
solution - with = 0, g = A. In this case it pays to allocate all
technical progress to sector M.
Therefore, only if oc > 1, and 1 will it pay to allocate
some technical progress to each sector (under the given criterion).
Consider equation 44):
44) g' = -[(l-%xm)/ ] ; gc" < o
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We see that the larger a (or a ), ceteris paribus, the greater the
portion of technical progress that should be allocated to M. That is,
the greater the elasticity of output with respect to capital, in either
sector, the larger the share of technical progress that we should
allocate to M. Naturally, the converse is also true. Finally, as a
and a approach one, the greater is the possibility of a corner solution
in which all technical progress is allocated to M; and as a and a
approach zero, the more likely is a corner solution with all technical
progress allocated to C.
This completes our study of the effects of Hicks neutral
technical progress in the investment sector. We have seen that when
am 1, there exist finite asymptotic growth rates to which the system
tends. Also, we have discussed the problem of allocating factor-
augmenting technological change within this economy. Let us now
attempt to develop a model in which Harrod neutral technical progress
occurs in only one sector.
III. Harrod Neutral Technical Progress in the Consumption Sector
In the previous section we have studied the problem of what
would happen if there were Hicks neutral technical progress in M. In
this part we plan to study a different problem - that in which there
is Harrod neutral technical progress in only one sector. Specifically,
we start by assuming that the technical progress occurs only in sector
C; later we show how this can be generalized to cover the case in
which it occurs in sector M, or in both sectors, tough at different
rates. The problem we are considering in tis section arises not
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because capital tends to grow too quickly, but rather because, even for
a fixed wa, the ratio o the marginal-productivities in at least one
sector will be shifting, and hence factors wil3 be continually
reallocated within the economy. Consequently, this problem is
fundamentally different from either the one-sector model or the
problem ust studied.
As we shall see from the ensuing analysis, the aggregate
(effective) capital-labor ratio for the economy as a whole will tend
to a constant, finite limit, as will the (effective) wage-rental ratio
and the capital-labor ratio (in efficiency units) in the investment
sector. However, due to the presence of different rates of Harrod
neutral technical progress in the two sectors, the effective capital-
labor ratio in the consumption sector will tend to either zero or
infinity. Consequently, this model will differ from the normal steady-
state model principally in terms of the fraction of labor allocated to
each sector and in terms of factor shares in the consumption sector.
To see this, let us assume:
46 ) fM = Fm C = F(K  ,Lced t ) ; d may be positive or
negative.
First of all, it is clear that if a =l, then we are done - the
technical progress in C is equivalent to Hicks neutral technical
progress, and a steady-state exists in that case. Thus, assume # 1.
Furthermore, we shall assume that the elasticity of substitution in C
is bounded from one.
In pursuing the analysis, we employ the normal two-sector
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model. Below we outline some of our basic relations:
47) ki = (Ki/li) x = [ke e- dt ]i i C
48) = mfm(k m) ; C = L edtf (x)m MC c
49) w = ([edt(f -xfc)]/fc} = [(f -k f')/f']
c c cm mm m
50) P = 1; P P = (fc/)
c cm
51) y = (Lc/L) = [(k-km)/(k-k)] ; (l-y) = [(kc-k)/(k-km)]
It is clear that k depends upon w; however, k (and x)
depends upon t as well as w. Thus, even if w is held constant, other
variables change. Since the presence of Harrod neutral technical
progress in only one sector involves this continual shifting in x, it
is clear that there must be a continual reallocation of resources (ac 1).
Consequently, an "equilibrium' can only occur asymptotically.
Below we illustrate how some of the variables shift over time,
assuming that the wage-rental ratio is held constant:
52) [(3x/3t)(l/x)] = -do - [(ak/at)(1/kc)]= d(l-ac )
53) [(3P/at)(./P)] = d(l-a )
54) [((3y/t)(i/y)] = -{[kcd(l-ac)]/(k -km }
55) [(a{l-y}/it)(l/{l-y})] = {[ykcd(l-Oc )]/[(l-y)(k-km)]}
From the above equations it is obvious that the sign of
[d(l-ac)] is important:
56) d(l-oa) > 0 if a) d>O, a<l or b) d<O, a >l
,5) d(1-ac) <0 if a) d< a <l oar bc d a >1
57) d(l- ) < 0 if a) d<O, <1 or b) d>O, a >1
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Finally, adopting the simple savings assumption that everyone
saves at the same rate, we can derive our two basic equations - the
capital-accurmulation equation (58) and the market equilibrium curve (59).
58) k = (l-y)fm - nk = 0 defines L(w,k,t) = 0
59) (l-s)(l-y)(w+km ) - sy(w+k ) = 0 defines H(o,k,t) = 0
We know from the traditional two-sector models that for these
two curves to have a unique (stable) intersection it suffices to have
either k >k or a cil. From equations 56) and 57) we have three
cm c
possible cases:
i) Whenever o >l, a unique intersection exists.
ii) For a <1, d>O, k increases over time (for fixed ), so
that (after sufficient time has elapsed) there will be
a unique intersection.
iii)lowever, for d<O and a <1, neither condition is satisfied
and we can not be certain that a unique equilibrium
exists in this case.
In this latter case it can be shown that as k -0, a >0 suffices to
c m
guarantee that an intersection of these two curves exists and is
unique. Thus, in the first two cases we can be sure of unique
intersections, whereas in the third case a unique asymptotic
equilibrium exists.
The question we now seek to answer is: how do these curves
shift over time and how does their intersection shift? To answer
these questions we must examine the partial derivatives of the implicit
functions defined by 58) and 59).
(IL/"t) = (- )fmrYkd(i-, )]/[(l-y)(k-km)]
' C
Assuming sufficient time has elapsed, k > k
C < 11m
(aL/at) > 0
as d(l-a ) > .
c 
in all cases (for t > t* so that the 'proper'
factor-intensity relationships have been established).
(aL/ak) = -[(l-y)fmkc]/[k(kc-k)] > 0
(aL/aw) = {[(l-y)f_]/w}[k oy(w+k ) 
Similarly:
as d(l-c ) <0,C
+ k_(w+k_)(l-y)]
I CC' i mm C
(aL/3a) > 0 as d(l- ) 0
Using the implicit function theorem we find:
(ak/at) kyd(l-c ) > 0 as d(l-a c ) > 0C<
(aw/at)= -{[w(w+k )kcYd(l-ac )]/[kcacY (W+k )+k (1-)(w+k )]}
(aw/at)L=0 < c
L= > as d(l-a) X O
Therefore, the sign of d(l-a ) is critical in determining
how the curve shifts. Figure I depicts the behavior of this curve over
time. Next, consider what happens to the market equilibrium curve:
(aH/3at) = {[(1-s)(l-y)(w+k )d(l-c )kc (w+k)]/[(k-k)( +k )} > 0
(a/ak) = -{[(1-s)(1-y)(w+k )]/[(kck)y]} > 0
(aa/V) =
as d(l-~ ) 0
(1-s)[w(k-lkm)(k-k)+(w+k)f k (w+k)y+akm(l-y)(w+k) ]
[ (w+k)w(k-km) ]
60)
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60 )
Thus:
62)
and
63)
64)
65)
66)
67)
(aH/a) 0 as d(l- ) > 0
c
(Note that for both the market equilibrium curve and the capital-
accumulation curve that [dk/dw] > 0).
Using the above equations, we can show how the variables shift:
(Ok/at)H=0 { [k (+k)Yd(l- ) ] / (+ kc) } as
- < 0 a s < d(l-c ) > 0
( w/at )F=0 = -[w(w+km)(w+k)k-yd(l -he A
[w(k-k ) (k -k)+(w+k){a ckc y(+k )+ k (1-y)) +k) }
(aw/at)H=0 < 0 as d(l-o ) <> 
Figure II (page 112) depicts how the market equilibrium curve shifts
over time.
So far, we are not able to determine what happens to the
intersection of these two curves - in order to do this we must
compare the magnitudes of the two shifts.3 Thus, if we call (k*,w*)
the (unique) intersection of these two curves at time t, then:
70) a* 0 as I[(ak/3t)(l/k))]L=0I1 I[(3k/t)(l/k)]I=
where the derivatives are evaluated at (k*,*). Or, for simplicity, let:
71)
nca = [(k/at)(l/k)]L= ; me [(ak/t)(1/k)]H= : then:
* > 0 as< 1L [!cal/nmel] > 1 
3We have seen for d < O, a < 1, it is possible that several
intersections may occur. In this case, we assume t is sufficiently
large (kc sufficiently small) to guarantee that only one intersection
occurs.
67')
11l
68)
69)
72)
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Figure I - Shifting of the Capital-Accumulation Curve
Due to Harrod Technical Progress Only in Sector C
k >kC m
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c m
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Figure II - Shifting of the Market Equilibrium Curve
Due to Harrod Technical Progress Only in Sector C
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113
But, from equations 63) and 68) we have:
73) [nca/m e] = [k(w+kc)]/[kc ( w+k)] 1 as k k (as d[l-o ]>O).ca/%e C C > > ~~c c<
Thus, we find:
74) * < O as d(l-ac ) >W> <C
In other words, if d(l-ac ) < O, then k < k; in this case,
the k = 0 curve intersects the market equilibrium curve from below, and
since the capital-accumulation curve shifts more than the market
equilibrium curve, w* must increase; the reverse holds for d(l-o ) > O.
In order to see what happens to k*, we must consider the
relative shifts of the two curves in the w direction.
k* O as 16 I 16 I
the derivatives are evaluated at (k*,w*).
From equations 64) and 69) we find:
[ ca/me ] = [w(k-k )(kc-k)+(w+k){ kc y(w+km)+amkm(Y-)(w+kc)}]
(w+k)[a ckcy(w+k) + amkm(l-y)(w+kc)]
Therefore:
[6ca/me] > 1 (equality only if k=km or k=k )m c
Since there can not be specialization (1 > s > 0), [6 a/6m] > 1
(except asymptotically as kc->- or kC-O), and thus k* increases over
time. Table VI (page 114) summarizes how (w*,k*) change over time,
75)
76)
6m [(a/at)(1/a)]H= 0me Hz
77)
77' )
a - aw/at)(i//0lCa L__O
TABLE VI - Changes in Equilibrium Values Due to
Harrod Technical Progress in C
ac >1 a <1
C C
d > O k > O, a* · O k > O, w* < O
d < 0 k* > O < 0 k* > O, W* > 0
assuming the uniqueness of the intersection of the two curves.
We have now determined how the "equilibrium" values shift
over time - k* always increases, whereas * may increase or decrease,
depending upon the value of d(l-a ). Clearly, for k > km k
cannot increase forever - an upper bound is established by:
78) k = O , k - k , for y, f(k*) - nk* = ; k* < k*
m
Since k continually shifts over time, our problem is
intrinsically an asymptotic one. Let us now attempt to determine
what does occur asymptotically.
A. Asymptotic Behavior
So far in this section we have seen how the "equilibrium" k
and w shift over time. However, it is clear that no steady-state occurs
in this case (ac l), and therefore our main interest concerns the
asymptotic values of the variables. As we shall see, both k and will
approach finite limits as t. Let us now see how these limits are
determined.
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For any finite (w,k), k must eventually tend to zero or
infinity as time becomes large. Thus, as t-*w:
79) d(l-ac) > 0 - [k+a]; d(l-a ) < 0 - [k-O0] ; [o>>O]
80) But, k implies: (l-y) [(kc-k)/(kc-km)] 1; [>(w,k)>O]
C C
81) And, kc-0 implies: (l-y) + [k/ki] < 1
If d(l-a c) > 0 we can show:
82) k = 0 tends to: [f -nk] = 0
m
83) (l-s)(l-y)(w+km ) - sy(w+kc) = 0 tends to:
83') (w+km) - s(w+k) = O
Equations 82) and 83') are the asymptotic relationships as
k +-; clearly, from 83'), k < k unless s = 1. Since k > k , there
exists a unique intersection between these two curves, and it is
towards this intersection that the economy tends. The value of [k,w]
(the intersection of these two asymptotic curves) depends only upon s,
n, and the production function in industry M - C influences this
equilibrium only insofar as it determines the sign of d(l-oc). From
equations 82) and 83') the value of is determined by:
84) [w/(w+km)] - [(l/s) - (f'/n)] = 0 (w) = 0
Equation 84) has a unique solution () since:
85) *(0) = a, (X) < 0, and i' < 0 when ' = 0.
Thus, if kc tends to infinity, there exists a unique
asymptotic equilibrium. As the economy approaches this equilibrium,
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k* increases, and w* decreases.
Next, suppose that d(l-ac) < 0, so that k -*O. As alreadyC c
stated, for ac < 1, we can not be sure that a unique equilibrium exists
for all time. However, as k cO, it suffices that am > 0 in order for an
unique intersection to exist between the two curves. As k +O0, our two
equations approach the following limits:
86) k = 0 tends to [(k/km)(fm - nk )] = 0 as k -+O.m m m c
87) (-s)(l-y)(w+km)- sy(w+k c ) = 0 tends to
87') k[(w+k) - sk - swk = 0 as k -O.
m m m c
As we can see from equation 86), there exists a unique w such
that k= 0 (independent of k); and [ak/aw] < (at k=O). Since 87),
the market equilibrium curve, is upward sloping, a unique (and stable)
equilibrium exists. Hence, is determined from equation 86), and k
from equation 87'), by using the value of obtained from equation 86).
In summary, the presence of Harrod neutral technical progress
(at a positive or negative rate) in sector C leads to an asymptotic
equilibrium in which both k and approach finite limits. If d(l-ac)
is positive, then the "equilibrium" value of (as defined by the
interesection of the k=0 curve and the market equilibrium curve)
decreases over time, approaching its (non-zero) asymptotic limit,
whereas k increases over time. If d(l-ac) is negative, then the
equilibrium values of w and k increase (if a unique intersection exists)
over time, approaching their finite asymptotic limits. Finally, if
a 1, then Harrod neutral technical progress is equivalent to Hicks
C
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neutral technical progress, and a steady-state exists.4
B. Asymptotic Growth Rates
Now that we have seen what happens to w and k asymptotically,
we would like to determine how the other variables behave. Since w and
k tend to constant limits, it follows that k also tends to some
m
constant limit. Consider the following variables:
88) M = L(l-y)f
89) C = edtLyf
90) P = [flf' ]
91) Y
92) (l-y)
Equations 53) - 55) tell us how P, y and (l-y) change for
constant w. Again, we need to divide our analysis into two parts:
d(1-ac ) > 0 and d(l-oc ) < O. Also, we need to consider the case in
which ca -l asymptotically. As already stated, if ac=l everywhere, a
steady-state exists.
i) d(l- c) > 0 and kit, (l-y) 1 and ac - 1
90') (P/P) -+ d(l-ac) + O
4Earlier we assumed ac < 1 or ac > 1 everywhere; since, as
to, xO (d>O) or x+- (d<O), and since acc depends only on x, it
suffices that ac be bounded from unity asymptotically. That is, the
same asymptotic result holds true if ac < 1 [or ac > 1 only
asymptotically, though it may fluctuate between the two for intermediate
values of x.
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91') (y/y) -d(l-ac) < 
92') [d(1-y)]/(l-y) * {[yd(l- )]/(l-y)} 0
dt
89') (c/c) n + d + (y/y) + a (x/x) n
88') (M/M) + n
ii) d(l-a) < and k -.O, (l-y) -* [k/km] ac 
90") (p/p) - d
91") (y/y) + O
92") [d(l-y)]/(1-y) + 0
dt
89") (C/C) + n + d + (.y/y) + a (x/x) +[n + d]
88") (MM) - n
Finally, it is possible that a +1l asymptotically; in this case k may
C C
tend to zero or infinity, but a approaches some non-zero value.
90"' ) (P/P) d(l-ac )
91"') (6/y) + 0
92"') [d(l-y)]/(l-y) -+ O
dt
89"') (C/C) + [n + d(l-ac)]
88" ') (M/M) + n
Thus, if k -o (and a bounded from one) there is no continual
c c
growth in per capita consumption or the price level. The reason for
this is, if d > O, then ac < 1 - the resources are continually
shifted away from C, offsetting the gains from technical progress. On
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the other hand, if d < 0 (technical regression) then x tends to
infinity and the output-capital elasticity tends to one - and this is
enough to offset the negative effect on consumption due to the
technical regression (and the shifting of resources out of C).
Therefore, if ko, then the effect of technical progress is
transitory (oc bounded from one) in the sense that the asymptotic
growth rates of C, M, and P are the same as if there were no technical
progress at all. Finally, consider the asymptotic values of P and C:
93) C = [(l-s)/s]PM P = [f'(x)]/[fl(km)]
If the Inada conditions hold, then P and (C/L) tend to infinity for
d > 0 (since xO, c < 1), whereas P and (C/L) tend to zero for d < 0.
Thus, even though the growth rates of P and (C/L) tend to zero, their
asymptotic values tend to zero or infinity. For d > O, there is a
bonus of greater consumption due to the technical progress, whereas for
d < O, there is a decrease in consumption. However, if the Inada
conditions are not fulfilled (and not all four can hold for a C.E.S.
function unless a=l), then P and (C/L) both have finite, non-zero
limits (as M always does in this case).
However, if kc tends to zero (d>O, c>l or d<O, ac<l), then
the fruits of technical progress show up in the growth rates of the
variables. For example, if d > , a > 1, then the continually
decreasing effective capital-labor ratio in C (x) eventually ceases to
be important since the output-capital elasticity tends to zero, and a
point is reached when no more resources are transferred out of (or
into) C, so that the share of labor employed in C remains constant.
Once this stage is reached, the effect of technical progress dominates
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TABLE VII - Asymptotic Growth Rates of Variables with Harrod Neutral
Technical Progress Occurring Only in Sector C
Variable
M
C
P
Y
(l-y)
W
R
k
(
ao41
C
n
[n+d(l-ac) ]
0
0d(l-a )
d(l-ac )
0
0
d> 0
a>l a<l
c c
,>
n
[n+d]
d
0
0
d
d
0
0
n
n
0
-d(l-a )
0
0
0
0
.0
c
d< 0
a> 1
c
n
n
-d(1- )
0
0
0
0
0
O
o<1
c
n
[n+d]
d
0
d
d
0
0
and C will increase over time (for d,0). Table VII summarizes these
results.
C. Extending the Analysis - Harrod Technical Progress
Only in the Investment Sector
Suppose that Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at rate g
in M and not at all in C:
M = F(KmLeg) ; C = F(KoLc)
This can be rewritten to indicate that Harrod neutral technical progress
occurs at rate g in both sectors, and at rate d (-g) in sector C:
M = F (K,Le gt); C = F(K ,[Le g]edt ) ; d = -g
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As we know, when Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at
the same rate in each sector, a steady-state exists, and the appropriate
variables, when expressed in efficiency units, are constant. Therefore,
we can use our previous analysis to study this case, except that we now
interpret our variables as being expressed in efficiency units. For
example, in this case and k (the efficiency variables) would both
approach positive, finite values, though X and k would each grow
asymptotically at rate g. Also, consumption per capita would grow at
rate g plus the rate determined from Table VII with [d = -g].
Consequently, (C/L) would grow at rate g if ao > 1, and it would not
(asymptotically) grow if ac < 1. Thus, we are prepared to handle the
occurrence of Harrod neutral technical progress in M alone, or at
different rates in the two sectors.
Similarly, if capital-augmenting technical progress also occurs
in C, we can treat this as Hicks neutral technical progress in C plus
some negative rate of Harrod neutral technical progress in C. Again,
our analysis would be identical to that Just completed, except that
consumption, the price level, the wage rate and the rental rate (in
numeraire units) would all grow at the additional rate of Hicks neutral
technical progress in C, as well as at the rates determined from
Table VII.
Finally, if Hicks neutral technical progress occurs in M (it can
also occur in C), and Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at the
same rate in each sector, then the analysis would be identical to that
performed in Part I, except that the variables would be expressed in
efficiency units.
Therefore, the only case we can not yet treat is if Hicks
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neutral technical progress occurs in M and if Harrod neutral technical
progress occurs at different rates in the two sectors. Note, however,
that if am-l, then we can always treat the problem as though Harrod
neutral technical progress occurs at the same rate in each sector (or
else as though there were no capital-augmenting technical progress in M),
and thus our earlier analysis can cope with this case. Similarly, if
a =1, we can arrange it so that Harrod neutral technical progress
c
occurs at the same rate in each sector. Therefore, if:
C = Fc(egtKc, c) ; M = F (eatKm, ebtL )
then the only case we can not yet handle is:
i) a 0, and (b-a) (d-g) and ac am #
The reason our previous analysis can not handle this case is
that, in treating the case of Harrod neutral technical progress in only
one sector we assumed that (w,k) remained finite - and this will not be
true if some Hicks technical progress occurs in M. To treat this case
we must return to (and modify) our analysis of Part I.
Before considering this case, let us briefly summarize our
findings on the asymptotic growth rates in various cases:
ii) a# 0, ac am 1, but (b-a) = (d-g)
When the variables are expressed in efficiency units,
they will asymptotically grow at the rates determined
in Part I, with Hicks technical progress in M at rate a.
Naturally, these rates depend upon the elasticities of
substitution in each sector. To derive the growth
rates of the original variables, one need only add the
growth rates that occur in a normal two-sector model
with Harrod neutral technical progress at rate (b-a)
in each sector.
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iii) a = O, b (d-g)
If a =1, a steady-state exists with Harrod neutral
technical progress at rate b in each sector, and Hicks
neutral technical progress at rate [(d-b)(l-ac ) + gac]
in sector C. If acfl, then Harrod neutral technical
progress occurs at rate b in both sectors, and at rate
(d-g-b) in sector C, as well as Hicks neutral technical
progress in sector C at rate g.
iv) a or a = 1
c m
As explained previously, any problem can be converted
into a type ii) or type iii) problem.
V) a Q0 and b = (d-g)
This represents the normal steady-state case with
Harrod neutral technical progress at rate b in both
sectors and Hicks neutral technical progress at rate
g in C.
vi) a = 0 and a = 1
m
This case is essentially the same as case iii).
vii) a = 0 and ac = 1
In this case a normal steady-state occurs since it can
be converted into a type v) problem due to the
equivalence of Hicks and Harrod technical progress in C.
viii) a 0, (b-a) = (d-g) , and am = 1
The Hicks neutral technical progress in M can be
converted into Harrod neutral technical progress, and
thus this case is equivalent to case iii).
ix) a O, (b-a) = (d-g) , and a = 1
This case is essentially the same as case ii).
X) a = O, b = (d-g), ac am = 1
This is the normal steady-state case, and the
restrictions on the elasticities of substitution are
unnecessary.
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Thus, the only case we cannot yet handle is case i) - let us
now turn our attention to this case.
IV. Hicks Technical Progress in the Investment Sector and
Harrod Technical Progress in the Consumption Sector
So far, we have considered how Hicks technical progress in sector
M or Harrod technical progress in sector C will affect the two-sector
growth model. Specifically, we have found that in the former case the
capital-labor ratio tends to infinity, but the growth rates approach
finite limits for am 1 (and the results are comparable to the one-
sector model. In the latter case, which can only occur in multi-sector
models, the capital-labor ratio and wage-rental ratio for the economy
tend to finite limits, and the principal difference between this case
and the normal steady-state case is that the output-capital elasticity
(and capital's share under competitive pricing) tends to zero or one in
the consumption sector (acl). In this part we shall consider both
cases simultaneously, and we shall find that, though the analysis is
comparable to that for Part I, our results will be more complicated. For
example, the growth rates of the system depend not only on ac and am and
the rates of technical progress, but they also depend on whether Hicks
neutral technical progress in M occurs at a faster rate than Harrod
neutral technical progress in C. Let us now investigate why this is so.
For simplicity, we assume that only Hicks neutral technical
progress occurs in M and only Harrod neutral technical progress occurs
in C; it is quite clear from our previous discussions that all other
cases can be readily incorporated into this case.
Using our previous notation:
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i) a = b, and g = 0, d 0; ac, am 1
For simplicity, we adopt the simple savings assumption: sk = sn.
Our two basic equations, as discussed in Parts II and III, are:
94) X (K/K) = [(l-y)e fm]/k
95) (l-s)(1-y)(w+km) - sy(w+kc) = O defines: H(w,k,t) = 0
We must remember that from equation 95) w is defined as a
function of t as well as of k. Similarly, k (it appears in equation
94) in [l-y]) depends on time as well as on w.
We follow our analysis of Part II, page 85, and find:
96) (X/X) = [{d(l-y)/(l-y)} + a + a (k /k)- (X-n)]
dt
97) (km/km) = {[m(X-n)]/a} , where a = [(dk/dw)(w/k)], depends
on t as well as on k.
98) [d(l-y)/(l-y)] = (X-n)[(l/o){yck+(l-y)a k } - k] + kcyd(l-a c )t mm dt
(kc-k)
Thus, comparable to equation 12, page 86:
99) (X/X) = (TX - Tn + A) + {[kcYd(1-ac)]/(kc-k)}
where T and are defined to be the same as in part II, equations 16a)
and 17a), except that they implicitly depend upon time.
As earlier, a is always positive; we have seen that T is
negative if either: i) k k or ii) a 1
c m c
In part III we showed that if tends to a finite limit, then
eventually [d(l-ac)/(kc-k)] > 0. Unfortunately, this is not
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necessarily true if w grows without bound, and so we cannot be sure of
the positiveness of the last term in 99).
From the previous two parts it is clear that both k and w tend
to infinity; therefore, we must be content to consider the asymptotic
growth path. We proceed as in Part II, considering what happens to the
growth rates for various values of ac and am.
c m
Table VIII presents the asymptotic growth rates; several
comments about the Table are in order. First of all, it no longer
suffices (in some cases) to state whether ac is greater than, equal to,
or less than one - in some cases we must further subdivide these
intervals. Secondly, when we write that ac tends to one (or am tends to
one), we assume that it asymptotically approaches one - if ac or am were
unity throughout, then our prior analysis would suffice, as previously
explained. Thirdly, in calculating the limits we assumed (as in Part
II) that ac and am were bounded from zero or infinity - or else
approaches those values "sufficiently slowly" (see footnote 2, page 100).
Though it is true, as we can see from the Table, that k, , and
km always tend to infinity, the same is not true of x (the effective
capital-labor ratio in C). In fact, what happens to x depends upon the
relationship between A and d (the rates of Hicks technical progress in M
and Harrod technical progress in C, respectively), and, in some cases,
am. For example, from the Table we see that for a l, a +l, then:
m c m
sign(x/x) = sign[A-d(l-am)]
When the expression in brackets is positive, x tends to infinity; when
it is negative, x tends to zero. If A = d(l-am ), then the asymptotic
value of x depends upon the initial conditions, the behavior of am as
we+, and so forth. In general, x can tend to either zero or infinity in
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this case. There are other examples in which this problem arises.
If we compare Table VIII to Table IV of Part II, we see that
whenever d=O (hence A>d), the two tables are identical, as expected.
However, when dO, the growth rates of R, W, , C, x, and P will, in
general, depend upon d (as well as A), whereas the growth rates of K,
k, and M depend only upon A and the values of ac and am.
C m
As we can readily see from the Table, the growth rates of K, k,
W, and M are always positive. The growth rates of (C/L) and W are also
positive for A, d > 0; however, if a < 1 and d < 0, then they may be
negative. On the other hand, the growth rates of P and R may be
negative, zero, or positive, depending upon the elasticities of
substitution and the relationship between A and d (the growth rates of P
and R can be positive only if d > A > 0). Therefore, if d > A (and not
both ac' a > 1), then the growth rates of P and R will be non-negative -
m
the technical progress in C "outweighs" the technical progress in M in
this case.
Finally, given Table VIII we can handle the general case in
which both types of factor-augmenting technical progress occur in each
sector:
M F(Kme ,Lmeb t ) e Fm(K,Lme(b )t)mm m mm
c F(,Kcet ,LLced ) F (K L(b-a)ted*t ); d* = (d+a)-(b+g)
cC ( dc a c c c ; )t-
Thus, the general case5 is equivalent to:
5The assumption that technical progress is only factor-
augmenting is a restriction in itself; thus, this represents the
general case, given that restriction .
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TABLE IX - Asymptotic Growth Rates - General Case
Variables Asymptotic Growth Rates
K, k, M, and w [p(a,d*) + (b-a)]
R and P [p(a,d*) + g]
W and (C/L) [p(a,d*) + (b+g-a)]
p(a,d*) is the rate of growth for the appropriate variable obtained
from Table VIII when Hicks technical progress occurs at rate a
in M and Harrod technical progress occurs at rate d* in C,
with d* = [(d+a) - (b+g)].
i) Hicks technical progress in C at rate g
ii) Harrod technical progress in both sectors at rate (b-a)
iii) Hicks technical progress in M at rate a, and
iv) Harrod technical progress in C at rate d*
We already know how to handle parts i) and ii) since they yield
steady-state solutions; furthermore, iii) and iv) are the cases we
have ust studied. Therefore, the growth rates in this general case
will be the sum of the growth rates from the respective parts. Table IX
summarizes the growth rates for each of the variables.
V. Factor Shares
In the previous discussion, we have determined the asymptotic
growth rates of the variables - as we have seen, all the variables
will approach some asymptotically constant (if finite) growth rate,
the magnitude of which depends upon many of the parameters of the
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problem, However, in general, the effective capital-labor ratio in each
sector will tend to either zero or infinity, and so the factor shares
(under competitive pricing) will tend to zero or one unless the
elasticity of substitution in that sector tends to one. For those who
are firm believers in marginal cost pricing, this result will hardly
seem plausible. However, it should be noted that while the factor
shares in each sector may tend to zero or one, for the economy as a
whole they may approach some intermediate value. Thus, from the market
equilibrium equation we can write:
100) sY = s(C + PM) = PM ; or, C = [(l-s)/s]PM
Clearly, the share of capital for the economy is the weighted
average of the capital-share for each sector:
101) a= [(RK)/(RK + WL)] R(K +K ) /(C + PM)] = [(-s)a + sa]
c m c m
Thus, unless both a and a tend to zero (or both tend to one), a will
c m
tend to some intermediate value.
Therefore, while the factor shares in each sector will, in
general, tend to zero or one, it is quite possible that factor shares
for the economy will be non-zero for both factors. From Table VIII
we can determine the factor shares in each sector, and given s, we can
subsequently determine factor shares for the economy as a whole. We
shall have more to say on this topic and other related issues in
Chapter 3.
VI. Maximizing the Asymptotic Rate of Growth of Consumption
In Part II we discussed the problem of allocating technical
progress (a surrogate for research funds) in order to maximize the
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asymptotic rate of growth of consumption, given that technical
progress had to be Hicks neutral. In general, we found (Table V)
that, unless < 1, the planner should allocate at least some
technical progress to the investment sector, so that a steady-state
would not occur. We can now generalize this discussion to include
all types of factor-augmenting technical progress.
A. Allocating Labor-Augmenting Technical Progress
Between Sectors
As our first example, let us assume that technical progress
is only of the labor-augmenting variety, so that:
M = F(K ,Lmeht) ; C = F (K ,Lcegt) ; h h(g); h, g 0.mm m C c c
g = A, h(A) 0 ; g = 0, h(0) A h', h" < 0
Naturally, h(g) represents the trade-off between technical progress
in the two sectors; though it may seem reasonable for this frontier
to be symmetrical, we do not impose this a priori restriction.
If Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at rate h in M
and at rate g in C, this is equivalent to it occurring at rate h in
both sectors and at rate d [ = (g-h)] in sector C. Thus:
102) (C/C) = [h + 6(d)] , where 6(d) is the rate of growth of
consumption when Harrod neutral technical progress occurs only in C.
Since we have already studied this problem in Part III, we can
immediately write:
103) d(l-ac ) > 0 (C/C) = (n+h); d(l-ac ) < 0 (C/C) = (n+g)
d = o0 (C/C) = (n+g) ; -ac-1 * (C/C) = [n + ach + (l-ac)g]
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If a = 1 everywhere, then a steady-state exists, and C grows at
the same rate as the asymptotic growth rate for the case in which a -l.
Given equation 103), we can make our decision about how to allocate
technical progress, given the (asymptotic) value of ac:
104) aC > 1: g > h (C/C) = n + g ; g = , h = 0
ac > : g < h + (C/C) = n + h; g = 0, h = A
a < : (C/C) = n + Min(h,g) = n + g ; h(g) = g, d = 0
c
a T 1: (C/C) = n + a h* + (1-a )g*; h'(g*) = -[(l-ac)/ac]; h"<O
We can see that for a < 1, one should allocate technical
C
progress equally between the two sectors, so that a steady-state would
exist. If a = 1, one should (barring a corner solution) allocate some
technical progress to each sector, but a steady-state would exist, as
stated previously.
If asymptotically al, then, in general, some technical
progress should be allocated to each sector, but a steady-state will
probably not occur. Finally, if ac > 1, then one should allocate all
technical progress to only one sector, that sector depending upon the
shape of the transformation curve. Thus, as A, the planner should
allocate all technical progress to C, to either sector, or to M.
Therefore, in the case A = A, the planner is indifferent (under this
criterion) as to here technical progress is to be allocated, except
that it all must go to one sector.
So far we have overlooked one factor - if d [=(g-h)] > 0, then x
(the effective capital-labor ratio in C) tends to zero, whereas if d < 0,
x tends to infinity. Clearly, the asymptotic value of a as x-+O may be
different from the value of ac as x. Thus, the planner may have to
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base his decision on the sign of d, as well as the asymptotic value of ac
For example, suppose a <l as x-*O, and a c>l as x+'. From 104), it
is quite clear that the growth rate for ac>l is greater than that for
ac<l. Therefore, the planner must choose x (thus, d<O). This implies
that he should choose g=O, h=A even if A < A.
Similarly, suppose a l1 as xO, and a >1 (or a <l) as x. If
a +1:
C
105) (C/C) = n + ach* + (l-ac)g* ; h'(g*) = -[(1-ac)/ac]
Thus, h* and g* now depend only upon ac. Define:
106) e = [ ch* + (1-ac)g*] ; h'(g*) = -[(1-ac)/a ]
Then it can readily be shown that:6
All of the following results are derivable from the definition
of 8:
e = a h* + (1-ac)g* , where h'(g*) = -[(1-ac)/ac]; (dg*/dac)<O
Thus:
i) (d8/dac) = (h*-g*) + [ac(dh*/dg*) + (l-ac)]I(dg*/dac ) ;
Therefore, (d8/dac) = [(h* - g*) + 0] = (h* - g*) , and
ii) (d2e/da2) = [(dh*/dg*) - l](dg*/dac)] -
-[1 + {(l-ac)/ac}](dg*/da) = -(l/ac)(dg*/dac)>O
Therefore, is a minimum for such that h* = g*; there are no
interior maxima, Just boundary maxima.
iii) (0) = , (1) = A
By continuity, if A A, (assume A > ), then there exists ac such that:
iv) A > , ac > a , (a ) > 
Therefore, depending on the slope of the transformation curve, the
planner may choose either:
h* > g* > 0 or h = A*, g = 0 (for ac > a ).
A comparable result holds for A < A.
IF
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107) Max(A,) > e g where h(g) = 
108) There exists a unique ac such that: (ac) = g; ac ac, e > g
C c C C
109) A = A implies 6(ac) < A
C
if ac(1-ac ) 0
) 'A,110) If A > , there exists an a such that: a > a -* (Ca ) > X
111) If A < , there exists an a t such that
C ac< a ct- 6(a c) > AOc c
Given the above properties of 0, we can decide how to allocate
technical progress should a *l. For example, if a l1 as x-*O, and a <1
c c c
as x, we find that, given ac(0) as x0:
C
112) If ac() < c (ac implies h*=g*), then g* > h* 0 (g*, h*
determined from h'(g*) = -[(l-ac(O))/ac(0)]), and
g* > h* implies x-O. Therefore, the maximum occurs at
g*, h*. However, if:
113) a (0) > a , then h* > g* 0, which implies x, and
hence a < .7 Thus, in this case we find:
114) To maximize (C/C) choose: g* = g = h(g) if a c(0) > a , and
choose: g* > h* 0 [where h'(g*) = -(1-ac(O))/ac(O)}]
if a (0) < a
7
For a > ac, h* > g* implies x+X. Given o +l as x+-0, for
fixed ac, it follows that we seek:
i) Max[e] = [ach + (1-ac)g] such that g > h. But since 
{gc
is concave in g (given ac), and since ac > ac, this implies g* g =
the same solution as for a < 1, and hence a steady-state.
C
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Therefore, it is not enough to consider the asymptotic values of
oc, but we also need information about the shape of the transformation
curve (its slope at h(g) = g), and the asymptotic value(s) of ac.
Of course, we must follow the same procedures in all cases in
which a -*l as either x-+O or as x-+ (or both). Thus, if a +l as x-+O and
C C
as x-+, we must consider both the values of ac(O) and of ac(o).
Table X (on page 138) summarizes the results for all possible cases.
B. Allocating Technical Progress Within the Consumption Sector
Alternatively, we might suppose that the planner has to decide
how to allocate factor-augmenting technical progress within C (somewhat
analogous to the one-sector Kennedy model).
115) M = F(K,L) ; C = F(Kce ,Lce gt ) = e (KcLce )
mm c c C CCC
Letting d = (g-h), we have:
116) (C/C) -+ [h + 6(d)], where 6(d) is the rate of growth of
consumption that results from Harrod neutral technical progress in C
alone. However, it is obvious that this problem is the same as the one
just discussed. That is, under the criterion of maximizing the
asymptotic rate of growth of consumption, the problem is comparable if
the choice is either:
i) Between Harrod technical progress in C or in M
ii) Between varying amounts of factor-augmenting technical
progress within C.
In either case, the planner should reach the same decision as to how
to best allocate technical progress (in so far as the occurrence of a
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TABLE X - Allocat:ing Labor-Augmenting Technical Progress
Between Sectors
Either C = F (Kc,Lcet) , M = F (K L eht)
Or C = Fc(Keht Legt) , M = Fm(Km ,Lm)
h = h(g); g, h > 0; h(O) = A; h(X) = 0 ; h', h"< 0
x is the effective capital-labor ratio in C.
Limit
x-+O
a >1
a as
a >1
C
a >1 a -1
c c
a >1
C
a +1
c
a <1
a >1
c
A= A
g=O, h=A (x-*c) or
g=A, h=O (x-O)
g=X, h=O (x-O)
g=X, h=O (x-+O)
g=O, h=A (x->3)
A> X
g=O, h=A (x+)
There exists a* :
c
a a* , g=A, h=O
C C
a > a* , h*>g*>O
C C
h'(g*)=-(l-a c )/ ac
and x.
g=, h=O (x-O)
g=, h=A (x+')
g=A, h=O (x-+O)
g=X, h=O (x-+O)
g=, h=O (x+O)
There exists a*:
C
a> * g=O, h=AC C
a < a*, g*>h*>O,
C C
h'(g*)=-(l-ac )/a
and x-+O.
a -1 a +1 In this case it is unimportant whether A - .
c c The values of ac(0) and of a (-) are critical
There exists an a such that: h* g* and xsteady-state
c <
tO
as a - a
c< c
1) If ac (O)= ac (), then h' = -(l-ac)/ac; hg if acf C
2) a c()> c' c(°)- c; h' =-(l-ac ())/a c(); -*
3) a (C) ac(O)<& ; h' =-[1-a (0)1/a (0); x-OC c' aC c
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TABLE X - Continued
Limit a as
c
x-+O x+ct
a -1 a +1
c c
(Continued)
A. = A A > X A < 
4) ac() < ac(O) = c = h* ; Steady-State
5) ac(O) > a(x) = ac ; g* = h* ; Steady-State
6) ac( )< , a (0) > a; g*= h* ; Steady-State
7) ac()> c ac(0) < c ; let: h(gl) = -[1-a c()]
C
h2(g2) -[l-ac(o)]/a () ;
Let: 61 = [a c()hl + {1-a ()}gl]
62 = [ac(O)h2 + {l-ac(O)}g2]. Then, choose:
gl or g2 as 61 62 (61=62, indifferent
between gl and g2)
a-+1 a <1 Define a such that h* g*as a >c c c < g" as ac 
1) a(0) a c choose g* = h* ; Steady-State
2) a(O) < c ; choose g* > h* > 0 (x-+O), where
C C
h'(g*) = -{[1-ac(0)]/ac (0)}
ac<1 ac>1 g=O, h=A (x+) g=0, h=A (x+-) g=O, h=A (x+)
a <1 a -l Define a such that h* g* as a > a
C C C< CC
1) ac () ac ; choose g* = h* ; Steady-State
2) ac () > ac ; choose h* > > 0 (x+w) where:
h'(g*) = -{[1-ac()]/ac(-)}
a 1 a <1
c C
g* = h* > g* = h* > 0 g* = h* > 0
(Steady-State in all three cases)
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steady-state is concerned), and the asymptotic growth rates are the same
in the two cases. Also, there can only be a steady-state if
asymptotically ac < 1 (as xO and as x-), if a c = 1 everywhere, or
perhaps if a - 1 (a necessary condition is that c 1 asymptotically
as x0 and as x+X).,
C. Allocating Capital-Augmenting Technical Progress
Between Sectors
As another example, suppose that we have the following:
117) C F(K e t, Lc ) ; M = F(Kmeht,L) . This can be rewritten as:c C C mm m
c= gt (Ic Le-ht (h-g)t) M ehtF (Km,Lmeht)
h, g > 0 ; h = h(g); h', h" < 0; h(0) = A, h(X) = 0
Consequently, this case is equivalent to:
i) Hicks technical progress in C at rate g
ii) Harrod technical progress in both sectors at rate (-h)
iii) Harrod technical progress in C at rate (h-g)
iv) Hicks technical progress in M at rate h
From our earlier discussions we know that:
118) (C/C) = g + (-h) + 6[h,(h-g)] , where 6[h,(h-g)] is the
rate of growth of consumption when Hicks technical progress takes place
at rate h in M and Harrod technical progress takes place at rate (h-g)
in C. These rates are readily ascertainable from Table VIII, page 127.
From Table VIII we can see that an important consideration in
determining the growth rates is whether the rate of Hicks technical
progress in M is greater than the rate of Harrod technical progress in C:
119) That is, it is important if: h d or h d(1-a)
However, since d = (h-g), and since h, g > 0, it follows that:
120) h > d always, with equality only if g = 0. Also,
121) h > d(l-a m ) always (a > 0).
m m
Thus, many of the different possible subcases are eliminated
from Table VIII, and since h > d, x (the effective capital-labor ratio
in C) always tends to infinity. Therefore, unlike the previous problem,
we need not worry about the asymptotic value of c as xO.
c
Table XI presents the decisions that the planner should make,
which depend upon the values of the elasticities of substitution. From
the Table we see that whenever ac < 1, it does not matter (under this
c
criterion) what decision the planner makes - in any case, the asymptotic
growth rate of per capita consumption will be zero. This is true simply
because capital-augmenting technical progress in either sector
eventually leads to capital-deepening in C, and since the elasticity of
substitution in C is less than one, this capital-deepening is of little
use in increasing the asymptotic growth rate of consumption.
On the other hand, if ac > 1, then am is the determinant of our
actions. Since ac > 1, capital-deepening in C can lead to increasingc
consumption levels. If am > 1, the technological progress in M will
lead to an ever-increasing rate of growth of capital, and therefore we
should direct all our technical progress to sector M. On the other
hand, if ac < 1, then the investment sector can not (asymptotically)
benefit from the capital-deepening, so in this case we should direct all
our new technology to sector C - directly increasing the level of
consumption. Finally, if am - 1, then technological change should be
m
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TABLE XI - Allocating Capital-Augmenting Technical Progress
Between Sectors
C = Fc(Kc e gt,L c ) ; M = F(Kmeht ,Lm)
a ac
Allocation Rule
h = h(g), h, g O ;
h', h" < O; h(O) = A, h(A) = 0
(C/C)
a >1 a >1
m c
a +1
a <1
c
g O, h = A
g = 0, h = A
Indifferent n
a +1 a >1
m c
c
a <1
c
h'(g*) -[(1-am)/am]
h'(g*) = -[(1-a )/a ]
m m
Indifferent
n + {(amh* + (1-am)g*]/(l1-a)}
n + a {[a h* + (1-a )g*]/( 1-a )}
c m m m
n
a <1 a >1
m c
a -+1
a <1
c
g = , h = 0
g = , h = 0
Indifferent
n + A
n + a 
c
n
divided between the two sectors (the allocation of technological change
does not depend on whether ac > 1 or ac 1).
In this case there can only be a steady-state if h=O, ac=l
everywhere, or else if both ac and a equal one. Consequently, a
steady-state is very unlikely to occur in this case.
Finally, we also see that, unlike the previous cases, the shape
of the transformation curve (given its concavity) is unimportant except
in the case am 1.
m
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D. Allocat:ng Technical Proess Within the Investment Sector
Another possible alternative is to assume that there exists a
trade-off between capital- and labor-augmenting technical progress in
the investment sector, and to ask what decision the planner should make
about allocating this technical porgress if he seeks to maximize the
asymptotic rate of growth of consumption. Thus, assume:
122) C = Fc(Kc,L ) ; M = F (Ke hLe g ) ; h=h(g); h,g > 0, h', h<O
Equation 122) can be rewritten as:
123) M = ehtFm(Kn,Le ( g -h)t) ; C = F(K,Le(g-h)te(h- g)t)
Following our previous procedure, we find:
124) (C/C) = (g-h) + 6[h,(h-g)] , where 6[h,(h-g)] is the rate
of growth of consumption as determined from Table VIII (h is the rate
of Hicks technical progress in M, (h-g) the rate of Harrod technical
progress in C). However, from equation 124) it is apparent that this
is equivalent to the problem that we have just investigated, so that
Table XI applies equally well to this case. Once again, a steady-state
will be chosen only if:
i) a a - 1 or ii) a < 1, a E 1
m c M c
E. Induced Technical Progress in Each Sector
As our final case we shall investigate what decision the
planner should make (under the criterion of maximizing the asymptotic
rate of growth of consumption) if there is a Kennedy-type trade-off in
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each sector. Specifically, assume;
125) C = F(Kedt ,Le ) ; M = F(Kebt ,Le a t )
b = b(a) ; a, b O; b', b" < O; b(O) = B, b(A) = 0
d = d(g) ; g, d O; d', d" < O; d(O) = D, d(G) = 0
Professor Chang [11] has studied this model under the assumption
that each firm seeks to maximize the rate of reduction of per unit costs,
given constant factor prices. In his model he found that there is a
locally stable steady-state equilibrium (assuming sk > sn = 0) if:
i) k k and ii) a , a < 1 everywhere
c m · c m
This result is, of course, akin to Professor Samuelson's [42] one-sector
model in which he showed that the "Kennedy" equilibrium was stable only
if the elasticity of substitution were less than one.
In investigating this case, we are interested in determining
under what conditions the planner will choose a steady-state solution.
As we shall see, the most likely case for the occurrence of a steady-
state solution corresponds to the Chang case, ac < 1, am < 1 (however,
unlike in Chang's model, these are only asymptotic restrictions on ai).
However, unlike the Chang case, it is possible that a steady-state
would be chosen even if a > 1, or if a -+ 1. On the other hand, if
ac > 1, then the planner will never choose a steady-state since the
consumption sector can profit from the continual capital-deepening that
occurs in the asymptotic equilibrium if there is capital-augmenting
technical progress in either sector.
Clearly, all the information that we need to solve this problem
is contained in Table VIII. We must consider each case separately (for
different values of the elasticities), and determine whether the
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planner should choose a steady-state solution.8
i) am > 1, aC > 1
In this case, if some capital-augmenting technical progress is
present in the investment sector, then the rate of growth of consumption
is unbounded. Furthermore, since the rate of growth of the rate of
growth of capital depends upon the rate of capital-augmenting technical
progress in M, it follows that we should allocate as much capital-
augmenting technical progress to sector M as is possible, and
consequently a steady-state solution is not desirable in this case.
ii) am > 1, a 1
Though the rate of growth of capital is unbounded in this case,
the rate of growth of consumption is finite since the consumption sector
cannot profitably avail itself of the continual capital-deepening. If
any capital-augmenting technical progress occurs in M, then we find:
126) (C/C) = n + g , and maximization of 126) implies d=O, g=G.
The values of (a,b) are unimportant, provided that b > 0. On the other
hand, if no capital-augmenting technical progress occurs in M, we
find from Table VII:
126) (C/C) = n + d + A + Min[O,(g-d-A)] ; b=O, a=A.
Maximization of 126') yields: g* = (d* + A), assuming that this is
feasible (that is, that G A). If we compare our results from 126) to
8Chang assumes that ac, a < 1 everywhere; we are interestedonly in the ymtot
only in the asymptotic values of c and of a 
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those for 126'), we find that for G > A, it pays to have some capital-
augmenting technical progress in M, and so we would choose d=O, gG,
b > O (and hence there is no steady-state). If G = A, then we would
lose nothing (in terms of the rate of growth of consumption) by choosing
the steady-state solution, whereas if G < A (and d ' O), a steady-state
is not possible since either capital-augmenting technical progress will
occur in M, or else Harrod technical progress will occur at different
rates in the two sectors.
Thus, the planner is unlikely to choose a steady-state in this
case.
iii) am 1, a > 1
From Table VIII we can show:
127) (C/C) = n + d + (a-b) + Max[{b/(l-am)}, (g-d+b-a)] =
n + Max[{d + a + [(amb)/(l-am)]}, g]
In general, the planner will not seek a steady-state solution
in this case. If:
D + Max[a + {(a b)/(l-am )}] D + Max(A,B) > G,
{a} m m
then the planner should choose dD, g=O, and (a*,b*) such that:
b'(a*) = -[(1-am)/amI
Obviously, there is no steady-state solution under these circumstances.
On the other hand, if::9
9This is possible only if: D + Max(A,B) > G, which implies
that the d(g) curve is skewed, and that the technical progress
transformation curve is smaller in M than in C. There seems to be
no reason to believe that this case should occur.
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D + Max[ a + {(a b)/(1-a )}] < G,
{al
the planner should choose d0, g=G; the values of (a,b) do not affect
the asymptotic rate of growth of consumption. However, even if he
chose a=A, b=O (so that there is no capital-augmenting technical progress
in M), Harrod neutral technical progress would still occur at different
rates in the two sectors. Furthermore, even if we allowed b to be
negative, so that a G, there could be no steady-state solution in
that case because of the presence of capital-augmenting technical
progress (at a negative rate) in sector M.
Thus, the planner will not choose a steady-state in this case.
iv) a + , a c 1
In this case we find:
128) (c/C) = n + [ad + (l-a)g] + a[a + (amb)/(l-a)}]
Maximization of equation 128) yields: d'(g*) = -[(l-ac)/c], and
b'(a*) = -[(l-a)/am. In general, b* 0, so that no steady-state
solution will be chosen (we are not considering Cobb-Douglas functions -
we have discussed this case earlier). Even if b=0, a=A (a corner
solution), there is no a priori reason to expect g*, d* to be such that:
[(g* - d*) = A], though it is possible that this may occur. Thus,
while it is possible that the planner may seek a steady-state solution
in this case, such an occurrence would be a singular result indeed.
v) am + 1, < 1
Proceeding as in other sections, we find:
Proceeding as in other sections, we find:
129) (C/C) - n + d + (a-b) + Min[{b/(l-am)}, (g+b-d-a)]. Therefore:
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129') (C/C) = n + Min[g, {a + d + [(a b)/(l-am)]}].
Letting H = Max[a + {(a b)/(l-am)}] > A, we see that maximization of{a}m m
(C/C) implies choosing (d*,g*) such that: g* = d* + H . (If d*, g*
exist - for H > G, and g, d > 0, no such d*, g* exist). Therefore,
if H ' G, then (a*,b*) and (d*,g*) are determined. For H < G, d > 0,
whereas for H = G, d* = 0. In either case, however, it "pays" to
maximize the expression [a + {(a mb)/(l-am )}], and clearly there is no
reason to expect this to yield b* = 0. However, it is feasible that
b*=O, a*=A, and if this occurs, then the planner would seek a steady-
state solution. This result, however, corresponds to a corner solution,
and consequently a steady-state solution is quite unlikely.
On the other hand, if H > G, (and d > 0), it is clear from
129') that g determines the rate of growth of consumption, and hence
we should choose d=O, g=G. However, since H > G, and since (C/C) = n+G,
nothing is gained by maximizing [a + {(amb)/(l-am)}], provided that
we choose a, b such that this expression is at least equal to G.
Specifically, if A G, then nothing is lost (asymptotically) by
choosing a=A, b=O (and d=O, g=G). Consequently, the planner could
choose a steady-state solution if A = G; if A > G, the planner need
not choose any capital-augmenting technical progress, but a steady-state
will not occur since Harrod technical progress occurs at a quicker rate
in M than in C.
In summary, while a steady-state solution might be chosen in
this case, such an occurrence would be a singular result, and thus we
do not expect the planner to choose a steady-state path in this case.
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vi) a <1, o 0 1
m c
In this case the growth rate of consumption is:
130) (C/C) = d + a - b + n + Max[b,(g+b-a-d)] = n + Max[g,(a+d)]
Since the elasticity of substitution in M is less than one, there is
nothing to be gained from capital-augmenting technical progress in M.
Therefore, the planner should allocate technical progress as follows:
a) If G > [A + D , then choose: d=0O, g=G ; (a,b) unimportant
b) If G < [A + D] , then choose: dD, g=O ; a=A, bO
c) If G = [A + D] , then choose either case a) or case b)
Case b) would seem to be the most plausible one, and clearly it does
not provide a steady-state solution. Even if case a) pertains, there
will not be a steady-state since, for bO, a=A<G, and hence Harrod
technical progress occurs at different rates in the two sectors.
Therefore, no steady-state solution will be chosen in this case.
vii) a < 1, a + 1
Proceeding as in prior sections, we find:
131) (C/C) = n + aca + [a d + (-ac)g] . In order to maximize
the rate of growth of consumption, we would choose: aA, b, and
(d*,g*) such that: d'(g*) = -[(l-ac )/ac] Note that once again there
is no reason to allocate any capital-augmenting technical progress to M
since the elasticity of substitution in that sector is less than one.
There can be a steady-state in this case only if: [g* - d*] = A.
Since a is a parameter, there is certainly no reason to expect this
equality to hold (if G < A, there can never be a steady-state), though
it might occur by chance. Thus, we conclude that a steady-state
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solution would be a singular occurrence in this case.
viii) a < 1, a 1
m c
This case coincides with Chang's assumptions on the
elasticities of substitution, and it yields the best chance for a
steady-state solution. We find:
132) (C/C) = n + d + a - b + Min[b,(g+b-d-a)] = n + Min [g,(a+d)]
From 132) it is clear that there is no reason to allocate any
capital-augmenting technical progress to M - therefore we choose aA,
b=O. Furthermore, if possible, we should choose g*, d* such that:
g* = [A + d*]. Therefore, if G A, a unique steady-state solution
exists and will be chosen by the planner in this case (if G > A, then
there will be both Hicks and Harrod technical progress in C, whereas if
G = A, then only Harrod technical progress will occur in each sector).
If G < A, a steady-state solution is possible (and will be chosen) only
if we permit d to be negative, and if Max(g) A. Should we maintain
our restriction that d be non-negative, then only labor-augmenting
technical progress will occur in each sector, but it will occur at
a faster rate in the investment sector.
From the preceeding analysis we have seen that the only case in
which the planner is likely to choose a steady-state solution is if the
elasticity of substitution in each sector is less than one (Not
surprisingly, this case corresponds to Chang's results for the stability
of the steady-state solution in a laissez-faire economy). We have seen,
however, that the steady-state path might be chosen if am 1, ac < 1,
or ac - 1, am 1, though these possibilities correspond to singular
cases. If a > 1, no steady-state solution is ever desirable because of
C
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the ability of the consumption sector to productively employ the ever-
increasing capital stock (in efficiency units).
VII. Conclusion
In this lengthy chapter we have studied two-sector models of
growth that, in general, do not lead to steady-state solutions. We have
determined the asymptotic growth rates of variables for these non-
steady-state models, and we have presented a generalized framework that
can handle any combinations of factor-augmenting technical progress in
this two-sector world.
Finally, we postulated the existence of trade-offs between
certain types of factor-augmenting technical progress, and we have
investigated how a central planner should allocate technical progress,
assuming that he was trying to maximize the asymptotic (or steady-state)
rate of growth of consumption. Basically, we found that his decision
would depend upon the asymptotic values of the elasticities of
substitution in each sector, as well as on the nature of the
transformation curve between different types of technical progress. In
some cases he may deem it desirable to seek a steady-state solution,
while in others he will not. While we have not considered every
possible trade-off between types of factor-augmenting technical
progress, we have explored five particular cases. It is quite lear
that other cases could readily be treated within the context of the
model used in this chapter.
This concludes our study of the growth rates of variables for
one- and two-sector models in which there is no steady-state path. In
the next chapter we shall compare the characteristics of this non-steady-
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state path to those characteristics attributed to the one- and two-
sector steady-state models. As we shall see, these two models
(the steady-state and the non-steady-state models) differ principally
in the values of the observed factor shares (under competitive or
"pseudo-competitive" pricing) and in the motivation for investment in
the non-steady-state case.
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Chapter 3: A Summing Up - The Steady-State and the Asymptotic Path:
Progress and Problems
I. Introduction
The previous two chapters have dealt with the conditions needed
for a steady-state to occur, and they have examined how the economy will
behave if no steady-state path exists. We have found, like others
before us, that the conditions needed for a steady-state to exist are
quite stringent, and that there appears to be little reason to believe
(a priori) that these conditions are in fact fulfilled. On the other
hand, we shall see in this chapter that the asymptotic equilibrium can
not, in general, duplicate all the stylized facts of growth. The
failure of the asymptotic equilibrium to explain the observed relation-
ships in a growing economy and the implausibility of a steady-state
equilibrium illustrate the dilemma facing the theory of economic growth.
Somehow the theory must be able to explain the observed empirical
relationships without placing the types of constraints (and seemingly
unreasonable ones) on the system that must hold if the steady-state
equilibrium is to occur. Though we have no ready answer to this
dilemma, it is instructive to consider what constraints must be placed
on the economy to achieve the steady-state path, and to investigate Just
how the asymptotic equilibrium deviates from the basic properties of the
steady-state. In addition, it is helpful to consider what assumptions
(or types of behavior) would enable the asymptotic equilibrium to meet
the stylized facts of growth. It is these issues that we shall consider
in this chapter.
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Specifically, if we consider the one-sector model studied
earlier, we find:
1) (x/x) = [(se f(x)l/x] + b - a - n - ; ( A is the rate of
depreciation).
2) 6 = (a+n)h - (a+n-b)] ; x = [(Kebt)/(Leat)]
Obviously, if 6 = 0, then a steady-state solution will exist for a
constant s (given the other normal" neo-classical assumptions); other-
wise, it is most unlikely that a steady-state should exist.
Specifically, if 6 Q0, then it is clearly impossible to main-
tain indefinitely a fixed value of x (since s is bounded by one), and no
steady-state solution is feasible (a 1). An example of this case is
if no capital-augmenting technical progress is present (b = 0), and if
decreasing returns to scale prevails h 1). Economically, this says
that as growth takes place in factor inputs, output grows at a slower
rate, and so in order to maintain the same effective capital-labor
ratio, we must- invest a continually larger fraction of output.
Eventually, all output would be invested, but this still would prove
incapable of providing enough new machines to maintain the steady-state
path, and hence a steady-state cannot be maintained for all time.
Alternatively, if 6 > 0, then it is clear that if:
-6t3) s s e
then a steady-state solution will exist, and otherwise it will not (1).
Note, however, that this implies that the fraction of resources devoted
to investment declines over time - an assumption that does not appear
to be empirically validated.
We might, in order to Justify this very special saving behavior,
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seek some economic mechanism that would predict this declining savings
rate. For example, it might be assumed that investors seek to maintain
a constant marginal physical product of capital:
4) R = (aQ/aK) = e 6 tf'(x)
However, from 4) it is apparent that this assumption will not maintain
a steady-state path (6 # 0):
5) d(aQ/aK) = 0 implies 6 = [(l1-k)/a](x/x) ,
dt
where k represents the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
In general, it is very difficult to think of any compelling
economic mechanism that serves to maintain the steady-state path. We
have also seen that the problem is even more difficult in the two-sector
(or multi-sector) model since, in addition to needing the proper fraction
of output to be invested, we also have to worry about the problem of
continual reallocation of resources within the economy due to differing
2
rates of technical progress in each sector. Therefore, in the two-
sector model, even if the production function of the investment good is
Cobb-Douglas, there still will not normally be a steady-state because
there is no guarantee that Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at
1 Some possibilities discussed earlier are a Cobb-Douglas
production function, a Kennedy-Samuelson innovation frontier, or a
continually declining (as x increases) "degree of homogeneity" of the
production function. None of these seems to be very compelling as
a priori assumptions or arguments.
2Chang [11], in a Kennedy-type model, tries to provide a
mechanism to eliminate this problem. However, as in the Kennedy
model, it is rather dubious that the process that Chang envisions
actually occurs in a decentralized economy.
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the "proper" rate in the consumption sector.
Since there does not appear to be any compelling reason to
believe that the conditions for a steady-state will be fulfilled, it
becomes imperative to compare the behavior of this "non-steady-state"
economy to those characteristics attributed to an economy generating a
steady-state path. In our previous chapters we have seen that if the
elasticity of substitution is bounded from one,3 then the "non-steady-
state" economy will approach a path in which the physical variables
grow at constant rates (Table I, page 37, and Table VIII, page 127).
How, then, does this asymptotic path differ from the "reality"
that the steady-state purports to describe? The basic properties of
the steady-state growth path are:
1) Output and Capital grow at the same constant rate
2) Output/Capita grows at a constant (non-negative) rate
3) Effective capital-labor ratio tends to a constant, and thus:
4) The marginal product of capital and the output-elasticity of
each factor tends to a finite, positive value
5) The share of each factor tends to a non-zero value
6) Wages grow at a constant (possibly zero) rate
7) A constant fraction of output is saved and invested4
On the other hand, the basic properties of the asymptotic path
3If a > 1 and h _ 1, b 0 (and not equality for both h and b),
then many of the asymptotic growth rates become infinite. However,
since this case does not seem plausible (and most studies show a < 1),
we shall consider only cases in which the growth rates are finite. Also,
a need not be bounded from one - it may tend to one (but not fluctuate
between being greater than, equal to, and/or less than one).
4For convenience, this is normally treated as an assumption.
However, this proposition would hold true if the proportion of invest-
ment to output were an increasing function of the MPK, and hence 7)
can be interpreted as a result, not an assumption, of the steady-state
model.
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(assuming that the growth rates are finite, that a is bounded from, or
tends to one, and that sk > s > 0)5 are as follows:
1) Output and Capital grow at the same asymptotic rate
2) Output/Capita grows at an asymptotically constant rate
(which may be negative)
3) The effective capital-labor ratio tends to zero or
infinity, and thus:
4) The output-elasticity of one factor tends to zero (if a is
bounded from one), while the marginal product of
capital probably tends to zero (for more on this,
see Part III of this chapter)
5) The share of one factor (under the Vanek pricing assumption)
tends to zero if a is bounded from one, or tends to
some non-zero constant value if a tends to one
6) Wages grow at an asymptotically constant rate (which may be
negative)
7) An asymptotically constant fraction of output is saved and
invested
From the above lists we can see that the basic differences
between the steady-state path and the asymptotic path are in properties
3) - 6). However, property 3) is not a directly observable magnitude,
but rather the constancy of the effective capital-labor ratio is
normally inferred from properties 4) to 6) of the steady-state model.
Property 4) itself is not directly observable in the real world, but
rather is normally construed to be reflected in the relatively constant
factor shares and in the approximately constant real interest rate.
5If s=0, and if the growth rates are finite, then, for a < 1,
h > [(a+n-b)/(a+n)], or for a > l, h < [(a+n-b)/(a+n)], the growth
rates of Q and K will be different. Similarly, if s = 0 and ifk - 0,
then the share of output being invested tends to zero. See Table I,
page 37, in Chapter 1, for further details.
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From an empirical point of view, then, the two models differ in
their ability to explain the relatively constant real interest rate and
the relatively constant non-zero factor shares. In order to discuss
factor shares (proposition 5), it is necessary to make some assumptions
about factor pricing. However, if we relax the assumption of constant
returns to scale, then the traditional assumption of competitive
pricing holds little special merit, and we are called upon to consider
other models of pricing factor inputs.
Therefore, the asymptotic path appears to explain the constant
growth rates of the physical variables as well as the steady-state path
does. One problem encountered with the asymptotic path is when we
consider the distribution of income within the society. Another
problem encountered is that the MPK may tend to zero in the asymptotic
path, and then we are logically compelled to explain why investment
still occurs. Therefore, it is our opinion that the asymptotic growth
model lacks the following parts:
i) A mechanism for explaining factor pricing
ii) An explanation of the causes of investment
Before we attempt to discuss these issues, let us briefly
consider how a change in the factor pricing assumption would affect the
6 Vanek's assumption that factors are paid proportionally to
their marginal products (the constant of proportionality being the
reciprocal of the degree of homogeneity) holds little general
relevance, though Prof. Chipman [12] shows that this type of factor
pricing might result if deviations from constant returns to scale were
due solely to externalities. The Chipman model is a quite special one,
however, for it assumes that each firm behaves as though constant
returns to scale prevails, that each firm is a very small part of the
market, and that externalities are due solely to total industry output.
Furthermore, it seems to us that this approach avoids the essentials of
non-competitive pricing.
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the growth path reached in this asymptotic equilibrium.
II. Factor Pricing and Asymptotic Growth Rates
In this section we intend to show that the asymptotic behavior
of the economy is independent of the factor pricing assumption.
Recalling the Vanek pricing assumption, we can write:
6) W = [((aQ/L)/h] ; R = [(aQ/aK)/h]
It is quite clear that if a proportional savings function is assumed,
then total savings is independent of the distribution of income within
the society. Suppose that the Cambridge savings assumption is adopted:7
7) S = sk(RK) + sn(WL) ; S = gross savings
We have already investigated how the growth path behaves for the factor
pricing assumption of 6) and the savings assumption in 7); in this case
the system will approach constant growth rates for Q and K (h < 1 or
a < 1). Consider the following factor pricing assumption:
8) W (l-a)(aQ/aL) ; 1 a 0 .
R = [(Q - WL)/K] = [(l/h)(aQ/aK) + (a + (l/h) - l)(aQ/aL)(L/K)]
If a = 0, this reduces to the assumption that labor is paid the value of
its marginal product (a most dubious assumption for h > 1) ; for
7Naturally, we are assuming that the government policy is
designed to maintain full-employment, so that savings equals investment.
If h > 1, it seems most probable that competition will break
down in either the factor market or the product market or both. Later
in this chapter we shall discuss a situation in which (for h > 1)
competition is maintained in the factor market, but is replaced by
oligopolistic behavior in the product market. If h > 1, and if labor
is paid its marginal value product, then its total share might exceed
one.
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a = [1 - (l/h)], this becomes the Vanek pricing assumption. 9 From 7)
and 8) we find:
9) S = k(RK) + Sn(WL) = [(aQ/aL)(L/h){sk - (sk-Sn)(l-a)h +
Sk( aQ/aK) (K/h)]. Let:
10) s* = [sk - (sk-sn)(l-a)h] ; 0 s* < sk if 1 > a [(h-l)/h]n k k n n 
Upon making this substitution into 9), we arrive at the following:
11) S = s*[(aQ/aL)(L/h)] + Sk[(aQ/K)(K/h)]. 10
Clearly equation 11) is fundamentally identical to the basic Vanek
savings equation, though the values of the parameters may differ.
However, if workers do no savings out of their income (s n=0), for
the Vanek pricing assumption we can show:
12) S = K = k[(aQ/BK)(K/h)] ; (K/K) = sk[(aQ/aK)/h]
For a < 1, and/or h < 1, (K/K) approaches a constant, finite limit, and
so must the marginal product of capital. However, under the more
general pricing assumption in 8) we have:
13) S sk[l + h(a-l)][(aQ/aL)(L/h)] + sk[(3Q/aK)(K/h)] ; sn - 0
Therefore, if [1 + (a-l)h] > 0, then (Q/aK) + 0, since the effective
capital-labor ratio tends to infinity and a < 1.
9As we shall briefly discuss later, this assumption can be
derived by assuming perfect competition in the labor market, but
momopolistic practices in the product market. In that case, (l-a) is
the marginal revenue (for P=1, the numeraire), so that a may be
interpreted as the reciprocal of the elasticity of the demand curve.
10Economically, a > [(h-l)/h] may be interpreted as placing a
limit on the elasticity of demand as a function of h. If h < 1, then
market power is unlikely, and hence a=0, in which case:
s* = [s h + sk(1-h)] > 0.
n n k
Nevertheless, it seems rather singular a case to assume s = 0;
if sk sn > 0, and s* > 0, as seems plausible, then the growth ratesn"
approached by these two systems will be identical since the growth
rates are independent of the savings parameters.
Thus, in the general case in which something is saved out of
each type of income (and a [(h-1)/h]), the growth path of the system
is independent of the factor pricing assumption (for those cases that
we have considered). This is tautologically true if everybody saves at
the same rate (for all types of income).
Now that we know that the growth path of the system does not
depend on the factor pricing assumption (unless s =0; naturally, this
n
statement is made within the limits of the previous analysis), let us
briefly consider the asymptotic behavior (and values) of certain
variables for the growth models studied in the previous two chapters.
III. Asymptotic Values of Variables
As has been continually emphasized, the system studied in the
previous chapters will approach an "equilibrium" in which the physical
quantities (Q, K) will grow at constant rates. However, we would like
to know how some of the other variables behave. For example, what
happens to the following variables in this asymptotic equilibrium?
i) (Q/K) and (Q/aK) .
Let us first consider the one-sector model. If we assume that
everyone saves at the same rate, we know:
14) (K/K) = s(Q/K) ; for simplicity, assume no depreciation.
Restricting our attention to those cases in which the growth rates
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remain finite, we have found:ll
15) a < 1, (K/K) [(a+n)h] ;
> 1, h < 1, (K/K) + [(bh)/(l-h)]
-+ 1, (K/K) - [(a+n)h - (a+n-b),]/(l-,*) . 12
Therefore, from 14), if (K/K) approaches a positive, finite limit
then (Q/K) tends to a constant, positive, finite limit. However, if
a < 1, then k + O, so that (Q/aK) + O. If a > 1, then (aQ/aK) also
tends to a finite limit (for h < 1).
Next, suppose that sk > sn > . In that case:
16) (K/K) = [(s/h)(aQ/aL)(L/Q)(Q/K) + (sk/h)(aQ/aK)] ; 13
From our earlier table on growth rates (Table I, page 37) we know that
the growth rates for 16) are equivalent to those for 14). Since x,
then 0k  and n -* h if a < 1. However, *k = [( Q/aK)(K/Q)] + O,
implies either (aQ/:aK) 0 or (K/Q) + O. However, from 16) it is clear
that for finite (K/K), (Q/K) is finite (sn > 0), so we conclude that
(aQ/aK) + O. Therefore,
17) a < 1, (K/K) * [(sn/h)(Q/K)h] l [sn(Q/K)] ; (aQ/aK) o
On the other hand, if a > 1, then k + h, n * 0, and:
1 1 In the ensuing discussion we shall assume that
6 = [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)] > 0, so that x-~ (barring the perverse case
discussed earlier) - this assumption seems most plausible to us.
Clearly, for 6 < 0, the discussion is quite symmetrical.
12it is the asymptotic value of [(aQ/aK)(K/Q)] as xX; if -k* 0,
the results are comparable to those for a < 1; if k 1, the
growth rates are unbounded.
1 3As explained earlier in this chapter, this can be interpreted
as a more general form of the capital-accumulation curve, valid for
different types of factor pricing assumptions.
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18) > 1, (K/K) [(sk/h)(aQ/aK)]. 14
Finally, if a 1, k + f < 1, we find:
19) a - 1, (K/K) = (Q/K)[(sn/h)(h-%*) + *(sk/h)]
and (Q/K) as well as (aQ/aK) tend to finite limits.
Finally, if s = 0, we have:
20) (K/K) = [(sk/h)(Q/aK)] .
Since (K/K) tends to a finite limit (a<l, or h<l), (Q/aK) also
approaches a finite, nonzero limit. If a < 1, (Q/K)-)w since k + 0;
for a > 1, (Q/K) will also approach a finite, nonzero limit. The table
on the following page summarizes these results under the assumption
that all growth rates are finite and that x+-.
From the table we see that there are many possibilities,
depending upon the values of the parameters. However, if a < 1 (which
is the most prevalent empirical result), then (Q/aK) -+ 0 unless sn = 0;
and the assumption that s = 0 is a very strong one, since sn can be
interpreted not only as the propensity of workers to save, but it also
depends upon the "degree of exploitation" of workers by capitalists, and
the capitalists propensity to save (see page 160). Thus, if we assume
h > 1, and that a is bounded from unity, then in order to achieve finite
growth rates we are forced to assume that a < 1, and hence the MPK tends
to zero (sn 0). Should the MPK tend to zero, we then are obligated to
rethink our savings assumption, and to delve into the investment
This result follows from: [(aQ/aK)(K/Q)] - h; if (Q/K) is
finite, then [(aQ/aL)(L/Q)](Q/K) - 0; if (Q/K) is infinite, then so
must be [Q/aK] (since k tends to h), violating the assumption that
(K/K) is finite.
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TABLE I - Asymptotic Values of the Average and Marginal Product of Capital
Cases (K/K) (Q/K) (aQ/3K) k
I) a < 1
a) Sk-Sn >0 [(a+n)h] [(a+n)h]/s 0 0
b) k>s n=0 [(a+n)h+(l-a)(a+n-b)] X [(K/K)(h/sk)] O
II) a - 1 [(a+n)h - (a+n-b)o~] [(K/K)(l/s)] [(K/K)(O*/s)] *k
( < 1) 
III) a > 1 [(bh)/(l-h)] [(bh)/s(l-h)] [(bh2 )/(1-h)s] h
(h < 1)
In the above table, s [sn + (sk - Sn)(Ok/h)]
behavior of the capitalists.
In the previous chapters we have considered how the marginal
product of labor (MPL) changes over time. As is apparent from Table I
in Chapter 1 (page 37), the MPL increases over time if h 1. For
decreasing returns to scale, if labor-augmenting technical progress occurs
at least as rapidly as capital-augmenting technical progress, then the MPL
will also increase over time in that case. However, if h < 1, it is
possible that for some values of the other parameters, the MPL will
decrease over time.
It is clear that the situation is considerably more complex in the
multi-sector case because of the presence of more than one good. In this
case, it is possible to think of the marginal product of capital in terms
of the consumption good or the investment good.1 5 Similarly, one must
1 5Since the ultimate purpose of investment (presumably) is consump-
tion. it might be argued that only the MPK in consumption units matters.
However, it is quite possible that there are several consumption goods, one
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speak of the output-factor elasticities for each sector, and so on.
Assuming the same two-sector model as discussed earlier, it is
possible to compute the asymptotic behavior of some of the variables.
Since constant returns to scale is assumed, the competitive factor pricing
mechanism is more plausible, and hence it can be argued that the output-
factor elasticities can be interpreted as the competitive factor shares in
16
each sector. As has already been pointed out, Harrod neutral technical
progress in each sector at the same rate leaves the growth model unaltered
(when variables are expressed in efficiency units). Therefore, it suffices
to limit our attention to considering Hicks technical progress in M and
Hicks and Harrod technical progress in C. Assuming that Hicks neutral
technical progress occurs at rate a in M and at rate EL in C, and that
Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at rate d in C (d may be
negative), we would like to find the asymptotic values of:
21) (Lm /L) ; ac a, a; (aC/aK c) , (aM/aK)
a. represents the share of capital in sector i (under competitive pricing),
and a is the share of capital in the economy as a whole. In Table VIII,
page 137, we have computed ai, as well as (K/K). Using the market
1 5of which (at least) is produced in the same way as machines, so that the
MPK in investment units also represents the MPK in terms of some consump-
tion good. (If a constant fraction of income is spent on this new
consumption good, the basic growth model is unaltered). In this case, the
choice of numeraire units seems quite arbitrary.
16The assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) is made to
avoid discussing the multi-sector allocation problem. If the degree of
homogeneity is the same in each sector, and if the Vanek pricing
assumption is made, the subsequent analysis (for h l)does not differ
much from that already performerd. However, the Vanek pricing assumption
has little Justificatic'n, and the issue of factor-allocation within the
economy should not be dismissed so lightly.
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equilibrium equation, the marginal product equations, and the basic
differential equation , we can readily derive the following:
22) (K/K) = (M/KF:) = [(L eatf )/K] = [K /(Ka )](eatf')
m m m m m
23) [K/(Ka)] - [s/(l-s)][Kc/(Kac)]
24) [Lml{L(l-am)}] = [s/(l-s)][Lc/{L(l-a )1]
Since we already know (K/K), we can calculate (aM/aK) [ (eatf')] if
m~m m
we can find [Km/(K )]. Using the above equations we can then derive
the asymptotic values shown in the table on the following page.
As is apparent from the Table, a great variety of behavior is
possible, depending upon the values of the parameters. It is interest-
ing to note that the marginal product of capital in machine units never
becomes infinite (for finite values of [K/K]); this corresponds to the
one-sector results. On the other hand, the MPK in consumption units
will always tend to either zero or infinity, depending upon the values
of the parameters.llr It is difficult to say what constitutes the most
plausible case, but it should be pointed out that if ac and am are both
bounded from unity, those cases for which (aM/aKm ) is nonzero
correspond to rather high shares for capital ( = [l-s]). Also, in
every case except a + 1, an + 1, the factor shares in at least one of
the sectors tends to zero (or one). Thus, it cannot be claimed that this
model explains the observed factor shares in the real world and the
1 7The ambiguity in the table in the case am + 1, a = d(l-am ),
stems from the inability to determine what happens to the effective
capital-labor ratio in sector C. It should be noted that if om 1,
this case would correspond to a steady-state solution.
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TABLE II - Asymptotic Values in the Two-Sector Growth Model
(aM/3Km ) = [n + {a/(l-am)}][(l-s)a + sa ]/sc m
(L/L) = {[s(l-am)]/[s(1-am) + (l-s)(1-ac)]} ;
R (aC/K )
(R/R)
g + Min[O, Max{[d-(a/am)],
[(a-a)/ac ]}
Same as above [ = g]
Same as a bove [ =g]
(d-a)(l-ac) ]
(d-a)(l-ac)] = g
(d-a) (1-ac)]
a <1
m
a or a < 1
m c
Value R
if g=O a a
0 0 0
f'(C)=C
f'(o)=
c
0
f, ()=
c
0
0
0 0
1 0
ac
c
a
c
a
c
0
0
0
a
0
0
(1-s)
(l-s)a
(l-s)ac(-uC
a >1:
c
a>d
a=d
a<d
a - 1:
a <1:
c
a>d(l-am)
a=d(l-am)
a<da(-a )
m
g + Max[O,{(d-a)/c},
{d - (a/a )}]
Same as above [ =g]
Same as above
rf ()= 
fc (-)=
c o
0
1 0
1 0
0 0
g + Min[O, {d - [a/(l-am)]] 0 0
Same as above 0 or - 0 or 1
Same as above f' ( 0)= 1
(l-s)
(l-s)
0
a sa
m m
am [(1-s)ac+sam]
am [(l-s) + sam]
Case
a < 1:
m
a <1:
C
a>d
a=d
a<d
(a -1:
a>d
a=d
a<d
[g +
[g +
[g +
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TABLE II - Continued
Case
a +l:
m
a -+1:
C
a>d(l-a )
a=d(l-am )
a<d(l-a )
a >1:
a>d(l-aM)
a=d(l-a )
a<d(l-a )
(R/R)
Value R
if g=O a a
-n
g + (l-ac )[d{a/(l-am)}] 
g + (1-ac)[d-'a/(-am) }]
g + (-ac,)[d-{a/(l-am)}]
g + Max[O,{d-[a/(l-am)]}]
Same as above [ =g]
Same as above
a
o ao am [(l-s)ac +sa ]
or ac am )a m
co a a [(1-s)a+saM ]
c m c m
f'()= 1
0 or 0 or 
0
a [(l-s) + sam]
a [(l-s)a +sa ]m c m
a sa
m m
apparent constancy of the real interest rate over time (presumably
reflecting the marginal product of capital).
In summary, we have seen that in both the one- and two-
sector models the asymptotic value of the MPK may tend to zero, though
this result seems more likely to occur in the one-sector case. Also, we
have seen that the asymptotic path leaves much to be desired in its
attempt to explain observed factor shares. Let us now comment briefly
on these problems.
IV. Factor Pricing and Factor Shares
As observed repeatedly in this chapter, as well as in
previous chapters, the asymptotic path fails to explain the distribution
of income within the society if the elasticity of substitution is
bounded from one (under the Vanek pricing assumption). That this result
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is inevitable becomes apparent immediately upon realizing that the
effective capital-labor ratio must tend to either zero or infinity in
this "asymptotic equilibrium".
Where does this leave us in attempting to explain reality in
this "asymptotic" world? We have stated earlier that the steady-state,
though it performs well in mapping reality, is a singular result indeed;
and the asymptotic path apparently does not satisfactorily explain the
income distribution in society. Clearly, something must give, and it is
our feeling that the weakest link in the chain is the factor pricing
assumption. If the assumption of constant returns to scale is dropped,
no great ustification remains for resorting to competitive pricing.
Even if we accept the notion of constant returns to scale, the world we
seek to explain does not, in our eyes, duplicate the competitive world
that the model presumes.
For simplicity, we shall concentrate on the one-sector model.
If decreasing returns to scale prevails, then it is still possible to
maintain the assumption of competitive pricing.18 Assuming h < 1, if
labor is paid its marginal value product, then the share of labor should
equal (h - k ). For a < 1, k - 0 (assuming the effective capital-labor
ratio tends to infinity), and so labor's share tends to h, leaving the
residual, (l-h), for capitalists. Thus, if the economy experiences
decreasing returns to scale, and if a < 1, as seems plausible, then
under competitive pricing the share accruing to each factor will
18However, it now becomes necessary to go beyond the aggregate
model and to observe the size of each firm. Clearly, with non-constant
returns to scale, the aggregate output is likely to depend upon
industry structure and the number of firms present in each industry
(assuming that it is not externalities that account for the decreasing
returns to scale).
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approach some positive limit.1 9 Though this would appear to concur with
reality, it does ignore the all-important question of what determines
the firm size in the micro-economy, and how are the decreasing returns
to scale manifested?
If h > 1, as seems possible, then competitive pricing is
meaningless. In this circumstance one would expect to see the economy
dominated by major firms (industries), and an alternative pricing
assumption is needed. As a simple alternative, it is possible to
imagine that firms have market power, so that marginal revenue deviates
from price, but that they behave as perfect competitors in the factor
market (this latter assumption is made for simplicity). In this case,
firms would hire each factor until its marginal revenue product
equalled its cost. Assuming each firm had comparable production and
demand conditions, the allocation of factors within this economy (for
given W, R) would be identical to that for a competitive economy.
How would factor shares in such a world behave? Since each
firm possesses market power, we know:
25) W = MR(aQ/aL); [(WL)/(PQ)] = (MR/P)(3Q/3L)(L/Q) = (MR/P) n
Even if n ( = [h-k1]) tends to h > 1 (and thus k + 0), labor's share
may well be less than one.20 Letting n represent the elasticity of
1 9This assumes that the effective capital-labor ratio tends
to infinity, which in turn assumes that there must be some capital-
augmenting technical progress (since we have assumed h < 1).
200f course, it must be less than, or equal to, one for it to
have any economic meaning (assuming free disposal). What guarantees
that this will be so? Clearly, the number of firms that can profitably
operate depends on h; the larger h, ceteris paribus, the fewer the
number of firms that; can survive (under our assumptions), and hence
the greater the disparity between MR and P must be.
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demand, we have:
26) [(wL)/(PQ)] = [(n-l)/n]n h[(n-l)/n] for on h
Thus, depending upon the elasticity of demand, labor's share may be
significantly less than one. Clearly, for the viability of business
(under the above assumptions) it must be true that:
27) h[(<-l)/,] < 1
This relationship tells us that the degree of increasing returns to
scale places an upper bound (in absolute value) on the elasticity of
demand, presumably through affecting the number of firms in the market.
It is possible to formalize the above presentation (though in
a static sense) by assuming Cournot behavior in the product market,
competitive behavior in the factor market, and to utilize this
information to determine factor shares. If we do this, assuming there
are two products, each facing unitary elastic demand (as in the growth
models), and that there are N firms in each market2 1 (it is quite
simple to allow a different number of firms in each market), we find:
28) [(WL)/(PQ)] = n[(N-l)/N] - h[(N-l)/N] , for *n - h
[(RK)/(PQ) = k[(N-1)/N] 0 for n + h, k ' 0
[(Profits)/(PQ)] =' {1 - h[(N-l)/N]} ; = [(1/N)] for h = 1.
Thus, it is quite plausible that, even though the output-elasticity of
capital tends to zero, its observed share, when combined with
2 1As stated earlier, h places limits on the number of firms
that can survive in the market. This appears clearly in the second
order conditions (for the above model) for a relative profit maximum
as N [(2h)/(h-1)] , h > 1.
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monopolistic profits, approaches a positive limit. For example, if
h = 1.2, and N = 3, then:2 2
29) [(WL)/(PQ)] -+ .8 ; [(RK)/(PQ)I + [(Profits)/(PQ)] + .2
It is quite obvious that the approach pursued above is quite
naive; nevertheless, it does readily illustrate a possible explanation
of the relative constancy of observed factor shares within the context
of the asymptotic equilibrium. What is needed is a more dynamic
approach to this problem, one that explains how the market position of
the firms change through time due to advertising, their individual
investment decisions, and so forth. Though we have not pursued this
problem further, the next chapter does deal with the problem of how
firms decide what growth rates to pursue, and how changes in various
parameters affect this decision.
Before concluding this chapter, there is one more fundamental
problem that must be discussed. In this past section we have attempted
to show that once we leave the competitive framework, the "asymptoitc
equilibrium" is as capable as is the steady-state equilibrium of
explaining the relaltive constancy of factor shares. However, even if
our preceding comments are valid, there still remains the more
fundamental problem of the zero marginal product of capital and the
incentives for investment.
2 2Obviously, nothing is special about the values used here.
Though the proofs of the above statements are omitted, they can readily
be demonstrated by using the normal macro-demand equations and by
dividing the economy into two industries, the firms in each industry
pursuing Cournot behavior. For brevity, the work is not included here.
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V. Investment Decisions and the Marginal Product of Capital
The most fundamental failing of the asymptotic equilibrium
(in our opinion) is its inability to explain both the observed interest
rate and the consequent investment decisions of the firm. In equilib-
rium it is assumed that investment is carried out until the marginal
product of capital equals the real interest rate (barring capital
gains); however, in the previous sections we have seen that, in
general, the marginal product of capital does not tend to a constant,
positive limit but rather normally tends to zero.2 3 If this happens,
the logical question is why any investment takes place, given that the
interest rate is positive.
Unfortunately, we have no definite answers to this problem.
One apparent answer that may suggest itself is that capital is the
bearer of progress, and as such new investment provides society with
new technology (vintage capital). Though the assumption of vintage
capital is, in our opinion, a plausible one, it does not answer our
problems. We have considered a vintage clay-clay model (with Hicks
neutral technical progress). and have found that the marginal product of
capital (of the newest vintage) still tends to zero, while the growth
rates of the system are identical to those in the non-vintage case
(for a 0). 24 Thus, even though technology is embodied in the
2 3In the one-sector case, if al2, then the MPK tends to a
positive limit (if the growth rates are finite). Also, for s =0, the
MPK tends to a positive limit. In the two-sector case, the MPK in
capital-numeraire units may tend to zero or a finite limit (for finite
growth rates); in terms of the consumption good as the numeraire unit,
anything can happen to the MPK.
24Our work on this model is omitted simply because of the
identity of its results to those of the non-vintage case.
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new machines, the marginal product of each additional machine tends to
zero because the economic lifetime of the machines (under competitive
pricing) tends to zero (for discrete time, there will be unused machines
of even the newest vintage). Though we have not investigated the putty-
putty or putty-clay vintage models, we feel strongly that even in these
cases the MPK will tend to zero ( for a < 1).
A second, and more promising, alternative is to assume that the
level of technology depends upon the amount of past investment (learning-
by-doing). In this case the social MPK will remain positive even if the
extra output generated directly by an additional machine (the private
MPK) tends to zero. For example, suppose technology takes the
following form:2 5
30) Q =F(K,Leat) -K[f(. )] ; L= Leat , = (K/L), A l 1
Assuming that everyone saves at the same constant rate, and that a < 1,
we can show:
31) (K/K) + [(a+n)/(l-X).] , and
32) (aQ/aK) = [{KXf(k)}/k](;+k) = {(K/K)(l/s)(,+Ok)}; therefore:
32') (aQ/aK) > [{A(a+n)}/{s(l-))}] O , a < 1
In other words, since the extent of technological efficiency depends
upon the amount of investment, further investment, even if it
2 5This form. of technical progress is postulated because of its
similarity to the Arrow learning-by-doing model [2]. Actually, the
production function is ust a special case of increasing returns to
scale, with h = (1 + ), and k *+ X as F4*-.
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contributes nothing directly to output, does increase output through
improving technology.
There are several obvious problems that arise from the above
formulation. In 32) we have found the social MPK; however, if the
world is composed of small businesses, the private MPK still tends to
zero, so the private motivation for investment is still lacking. If
instead the world is composed of large businesses, then, even though
some externalities may still occur, the private MPK will (in general)
exceed zero, should their investment constitute a "sizeable" portion
26
of total investment.
The other problem that arises is that the production function
in 30) does not exhibit constant returns to scale (as pointed out by
Arrow, among many others). Obviously, both factors cannot be paid their
social marginal products. Under the Arrow assumptions, competition
prevails and labor receives its marginal value product, leaving capital
"underpaid" (giving rise to the need for, or desirability of, capital
subsidies). However, it is quite clear that if this technology tends to
lead to large enterprises (by not being a total externality), there is
no reason to assume that competitive pricing prevails, and the private
MPK may well remain positive (Also, we must then discuss non-competitive
pricing, as in the last section).
Though learning-by-doing technical progress can conceivably
help to explain the presence of continuing investment despite the fact
26This line! of inquiry leads us to ponder whether this learning-
by-doing technology is passed on to all firms, or if it can be
internalized. Following this line of reasoning would lead us into
discussions of market structure and hence disaggregate investment
decisions. We feel that this latter course is one that needs to be
investigated (in a dynamic framework).
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that the physical marginal product of capital tends to zero, we feel
that it is fundamental (especially when the steady-state does not exist)
to inquire just why investment takes place at all. For example, if
instead of assuming that the value of investment is proportional to
income, we assume that the investment demand for each sector is
proportional to its output, we find that a steady-state will exist if
Hicks neutral technical progress does not occur in at least one of the
sectors. 2 7 (The normal result is that there can be no capital-augmenting
technical progress in the investment sector). Though this condition is
still quite strong, it is weaker than the corresponding result in the
normal two-sector model.
Obviously, there are other possibilities that could be
investigated. It is our opinion (because of the failure of the
"asymptotic equilibrium" to fully replicate the stylized facts of
growth) that it is quite essential to consider a more disaggregated
model in order to determine what investment for the economy as a whole
will be.
The two-sector model is considerably more complicated because
of the large variety of results that may occur (as is seen from Table II
of this chapter, page 167). When there are several consumption goods,
we do not know which to treat as the numeraire; consequently, it is
unclear (in the absence of specific utility functions) just what is
27This assumes that Harrod neutral technical progress occurs at
the same rate in each sector. If there are more than two sectors, then
there can only be Hcks neutral technical progress in one sector if a
steady-state solution is to exist (assuming that investment is as above,
and that the demand for each good is unitary elastic).
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meant by the interest rate or by the marginal product of capital.
However, should we consider the capital good to be the numeraire unit,
then in a large number of cases the MPK in terms of this good (which
might also be a consumption good) is finite, but nonzero, so that in
this case the "investment question" is less critical than in the one-
sector model.
In summary, we have seen that our aggregate growth model
presents us with quite a dilemma. On the one hand, the properties of
the steady-state equilibrium seem to coincide quite well with our
observations of the real world, but the chances of such a steady-state
occurring seem quite small indeed. On the other hand, the asymptotic
equilibrium appears to explain the relatively constant growth rates
observed in the economy, but it does not readily account for the
observed factor shares or the presence of continuing investment despite
positive interest rates (for a < 1). Whereas in the steady-state
equilibrium the MPK tends to a positive, finite limit (so that the
ex post observation of a constant fraction of output being invested is
quite plausible), in the asymptotic equilibrium the presence of
continuing investment as the MPK tends to zero (but interest rates
remain positive) is:more suspect. Obviously, then, the problem of
explaining the stylized facts of a growing economy has not been settled
quite so well as the literature might lead one to conclude. Accordingly,
it is our feeling that more attention must be devoted to explaining the
"whys" of investment, principally through a more disaggregate view of
the economy. In our final chapter we hope to take a small step in that
direction by considering the growth decisions made by an isolated firm
in a growing economy.
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Chapter 4: Technology and the Growing Firm - A Simple Model
I. Introduction
So far in this thesis we have considered aggregate models of an
economy, and we have studied how various types of technological change
affect the growth behavior of this economy. In this chapter we shall
adopt a slightly more disaggregate view and shall investigate how
different types of technical progress affect the decisions of a growing
firm.
Specifically, we shall adopt the model of a firm as developed
by Professor Solow 1491. In that paper Prof. Solow formulated a simple
model of a growing firm in order to investigate how the (qualitative)
behavior of a classical profit-oriented firm might differ from that of
the more "modern" growth-oriented firm. Though we shall not be
pursuing this question at any length, the model developed by Prof.
Solow is readily adaptable to our needs.
Though we do not choose to pursue Prof. Solow's line of
inquiry at any length, we feel that several comments about this subject
are in order. It is our understanding that one reason for the "exist-
ence" of growth-oriented firms is due to the separation of ownership
from control of the business. Given this presumption, it is ironic to
note that what Prof. Solow calls the owner-oriented firm will always
(for all types of technical progress) choose a larger growth rate than a
firm that maximizes its value without any concern for the opportunity
cost of the capital to the original investors. Thus, if we assume that
modern technology has given rise to a class of managers (technocrats?)
who run the corporation without direct control from the owners of the
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corporation, it seexms plausible to assume that the rewards to these
technocrats will depend upon the value of the firm (stock options,
stock dividends, bonuses). If these managers are interested in their
own well-being, then they will choose a smaller growth rate than a firm
which is identical in technology, but is run instead by (or for)
its owners.
The above result is a consequence of the fact that the manager-
run firm, disregarding the opportunity cost on capital, will choose a
larger initial size than will the owner-oriented firm. As a result of
this larger size, the manager-run firm receives a lower per unit price
for output, and hence it finds growth less appealing than its (originally)
smaller owner-oriented counterpart.
The question may arise as to how the manager-oriented firm can
ignore the original opportunity cost of capital. An explanation for
this phenomenon (as for the Williamson, Marris type firms) must of
necessity rely upon some imperfection in the capital markets (perhaps
due to lack of, or imperfect knowledge). Thus, the manager-oriented
firm will attempt to raise more funds (than its owner-oriented counter-
part would) through larger initial stock-offerings, or, in the case of a
take-over of an owner-oriented firm by a manager-oriented firm, through
subsidiary stock offerings. The managers can then use these additional
funds to expand the size of the firm beyond that size which the owner-
oriented firm would choose. However, if people subscribe to these
excessive stock offerings, it must be because of some lack of knowledge
on their part, since they surely must consider the opportunity cost to
themselves of their own funds.
We also feel (given our "classical" bias) that the "growth-
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oriented" theorists fail to fully explain why their firms behave the
way they do. One possible explanation for the "growth-oriented"
behavior, we believe, may be a failure to distinguish (or perceive) the
difference between short-run profits and long-run profits. Specifically,
it may seem that, for given technological and economic conditions, the
firm is growing faster than seems profitable; however, over the long-
run, the faster growth rate will (ceteris paribus) allow the firm to
gain a larger share of the market, and hence allow it to seize some of
the larger profits that accrue to the major firm in the industry. Thus,
the firm is sacrificing short-run profits to obtain more market power,
and hence larger profits in the long-run. To a casual observer it may
appear that the firm is growing more quickly than is optimal, but to one
2
who is privy to all the information, this may not appear to be the case.
1Williamson and Marris [31, 63, and 64] argue that the size of
the staff enters the managers' utility function, causing them to behave
differently than a profit-maximizing firm would. Presumably, in terms
of the Solow model this might mean that L, the size of the labor force,
enters the utility function (as a proxy for staff). Consequently, this
would effect the decisions made by the firm. Williamson also argues
that direct rewards ("emoluments") to the managers enters their utility
function. While this is certainly plausible, this latter assumption
would not affect the operation of a manager-oriented firm (per Solow)
since the bonuses come out of profits. However, if a fixed proportion
of net profits must go to managers as bonuses, this would effect the
operations of an otherwise owner-oriented firm since it is effectively
equivalent to an increase in capital costs to the owners (since part of
the dividend flow does not return to them). In order to see how an
increase in capital costs affects the decisions of the firm, consult the
Appendix to this chapter.
2Naturally, this type of reasoning would lead us into
oligopoly and game theory. Thus, if there are two firms in an industry,
each may choose a larger growth rate than would otherwise be optimal,
hoping to improve their market position. However, if both firms behave
in this way, no additional market power will accrue to either firm (or,
at least, additional market power cannot accrue to both firms), and it
will appear ex post as though each firm, and the industry, is growing
faster than a profit-oriented firm should. However, it is possible that
If we accept the hypothesis that firms might choose larger
growth rates to improve their market position, it is possible that, in
turn, this improved market position may lead them to select even higher
growth rates. Specifically, we shall see that within the context of the
model developed by Prof. Solow, the more inelastic the demand curve,
ceteris paribus, the larger the growth rate chosen by the firm. Since a
traditional definition of monopoly power is in terms of the elasticity
of demand facing the firm, it seems plausible to say that the improved
market position folmd by the growing firm may induce it to grow even
quicker. To carry this analysis much further would necessitate formu-
lating a specific model of the market structure, market demand, and
so forth - and this is something that we have not yet done.
Given our classical bias, and the above remarks, we shall
assume that the firm is, in fact, a "profit-maximizer". Using this
assumption, and the basic Solow model, we shall investigate how
different rates of technical progress (and different price behavior)
affect the growth rate chosen by the firm. But before we do this, we
shall present a bri:ef synopsis of the Solow model of the firm.
II. The Solow Model of the Firm
In this section we shall attempt to present the basic model
developed by Prof. Solow, and to briefly summarize his results. The
basic assumpticns are:
1) Fixed coefficients in production prevails
2neither firm acting alone should lower its growth rate, and thus,
without collusion, these profit-oriented firms will choose a larger
growth rate than would seem to be optimal, and hence they will appear
to be "growth-oriented" firms.
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2) There are constant returns to scale in production
3) There is no technological progress, or else it must be
labor-augmenting (in which case the wage rate is
assumed to grow at the same rate as technical
progress).3
4) Depreciation occurs at rate f
5) The price of capital,, m, and the wage rate (in efficiency
units) a, are constants
6) Demand is iso-elastic, with elasticity n, n > 1
7) In order to cause demand to increase over time, it is
necessary to advertise. For demand to grow at rate
g, a fraction s(g) of gross revenue must be spent on
advertising.
Given these assumptions, the firm is assumed to choose a constant price
and a constant rate of growth (and hence the initial size of the firm)
in order to maximize the present value of the firm. While it may seem
like an "imposition" to force the firm to choose a strategy that
prevails for all time, it must be remembered that this is the essence of
a steady-state model. Also, we shall show later in this chapter that,
if the problem is formulated using the Maximum principle, there is a
3It is the purpose of this paper to relax this assumption. The
assumption made corresponds to those made for aggregate growth models.
However, this assumption seems unrealistic since:
a) There appears to be empirical evidence of capital-
augmenting technical progress being present in
industry
b) Even if only labor-augmenting technical progress occurs, it
seems likely to occur at different rates in each
sector, and the wage rate can not, therefore, grow
at the same rate as productivity in each and every
sector.
4It is assumed that there exist gm, gl such that: s(gm)=O,
s(gl) = 1; s', s" > 
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unique growth rate and initial size of the firm that will allow the
firm to pursue the steady-state strategy.
Formulating the model mathematically, we can write:
1) Q = Min(bK,bL)
2) K = K egt ; bK egt
O O
3) I = K + Depreciation = (f + g)K egt
o= o-n implies: P = (/n0 0 0 0
5) T(g) = [1 - s(g)] ; T(g) is the fraction of revenue not spent
on advertising
6) Dividends D.iv = [TPQ - aL - m(f+g)Kegt] =
[Tb Kegt - aK egt - m(f+g)K egt] ; e = [1 - (l/n)]> 0
7) V = fo[(Div)e-itdt] = [TbKo - [a + m(f+g)]K}/(i-g)].0 
Given the value of the firm,5 the management must choose the initial
size (Ko) and the growth rate (g) in order to maximize V.
However, in making its decision, the firm might take no account of
the initial cost of capital - that is, there might be no opportunity
cost attributed to capital (This could arise if the planners had an
interest in the vaLue of the firm, but did not provide the original
capital). Thus, the question arises as to what criterion should be used
for maximizing the value of the firm. Prof. Solow considers two
possibilities:
5It might be argued that, due to myopia, imperfect capital
markets, and so forth, the value of the firm should be:
V = f[U(D)e-itdt] ; (where U(D) is the utility derived
from dividends), Though we have not investigated this case, it seems
likely that if U" < 0, this assumption would lead the firm to choose
slower growth rates than for expression 7) above.
184
I) (aV/aKo) = 0, (aV/ag) = 0
II) (aV/aK) = j, (av/ag) = 0, j - m
Though Professor Solow suggests that in a world of perfect capital
markets it must be true that [(aV/aKo ) = ml, he apparently does not feel
that a compelling argument can be made to guarantee this equality in the
real world. However, if one deducts from the value of the firm the cost
of the initial capital, we have:
7') V* = V - LK .
It is clear that maximization of V* leads to the criterion: Vk=m, Vg=O.
Since V, the value of the firm, is computed by calculating the present
discounted value of' the flow of dividends, it certainly seems appropriate
to deduct from this stream of dividends the initial outlays. Therefore,
we feel that V--m is the "proper" criterion, though we shall explore
both cases.6 Prof. Solow also focuses his attention on two cases
(which we shall call Criterion I and Criterion II):
I) Vk O, V =0
II) Vk m, Vg =
As indicated in the! introduction, Criterion I can be interpreted as
representing the manager-oriented firm, since no consideration is given
to the owners' original outlays, whereas Criterion II is more suitable
for what Prof. Solow calls the "owner-oriented firm".
Given the form of V, and the maximization criterion that is
6As we shall see, when the Maximum Principle is used, the only
steady-state solution implies that Vk=m, Vg=0. This is because in
deciding how much capital to invest, we implicitly attribute an
opportunity cost to the initial capital.
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adopted, one can then proceed to calculate the optimal solution for the
firm. Under the assumption that Vk=O, Vg=O, Prof. Solow proceeds to
sketch each curve (both are negatively sloped in the (Ko,g) plane), and
to show what a maximum solution would look like.7 We can briefly
summarize his results as follows:
a) If the curves never intersect, there is no interior
solution, and the smallest-feasible g is the
optimal solution.
b) There must be some interior relative maximum if:
[(a+mf)/{a+m(i+f)}] > [eT(o)/{T()+iT(0o)}1 > e
Note that for near one (n-*+), this condition will
not be fulfilled, and hence it is possible that in
this case no interior solution exists.
c) If there is more than one intersection of the curves, at
least one of them must be a saddle-point. However,
though Prof. Solow does not point this out, there
would appear to be no guarantee of a unique interior
(relative) maximum, and hence it may be necessary, in
the case of several relative maxima, to compare the
extreme values at each point to determine which is
the global maximum.8
As an alternative, consider the case: Vk = j m, Vg = 0.
Prof. Solow shows that the Vk = j m curve is either always negatively
sloped, or else has at most one change in the sign of the derivative
7From the second order conditions it can readily be seen that:
[dK0/dig](Vk=O)1 < I[dK0/dg](v g=)l at a maximum, and other-
wise the intersection is a saddle-point (no interior minimum is possible).
8This same problem arises when technical progress is considered,
and it proves quite burdensome since we wish to determine what happens
to the growth rate as a result of changes in certain parameters. We
shall assume that (except for singular cases) the same root (inter-
section) remains the dominant one (optimal one), thus enabling us to
consider only how each of the intersections shifts.
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(for = m, the slope is always strictly negative). Furthermore, since
Vkk < 0 everywhere, it follows that the Vk = curve (j > O) lies
inside the Vk = 0 curve. From this fact we can infer:
a) If there is an intersection of the Vk=O and V =0 curves,
then there must be one for the Vk=J > 0 and the
V =0 curves, though the reverse is not necessarily
g 9
true.
b) If there is a unique intersection of these two curves,
the owner-oriented firm will always choose a larger
growth rate than the management-oriented firm. If
there are several interior solutions, then each
relative maximum occurs at a higher growth rate for
the owner-oriented firm. It is possible that as the
Vkj curve shifts inward (as increases) that some
"troots" may be lost; however, the root corresponding
to the largest growth rate can not be lost since,
for K = 0, the V =0 curve must lie below the
o g
Vk=j 0 curve.
As a third. alternative (and to allow him to deal with the
growth-oriented firms), Prof. Solow considers the case in which the
initial size of the firm is fixed, and only the growth rate is to be
chosen by the firm. Since we are not mainly interested in comparing
the owner-oriented firm to the management-oriented firm, we shall not
even consider this alternative. We do feel, however, that it is less
plausible to assume the firm will choose a steady-state strategy when
it has no choice over its original size. Thus, if the initial size
is too small, it may choose a larger initial growth rate to increase
9Thus, for V =0, V =O, there might be a boundary solution,
k g
while for Vk=j > 0 V =0, there might be an interior solution.k 9~~
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the size of the film.1 0
Since our interest lies primarily in the growth rates chosen by
the firm, consider the "growth-rate determining" equations (we shall
assume, as Prof. Solow implicitly does, that a unique interior maximum
exists):
I) Vk Vg = 0 ; [T + (i-g)T']/T = e[a + m(i+f)]/[a + m(f+g)]
II) k= m V = 0; T + n(i-g)T' = 0 ; (or [T + (i-g)T'] = T)kg
As already noted, it is clear that the owner-oriented firm
chooses a larger growth rate than the other firm. How does a change in
the elasticity of demand affect the growth rate chosen by the firm?
First consider the case Vk m, V = 0:k g
8) [T + n(i-g)T'] F(n,g) = 0 ; F < 0 clearly.
If we consider the second order conditions for a maximum we find:
9) [VkkVgg - (Vgk)(Vg)] > 0 implies [n(i-g)T" + (1-n)T'] < 0 ;
10) Therefore: Fg = [(l-n)T' + n(i-g)T"] < 0 at a maximum. Thus:
11) (dg/dn) = -[Fn/Fg] < O.
That is, by considering the second order conditions, it is
possible to show that the greater the elasticity of demand, the slower
1 0This assertion is borne out by the observation that there is
a unique steady-state solution to the Pontryagin problem. Thus, there
is only one set of initial conditions that will lead the firm to choose
a steady-state path (Assuming the price of output is not fixed for the
firm).
1 1Prof. Solow has suggested in his paper that as n-e, g-i, if
the restrictions on T(g) are ignored (Solow, op. cit., [49]). However,
if T', T" < 0, even if T(i) > 0, then, as n increases, g decreases,
and as n-, T() +* 0, not g - i.
188
the firm will choose to grow. If we identify the larger elasticity of
demand with a more highly competitive industry, then it follows that the
more competitive the industry, the more slowly growing the firm will be.
Combined with the assumption that a firm may seek a larger growth rate
in order to increase its monopoly power (and thus decrease n), it can be
seen that these two processes may be reenforcing.
Though we might speculate that the optimal size of the firm
will increase as the elasticity of demand increases (from the static
notion that monopolies underproduce), this is not necessarily so.
Specifically:
12) K {[6b Ti/[a + m(i+f)]ln ; = [1 - (/n)]
0
13) (dKo/dn) = (Ko/n)[ln(bK) + (1/0) + (T'/T)(dg/dO)]
Without further information on T" it does not appear possible to say
what will happen to K as n changes. Economically, it appears that if
K is initially sufficiently small, the increase in the price elasticity
may cause price to fall (ceteris paribus), thereby causing the firm to
contract its output. However, as n becomes sufficiently large, it seems
likely that further increases in n are likely to elicit increases in K .
Similarly, for the case Vk=O, V =0 it can be shown, using
the second order conditions, that an increase in n will lead the firm to
12As usual, the possibility of multiple roots of the equation
[T + n(i-g)T'] = 0 exists. In this case, we can say that each root
associated with a maximum decreases and that each root associated with a
saddle-point increases as n increases. If the chosen growth root does
not change, then our conclusion stands. It seems that, except in
singular cases, a change in n will not lead the firm to choose a
different growth root.
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choose a slower growth rate.l 3 However, since the work is rather
tedious, we shall omit the proof.
This concludes our brief summary of Prof. Solow's paper. In
addition to outlining hisf model, we have found that:
i) The owner-oriented firm will choose a larger growth rate
than the management-oriented firm.
ii) The more competitive is the industry (as measured by the
elasticity of demand facing the firm), the slower
each firm will choose to grow.
In the following sections we shall consider how changes in the
model affect the optimal growth rate for each type of firm. Our first
analysis deals with a problem suggested by Prof. Solow himself - how do
our results change if the firm is allowed to change its price at a
constant rate over time?
III. The Solow Firm and Price Strategy
In this section we adopt Prof. Solow's suggestion and allow the
price to change at a constant rate over time. Adopting his notation:
14) Q Qegt ; P = P e ; thus, Q = (o)-ne (h + n w)t,
g = (h + n), where h is the rate of increase in demand due to
advertising.
15) Div(t) = T(h)b6K-e( g- W )t [a + m(g+f)]K eg t0 
If the firm adopts a policy of falling prices, eventually
dividends will become negative. If there is free disposal of its
13All the previous warnings regarding multiple equilibria
apply here. From now on we shall assume (for simplicity) that a unique
interior solution exists. If not, our previous cautions must be
considered.
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assets, then the firm should shut down when the dividends fall to zero.
However, it seems unlikely that a firm planning to terminate its opera-
tions in the not-too-distant future would pursue a steady-state path
until its demise. Thus, the framework of this model is not suited to
deal with a falling price situation. Also, it is clear that a policy of
price reduction is not compatible with the notion of a firm interested
in its own self-preservation.1 4
If we assume that a firm pursues a policy of falling prices, as
well as a continuous rate of growth of output until it shuts down, then
its current value would be (assuming it shuts down when dividends fall
to zero):
T it
16) V f 0 [(Div)e dt] ; Dividends equal zero at T such that:
e- = {[a + m(f+g)]/[T(h)beK(e-1)]} . Thus:
le ) [ (i+-g) Tb K [a+m(f+g)]K + 7rK[a m(fg)]]
17) V= - + T(01)
l(i+sr-g) (i-g) j(i-g)(i+n-g)[Tb K- )][ (i- g)/ ]
For falling prices (T > ), this expression exceeds the one developed by
Prof. Solow because he implicitly assumes that the firm must live
forever, forcing it to pay" negative dividends. The last expression
on the right hand side of equation 17) indicates how much the firm saves
by closing its doors when dividends reach zero (instead of continuing to
operate forever).
14Because of oligopolistic markets, it may be that a certain
asymmetry in price changes exists. That is, the firm may be able to
pursue a policy of rising prices without reprisals, but its policy of
falling prices may be followed by competitors, offsetting the initial
advantages of the lower prices (This is, of course, the kinked-demand
curve phenomenon). This problem points out, we believe, the danger of
a partial-equilibrium approach.
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If the firm pursues a falling price strategy, then its optimal
lifetime depends upon all the decision variables of the firm. An
increase in K , ceteris paribus, leads to an earlier shut-down because
the price falls in response to the larger output. Comparably, the
quicker the firm chooses to grow, ceteris paribus, the sooner the firm
will shut-down because a larger fraction of gross revenue is spent on
advertising. An increase in the rate of decline in prices works in two
directions - it leads to lower advertising expenditures (for the same
growth rate for the firm), but it also means prices are falling more
rapidly.
Since expression 17) is a rather difficult one to work with,
and since falling prices do not seem appropriate in a steady-state
model, we shall assume that either:
a) Prices increase or stay the same over time, or
b) The firm must operate forever.
If we make either assumption, we can then derive the expression for the
present value of the firm (which is the same as Prof. Solow's
expression):
18) V = {[T(h)b Ko ]/(i+i-g)} - K {[a + m(f+g)]/(i-g)}
As earlier, there are several criteria that may be used in
determining the optimal values of (g,Ko,r).
I) Vk=V =V =0
g w
II) Vk = m, V = V = 0
Using criterion I, and solving the resulting simultaneous
system, we find:
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19) [T + n(i+ir-g)T'] 0
20) = -{[m(i-g)2]/[a + m(i+f)]} < 0
21) K = [{eTb (i-g)}/{[a + m(f+g)](i+T-g)}]n
From these equations we can see that the management-oriented
firm will choose a strategy of rising prices. How does a change in n
affect g?
19) F(n,r,g) [T + n(i+wr-g)T'] = 0
20) F = (i-g)Tt - n(i+w-g)wT" < 0 (h = [g - n]; < 0)
But, from the second order condition we can show that:1 5
21) F = (.aF/ag) + (.aF/a)(d/dg) < 0
22) Therefore, (dg/dn)-< 0; (.dw/dn) = (d/dg)(dg/dn) < 0
Thus, as in the case of the firm that holds price constant, an increase
in the elasticity of demand will lead to a lower growth rate but,
paradoxically, to more rapidly rising prices. It would be interesting
to know whether the firm with fixed prices or the firm with rising
prices (for the manager-oriented firm) chooses a larger growth rate;
unfortunately, even, though we might expect the constant-price firm to
choose the larger growth rate, we have not been able to demonstrate this.
Fortunately, when we consider our second criterion, our results are more
definitive.
II) Vk =m, = V=0
Using this alternative criterion, and proceeding as before, we
1 5This result follows directly from the second order
condition; for the sake of brevity, the proof is omitted.
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derive: 
23) [T + n(i+w-g)T'] = 0
24) w = 0; therefore, [T + n(i-g)T'] = 0
25) K = {[OTb ]/[a + m(i+f)]}n
The owner-oriented firm, when faced with the opportunity to
vary prices over time, will behave in exactly the same way as his
counterpart firm that is constrained to hold prices fixed over time
(though he can set the initial price level). Thus, all our comments
from the prior section regarding the owner-oriented firm are applicable
in this case. Specifically, the growth rate chosen by the firm depends
only on n and i (and the shape of T(g)), and an increase in either
will decrease the optimal growth rate of the firm.
Also, if we compare our results for criteria I and II, we see
that the owner-oriented firm chooses a smaller initial size (and hence
a larger initial price), but a larger growth rate. Therefore, even
though the management-oriented firm will initially provide the public
with more output at a lower price, it will eventually be dominated (in
total size) and undersold by the owner-oriented firm.
Now that we have considered how firms will vary their prices,
if allowed to do so, let us next consider what effect technical progress
will have on the decisions made by the firms. As we shall see, the
analysis becomes more complicated as a result of this new assumption.
16This result coincides with the steady-state solution obtained
from the Maximum Principle - see Section VII of this chapter.
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IV. The Effect of Disembodied Capital-Augmenting Technical
Progress on the Firm
In this section we- shall consider what effect changes in
technology have upon the decisions of the firm. As Prof. Solow mentions
in his paper, if the technical progress is disembodied and labor-
augmenting, and if the wage rate increases at the same rate as labor
productivity, then the model is unchanged (except for the physical
quantity of labor). However, if the wage rate changes at a different
rate than does the productivity of labor (as is certainly possible in a
many sector model), then the Solow model will be altered. For
simplicity, we shall adopt Prof. Solow's assumption regarding the wage
rate and labor productivity, and instead we shall focus our attention on
the effect of disembodied capital-augmenting technical progress. In a
subsequent section we shall consider how our results change if the
technical progress is embodied in new machinery.
Assuming technical progress occurs at rate c, and that the firm
plans to grow at rate g, we calculate:
26) Q bK egt ; K = K e( g - c )t0 0
27) Div = TbeKegt - aK egt - m(g+f-c)K e(gc)t
28) V = {[Tb K - aK ]/(i-g)} - {([m(f+g-c)K ]/(i+c-g)}
Note that the larger c, ceteris paribus, the less investment the firm
will undertake. In fact, if c is sufficiently large, the firm may
discard capital over time (if c > f + gl] , where T(g1) = 0, then
clearly capital will be discarded over time). However, since it seems
plausible that f > c, we shall not worry about this possibility.
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The firm's problem is to choose K and g; however, as
there are several possible criteria. We shall explore the two
considered in previous sections:
I) Vk = Vg = 
II) Vk = m, Vg
always,
= 0
For Vk = 0, V -
29) Vk = TbK(6l) - a
0, we can derive:
- {[m(i-g)(f+g-c)]/[i+c-g]} = 0
(i-g)
30) V = K {bK [T+(i-g)T'] - a - [{m(i-g)2(i+f)}/(i+c-g)2 ] = 0
(i-g)2
From 29) and 30) we can see that an increase in the rate of
technical progress, ceteris paribus, will increase the marginal values
of both K and of g:
31) (aVg/ac) > O0 (aVk/ac) > .
Furthermore, since Vkk <
that an increase in c shifts both
Unfortunately, it is not
monotonic for c > 0. For Vk=0 we
32)
0. and [Vgk](V =O) < 0, it follows
the Vk=O and the V =0 curves outward.
possible to show that either curve is
find:
[Vkg](Vk) = {[ebK(e 1)T' - m{ - [c(i+f)/(i+c-g) ]}]/(i-g) ;
kg (Vk=0) = {[bo
32') Vkk < 
For Ko sufficiently small (g sufficiently large), this expression [32)]
will be negative; however, as g becomes small, this expression might
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become positive. Nor is there any guarantee that Vkg changes sign only
once. Therefore, we can not obtain much information about the shape of
the Vk-O curve, except that for small K it must be downward sloping. 17
Let us see if we can learn any more about the shape of the
V =0 curve. Clearly, for V =0 it must be true that g (where
g g"
[T(g) + (i-g)T'(g)] = O); as K + 0, g + . Also, as g 0 , K0 0
approaches some finite, positive value. Therefore, the V =0 curve
must be negatively sloped at some points. Furthermore:
33) Vgk < 0 for V = 0
34) V = [Ko/(i-g)3 ][beK(e-1)(i-g) 2 T" + {[2mc(i+f)(i-g)2]/(i+cg)3}]
gg~ o o
Without further information on the shape of T, it is not possible to
ascertain the value of Vgg ; however, as K + 0, g + g, and V < 0
(provided that T"(g) £c < 0). Thus, for large g, the V =0 curve will
be negatively sloped; elsewhere, it is not possible to determine its
slope. 18
When the two curves intersect, [Vkg](V =O) = [Vgk](Vg O) , and
thus the Vk- =0 curve must be negatively sloped at any intersection of the
1 7For g > , where [T(g) + (i-i)T'(g)] = 0, [dKo/dg(V 0 ) < 0;
also, if i > (c+f), then d[dKo/dg] < 0. Since [dK /dg] < 0 for c=O,
dc 
it follows that for c > 0, i > (c+f), then [dKo/dg](V =O) < 0.
However, there is no reason to assume that i is as large as is needed
for this result to apply.
If T"=O for g g*, then Vgg > 0 in this range. Since it
is likely that there will be some increase in demand over time even
without advertising, it seems plausible to assume that T"O for some
g* > O. Thus, the V =0 curve is likely to have positive slope for
small values of g. g
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two curves. Furthermore, for a maximum it must be true that:
35) V < 0, Vg < 0, and [VggV - (Vgk ) ] > 
Therefore, if V =0 has positive slope when the curves intersect, the
g
intersection is a saddle-point; and if Vk=0 has a larger slope (in
absolute value), then the intersection is again a saddle-point. Only
if V =0 has a steeper (and negative) slope (dKo/dg) when the curves
cross can the intersection be a maximum.
As Prof. Solow does, we can consider how these curves behave as
they approach the axes. For Vk=0, as K + 0, T + 0 (call the value of
g such that T = 0, gl); similarly, for V =0, as K + 0, g must tend to
(where [T(j) + (i-g)T'(g)] = 0). Since T" < 0, it follows that
< gl; therefore, if the two curves ever intersect, at least one of
these intersections must be a maximum.9 So far, there is no guarantee
that the curves ever intersect; however, if K > K (where Vk[0,K ]=0,
V [0,K ]=O), then there must be at least one interior solution. In
other words, if:
36) [T(O) + iT'(O)] > [a + [mi 2 (i+f)]/(i+c) 2}1 ; (f c)
T(O) [a + {[mi(f-c)]/(i+c)}]J
then the two curves must intersect (for c=O, this reduces to Prof.
Solow's expression that was referred to earlier). If K < K it is
possible that the curves never cross (in which case the smallest
1 9From the fact that g < gl, it follows that the intersection
of these two curves corresponding to the largest g (if there is more
than one intersection) must be at least a relative maximum since the
V g=0 curve must have a steeper slope [(dKo/dg]) at this intersection.
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feasible value of g is the optimal growth rate), or else that the
curves intersect several times.
To summarize:
a) There is no guarantee that the curves are monotonic.
b) The Vk=0 curve has negative slope whenever the Vg=0 curve
lies below it.
c) Both curves are negatively sloped for "large" values of g.
d) If the curves ever intersect, at least one of the inter-
sections must be a relative maximum. Also, the
Vk=0 curve must have negative slope whenever the two
curves intersect.
e) There is no guarantee of the existence or of the uniqueness
of an interior maximum.
The diagrams on the following page indicate some of the possibilities
of the behavior for the V =0 and the V =0 curves; naturally, there are
k g
other possibilities. Obviously, the simplicity of the Solow model
disappears when we consider the possibility of capital-augmenting
technical progress.
Assuming that an interior solution exists, it remains to be
determined how the optimal solution (K*,g*) changes as c increases.
Since both curves are shifted outward, it is not possible to determine
by inspection how the intersection shifts (though at least one of K* and
0
g* must increase). Using the fact that a maximum occurs at the
intersection of the two curves (assuming the proper slopes), and that a
change in c shifts both curves, we can derive (at a maximum):
37) (dg/dc) = (-V gk)(Vkc )[{(cV)/(V kcVgk - 1]
[V V - (Vkg) 2]gg kk kg
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38) (dK/dc) = (-Vgg)(Vkc)[l - {(VgcVkg)/(V c )}g
[VVkk - (Vkg )2]
At a maximum the denominator of each expression must be positive; also,
since V < 0, Vgk < 0, and Vkc > 0, it follows that:
39) sign(dg/dc) = sign[{(VgcVkk)/(VkcV ) - 1] ; and,
sign(dKO/dc) =signt 1 - {(VgcVkg)/(VkcVgg)}]
Thus, from the second order condition it is apparent that at least one
of (dg/dc) and (dKo/dc) must be positive.
It is not possible to determine the value (or sign) of (dg/dc)
for all values of c; however, for c near zero we find:
40) sign(dg/dc) = sign[a + m(f+2g-i)]
Thus, for i sufficiently small (i < f suffices), the management-
oriented firm that faces disembodied capital-augmenting technical
progress will choose a larger growth rate than a firm which does not
possess technical progress. However, if i is rather large, it is
possible that (dg/dc) < 0 (and thus (dKo/dc) > 0).2 0 If (dg/dc) > 0, it
is not possible to determine the sign of (dKo/dc) without further
knowledge of T". 21
2 0In other words, if people are "quite myopic", they may be
tempted to use the fruits of technological progress for immediate
plunder rather than for long-term growth. Thus, firms facing identical
cost and demand conditions (except, presumably, for interest rates), may
respond differently in different societies. Particularly, in a develop-
ing country, where the rate of time preference may be high, technological
change may lead to lower growth rates for the firm (and perhaps for the
economy, depending upon who does the savings).
2 1 Similarly, it is not possible in this case to show that the
firm that has any positive level of technological progress will grow
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The procedure followed to determine the sign of (dg/dc) is
applicable for determining how changes in any of the parameters affect
g or K (In his paper, Prof. Solow, in order to compare the classical
profit-maximizing firm to the growth-oriented firm, performed these
comparative static operations. However, he did this under the assump-
tion that the initial K was given to the firm). Thus, for any
parameter z we find:
41) (dg/dz) = (-V)[(V){[(V V)/(V._)] - 1}]g.- KZG gZ 1 L KZ gl
[VggVkk- (Vg) 2
.gg kk ~~~(kg)
42) (dK /dz) = (-V )[(Vkz){l - [(V zVk)/(Vkz v )]
[VggVkk (vkg) 2 ]
Since the denominator is positive at a maximum, as is (-Vgk ) and (-Vgg),
the sign of each expression depends upon the term in brackets in the
numerator. Therefore, we find:
4 3) Vkz < 0, Vgz > 0
Vk > O, Vgz< 0
VkZ > O VgZ > 0
Vkz < 0, V < 0
implies (dK/dz) < 0,
implies (dKo/dz) > ,
implies at least one of
positive.
implies at least one of
negative.
(dg/dz)
(dg/dz)
> 0.
<0.
(dg/dz), (dK0/dz) is
(dg/dz), (dKo/dz) is
Following this procedure (and assuming c=0), we find:2
2 1faster than the firm with no technical progress. See the appendix
for more details.
22In the appendix we shall consider how any price change ( or
change in technology) affects the growth decisions made by the firm.
This is done in the case of embodied technological progress, as well as
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44) a) (dKo/di) > 0 , (dg/di) < 0
b) (dK/da) < 0 , (dg/da) > 0
c) (dK/dm) ? , (dg/dm) < 
d) (dKo/dn) ? , (dg/dn) < 
As is expected (and as Prof. Solow finds for constant K ), an increase
in the price of capital goods or in the rate of discount leads the firm
to choose lower growth rates. (Remember that 44) was derived by using
the criterion that Vk=O, and by assuming that c=O). In the case of a
change in the discount rate, since this does not represent an increase
in costs per se (but rather a bias against the future), the smaller
growth rate leads the firm to choose a larger initial size.23 However,
an increase in the wage rate actually results in a larger growth rate
for the firm.
We have seen that for Vk=O, Vg=0, the model becomes quite
complicated for c > 0; and we have seen that we cannot reach many
definitive results, even concerning how changes in technological
progress affect the growth rate chosen by the firm. If we adopt the
criterion for the owner-oriented firm things become slightly more
tractable. Let us now investigate this case.
II) Vk m, V = 0
Using this criterion we arrive at the following conditions:
2 for disembodied technological progress. Also, it is done for the
owner-oriented firm as well as for the manager-oriented firm.
23Note the similarity of this result to that which we found for(dg/dc) - that is, if i is large enough, the firms may take profits
imediately, foregoing the opportunity for growth.
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45) Vk - m = [ K(oe ) - a - {[m(i+f)(i-g)1/(i+c-g)}] = O
.U. e..-1(i-g)
Vg K= [ob K ){T+(ii-g)T'} - a- {[m(i+f)(i-g) 2]/(ic-g)2}] = 0
(i-g)2
Since Vk=m lies inside the Vk-O curve, it follows that if an interior
solution exists in the latter case, than it exists in the former case.
Thus, as in the case c, the owner-oriented firm will choose a larger
growth rate but smaller initial size than the manager-oriented firm.24
Unfortunately, we are still not able to say that either curve is
monotonic. All our previous comments regarding the shapes of the two
curves (see page 198) are also valid in this case. From equation 45)
we can show:
46) T + n(i-g)T' + [[(n-l)Tmc(i-g)(i+f)] O
[la(i+c-g)2 + m(i-g)(i+f)(i+c-g)]J
When c=O,this reduces to the case considered by Solow; if c-> 0,
it follows that in equilibrium (since n is assumed to be larger than
one):
47) [T + n(i-g)T'] < 0
Therefore, the owner-oriented firm with capital-augmenting technical
progress will (at least for small values of c) choose a larger growth
rate than a comparable firm that has no technical progress.
More formally, using the technique described earlier, we find:
2 4The usual warnings regarding multiple roots hold in this case,
as in all other cases.
204
48) sign(dg/dc) = sign{(V gcvkk)/(VkVgk) - 1] =
sign { 2[a(i-g) + {[m(i+f)(i-g)2]/(i+c-g)} ]] - 1}> 0 at c=
[a(ic-g) + {[m(i+f)(i-g) 2/(i+c-g)1]
As we can readily see, for c=0O this expression is always positive;
furthermore, for [i > (c+g)], (dg/dc) > 0 everywhere. 2 5 Since, for
convergence, we must assume i > g, if c is not "too large", this
26
condition seems quite likely to be fulfilled. Unfortunately, without
further assumptions on T(g), we cannot ascertain the sign of (dKo/dc).
Though we shall not present the actual computations, it should
be noted that the "neat" solution of a constant price strategy for the
owner-oriented firm disappears in the face of capital-augmenting
technical progress. Even if the firm is forced to operate forever
(thus absorbing some unnecessary losses in the case of falling prices),
the owner-oriented firm with some technical progress will choose to
purs'ue a falling-price strategy.2 7
Obviously, however, this firm would do even better if it
terminated its operations at some point in time, and consequently a
a steady-state model is hardly the proper framework for analyzing this
2 5Note, paradoxically, that the larger i is in this case, the
more certain we are that (dg/dc) > 0; Just the opposite case holds for
the management-oriented firm.
26Though it is not necessarily true that (dg/dc) > 0 for all
values of c, we show in the appendix that the owner-oriented firm with
some capital-augmenting technical progress always chooses a larger
growth rate than the firm that has no technical progress.
27If (PIP) = -, assuming that the firm operates forever, we
find: 0 < = {[m(i+f)c]/[({a(i+c-g)2}/(i-g) 2) + m(i+f)]} c.
If the firm were allowed to shut-down when dividends fell to zero, it
clearly could do even better.
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case. Though we do not plan to offer an alternative model at this
time, it is worth observing that the presence of capital-augmenting
technical progress causes "perverse" behavior for the Solow firm
(which is geared to the steady-state), as it does for the neoclassical
growth models.
Our next task, one which is a logical extension of this
section, is to investigate how our results change if the technical
progress is embodied in new capital (though it is still assumed to be
capital-augmenting). Since the fruits of technical progress are
bestowed only upon new capital, we should expect the firm to choose a
smaller initial size, but larger growth rate, than in the case in which
technical progress is disembodied. Let us now see if our intuition is
substantiated.
V. Embodied Capital-Augmenting Technical Progress
and the Solow Firm
Before proceeding to the analysis, let us take a closer look at
the model we have been using. The firm is assumed to start with some
"chunk" of capital, and it is assumed to keep adding to this capital so
that the total available stock of capital grows at a constant rate (of
[g-cl). If we think about this, it is apparent that while a finite
amount of capital of vintage t=O exists, only infinitesimal amounts of
28The question arises as to why the firm, instead of shutting
down, does not Just cut its output and raise prices. This approach,
which is not acceptable in the steady-state model, indicates the limit-
ing behavior of our assumptions. However, we feel that a more general
equilibrium approach, properly representing the oligopolistic nature of
the market (and thus giving rise to kinked-demand curve phenomena),
would make a falling-price strategy much less likely to be chosen.
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any other vintage exist ( K(t) = Kt = (gf-c)Koe(c)t is the rate of
flow of machines of vintage t). Though this may seem slightly strange,
it causes no problems as long as all machines are used. However, if
older machines are eventually discarded (due to economic obsolescence),
then at some point in time a discontinuity in output will occur (when
this large block of capital is discarded). As we shall see, this aspect
of the model (plus the fact that the economic lifetime of- capital depends
upon the other variables under the firm's control) will cause us a great
deal of trouble when we consider the case of embodied labor-augmenting
technical progress.
Assuming technical progress is embodied and only capital-
augmenting (or, if any labor-augmenting technical progress occurs, it is
assumed to be disembodied, and for simplicity wages are assumed to grow
at the same rate as the labor-augmenting technical progress), we have:
49) QV = flow of output from capital of vintage v.
Kv = flow of capital of vintage v. Thus,
= bKve ; K = initial block of capital
L = K ecv
V V
Next, assume that depreciation occurs at rate f on capital of all
vintages:
50) Qv(t) = flow output at time t from capital of vintage v
K (t) = amount of capital of vintage v left at time t
Lv(t) = amount of labor used at time t on capital of vintage v
K (t) = K e-f(t-v) t v
(t) = ef(t) t v ; and so forth.
Finally, assume the firm seeks to grow at (a constant) rate g:
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51) K(t) = (g+f)K e(g-C)VJf(t-v) = (g+f)K e(g+fc)v e ; t > v
Qv(t) = b(g+f)K e(g+f)ve-ft therefore,
= ; , therefore,
52) Q(t)= f[Qv(t)dv] + Qo( t ) bK egt ; L(t) = K egt and:
Qo(t) = bKoe
Therefore, the flow of dividends at time t is:
53) Div(t) = Tb eg t - aK egt - m(g+f)K(; and thus:
54) V = fo[Div(t)e itdt] = [bKoT - aK] - [m(g+f)Ko ]
(i-g) (i+c-g)
For c=0 this reduces to Prof. Solow's expression; for c > 0, note that
the value of the "vintage" firm is always less than that of the firm in
which technical progress is disembodied (call it V'). That is, we know:
28) V' = ({[b KoT - aK ]/(i-g)} - {[m(g+f-c)K]/(i+c-g)})
Let us now investigate how the vintage firm will behave under
each of our two criteria:
I) Vk = = 0
55) Vk = ({[b K e-1 )T - a]/(i-g)} - {[m(f+g)]/(i+c-g)}) = 0
56) V = [K /(i-g) ][b0K(e-1){T+(i-g)T'} - a - im(i+c+f)(i-g)2 = 0
(i+c-g)
Since Vk , V > 0, the curves for c > 0 both lie outside those forkc gc
c = , and hence we can not tell by inspection what happens to Ko and g
(except that at least one of them must increase). Also, observe that
the 'k=O and the V =0 curves each lie inside their corresponding curvesk g
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for disembodied technical progress, and hence all that we can now con-
clude is that either Ko or g (or both) is lower in the vintage case
than in the disembodied case.
As in the previous section, it is not possible to show that the
Vk=0 and the V=0 curves are negatively sloped at all points. However,
all of our prior remarks regarding the slopes of the curves remain
qualitatively unchanged. Thus, when the curves intersect, Vk=O must
have negative slope; and if the curves ever intersect, at least one of
these intersections must be a relative maximum; and so forth.
Will the firm choose a larger growth rate for the case of
vintage technical progress than for the non-vintage case? Since both
curves shift inward (for the vintage model vis-a-vis the non-vintage
model) it is not possible to tell a priori. Remembering that the V =0
g
curve must have a larger slope (in absolute value) at the intersection
of the two curves (for it to be a relative maximum), it follows that if
at the g which optimizes the non-vintage case (call it g), the Vk=O
curve lies above the V =0 curve (for the vintage case), then the
g
optimal g must decrease, and conversely. That is, if:
57) g, K is the optimal solution for the non-vintage case; and
define K1 , K 2 such that: Vk(g,K) 0 and Vg(g, K2 ) for
the vintage case. Therefore, if g' is the optimal solution for
the vintage case, then:
57a) g' g as K2 K2< 1
Using the fact that the pair (g,Ko) is the solution for the non-
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vintage case, we find:2 9
rn .1
58) (/K )l-' -
rA .
Ia + {[m(f+g)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)} - A , and:
[a + Em(f+g-c)(i-g)]/(i+c-g) 
I[a + m(ic+)(i-g)2]/(i+c-g)] B. Thus:
[a + [m(i+f)(i-g) 2]/(i+c-g)2 
59) (K2 /K1 ) = (A/B)n,
However, through simple multiplication it can readily be shown that
A > B. Therefore:
60) (A/B) > 1 implies: (K2/K) > 1, and thus: g' > g
Consequently, we have confirmed our intuition: the vintage
firm will choose a larger growth rate than the non-vintage firm
(assuming they are otherwise identical). Since the Vk=O, Vg=0 curves
shift inward (in the vintage case), the vintage firm must choose a
smaller initial size, given that it chooses a larger growth rate. In
other words, vintage technical progress raises the price of current
machines compared to future machines (effectively), and hence it
induces the firm to "start smaller and grow bigger", compared to its
non-vintage counterpart. In this respect it is like a decrease in the
discount rate.
2 9For Vk=0, [ebeK(1)T - a - {[m(f+g)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)1] = 0 in
the vintage case, and [eb K- 1 T - a - {[m(f+g-c)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)}] = 0
in the non-vintage case. Since this expression is evaluated at the same
g (called g), we readily obtain the ratio (/Ko)[81] ; and similarly
for V =0 we can obtain (K2 /Ko )[ 1 ] Finally, by looking at the ratio
of these ratios, our conclusion follows.
(K2/-%)LU-1J -
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If we next inquire how the onset of technical progress affects
the :irm (if the technical progress is embodied), we can derive for
small values of c (c = 0):
61) sign[dg/dc] = sign[[[a+m(gf] 2 + [(i-g)/(f+g)J] - 1] > O
L[a.,(i+f) ]J
Therefore, the firm will (initially) increase its growth rate due to the
onset of technical progress; unfortunately, it does not appear possible
to say that dg/dc] is positive for all values of c. In other words, it
is possible that for large values of c, a further increase in the rate
of technical progress may cause the firm to choose a lower growth
rate.3 As always, the sign of [dKo/dc] is ambiguous [for (dg/dc) > O]
without further information on the nature of T.
Let us now see how our results change for the owner-oriented
firm.
II) Vk =m, V =0
62) Vk - m = [ebeK(e-l)T - a - {[m(i+c+f)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)}] - 0
(i-g)
63) Vg = [K0/(i-g)2][beK(el){T+(i-g)T ' - a - (i+c+f)-g)]= 0
(i+c-g)
As in prior sections, it is easy to show that the owner-oriented firm
will choose a larger growth rate than the management-oriented firm.
3 As in the disembodied case in which Vk=m, Vg=0, it is
possible to demonstrate that a firm which faces some positive level of
capital-augmenting technical progress will choose a larger growth rate
than a firm that has no technical progress. For these results, and
others, consult the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
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Also, since both curves (Vk--m, Vg=0) for the vintage case lie inside
their counterparts for the non-vintage case, it follows that at least
either the size of the firm or the growth rate of the firm must be
smaller for the vintage firm, compared to the non-vintage firm. How-
ever, proceeding exactly as we did in the management-oriented case, it
can readily be shown that the vintage firm will choose a higher growth
rate, and hence a smaller initial size, than its non-vintage counter-
part. Naturally, the underlying economic reasons for'this result are
the same in this case as they were in the management-oriented case.
When we consider how technical progress affects the firm, we
can readily see that, for small values of c, the growth rate increases
as the rate of technical progress increases. Furthermore, for any
value of c, we find:
64) sign[dg/dc] =
sign{ ([a+{[m(i+c+f)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)}](i-g) [2+ (i+c-g)l] - 11
t[a+{[m(i+c+f)(i-g)2]/(g(i+c-g)) l (f+g)
For c=O, this expression is clearly positive. Though it is not neces-
sarily positive for all values of the parameters, [dg/dcl will be posi-
tive for all values of c if either i > f or i > (c+g) (for small c,
this latter inequality must hold for convergence of the integral for the
value of the firm). 31 Again, it is not possible to determine how a
change in the rate of technical progress affects the size of the firm
(if [dg/dc] > 0).
3 1 As for the embodied case, VkO= and V =0, we can show that
the firm with any positive level of technical progress will choose a
larger growth rate than the firm that has no technical progress. For
further details, consult the Appendix to this chapter.
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Though we shall not bother to exhibit the proof, it can be
shown that for the vintage model, as in the non-vintage case, the larger
the elasticity of demand, the slower the firm will choose to grow:
65) [dg/dn] < for Vk=0, V =0 or for Vk=m, V g=O
As in prior cases, it is not possible to determine how the size of the
firm is changed due to changes in the elasticity of demand without
better knowledge of the values of the parameters and the shape of T(g).
Finally, we can ask how our model will behave if we allow the
firm to pursue an optimal price strategy, in addition to choosing its
initial size and its desired growth rate. Assuming the firm must
operate forever (even with falling prices), we find that, as in the
disembodied case, the owner-oriented firm will choose a falling-price
strategy.32 Thus, unless we can resort to the notion of a kinked
demand curve (or some other oligopolistic practice), the owner-oriented
firm will choose self-annihilation, and the basic assumptions of this
model become quite dubious indeed.
In summary, we have found so far that:
1) The more elastic the demand curve, the slower the firm
will choose to grow.
2) The vintage firm will always choose a larger growth rate
and smaller initial size than its non-vintage
counterpart.
3) For small rates of technical progress, an increase in the
rate of technical progress will lead to larger growth
rates for the firm (except, perhaps, in the manager-
oriented, disembodied firm); for the owner-oriented
3 2Assuming the firm must operate forever, we find:
0 < w = [mc(i+c+f)] < c, where (P/P) =-w.
[m(i+c+f) {[a(inc-g)2]/(i-g)2}]
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vintage firm, this may be true for any rate of
technological progress (if i > [c+g]).
4) As in prior cases, the owner-oriented firm is more growth-
minded than his management-oriented counterpart.
5) The constant price strategy of the stagnant (that is, the
firm with no technical progress) owner-oriented
firm disappears in the presence of technical progress.
It is nice to summarize the results we have obtained so far,
since when we consider a vintage model with labor-augmenting technical
progress we shall find that the problem does not seem to be tractable.
Let us now see why this is so.
VI. Embodied Labor-Augmenting Technical Progress
and the Solow Firm
For reasons outlined earlier, the problem with embodied labor-
augmenting technical progress is much more complicated than those
problems we have considered so far. If the wage rate is increasing over
time at the same rate as technical progress, then it is clear that,
after some period of time has elapsed, it will no longer be profitable
to use machines that are older than some specific vintage. However,
this economic discarding of machines (which does not arise when
technical progress is either capital-augmenting or disembodied) causes
us problems for two reasons:
a) If the firm is portrayed as starting with some initial
amount of capital (of vintage t = 0), and growing at a
constant rate (so that there are only infinitesimal
amounts of capital of other vintages), it is clear that,
when the initial block of capital is discarded, there will
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be a discontinuity in output.33
b) Secondly, and more fundamentally, the economic lifetime of
the machines depends upon both the growth rate and the size
that the firm chooses. This aspect of the problem makes it
impossible (for us) to arrive at any conclusions.
Also, it is clear that a) and b) interact since the economic life of
capital that is chosen determines when the original chunk of capital is
discarded, and this, in turn, affects the current value of the firm.
It is possible to avoid the discontinuity problem by assuming
that there are only infinitesimal amounts of each vintage. However, for
the firm to reach a constant growth rate in this case it must originally
grow faster than its final steady-state rate of growth (until the first
machine is discarded). This, in turn, makes it difficult to consider the
problem in a Solow framework in which prices are rigid (allowing them to
vary merely complicates the analysis) and advertising expands demand at
34
a constant rate. Even if simplifying assumption are made, so that the
problem can be treated in the context of a steady-state growth path, the
solution remains essentially unsolvable.
D This is not a necessary assumption - it is possible to
assume that the firm starts with capital of various vintages (Though
one must still postulate how the magnitude of each type of vintage
capital is determined by the firm, since in this problem the firm is
free to choose its own initial conditions). However, even under this
assumption, the analysis proves intractable because the optimal econom-
ic lifetime of capital (for the firm) is an internal variable.
34For example, we could assume that no sales are made until the
steady-state growth path is reached - output would ust be given away as
an advertising gimmick. Alternatively, we could assume that output is
sold. at a price just sufficient to cover labor costs - and this would
be another advertising scheme (Naturally, this assumes that the price
can be set large enough to cover labor costs; however, for there to be
any long-run profits, this must be possible).
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For example, suppose technical progress is embodied in labor
and occurs at rate d; the wage rate is assumed to also increase at rate
d. f the firm starts with an initial block of capital of vintage o,
and if it seeks to grow at rate g, then we can write:
66) K = (g+f)K e g v
Qv(t) = b(g+f)Ke(g+f)v-ft
If is the age of the oldest machine in use, then we can find:
67) Q(t) = f[QV(t)dv] + Qe -ft = bKegt ; t J
(t-J) - f tQ(t) f(t [j)[(t)dv] = bKo[l - e (gf g ; t > J
Similarly, assuming technical progress is labor-augmenting and
embodied:
68) L(t) = [Ko/(g+f-d)][(g+f)e(g-d)t - deft ] ; t J
L(t) = [(Ko(g+f)}/(g+f-d)][1 - e (g+f-d)]e g ; t > J
Proceeding in this way, we calculate the value of the firm:
69) V = %J[Div(t)e-itdt] + fI[Div(t)e-itdt]
=([{Tb0Ko}/(i-g)][l - e(g-i)J{1 - [1 - e (g )]]
-[{aK0(i+f)}/{(i-g)(i+f-d)}][l - e( i+f-d)j]
-[{m(g+f)Ko}/(i-g)])
We cm either treat as a decision variable for the firm (in addition
to K and g), or else we can assume that is determined such that the
marginal revenue product of the last worker is ust equal to his cost
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(which is equal to the wage rate, assuming perfect competition in the
factor market):35
70) Q = be dvL implies MRP L = [bedV (eTP)] ; Wage Rate = aedt
Therefore, ed(t-v) - [(bTP)/al implies ed = [(ebTP)/a]
Clearly, the larger is g, the sooner machines must be discarded since
a larger fraction of total revenue is devoted to advertising. Also,
the larger firm (with the smaller price) will tend to discard its
older equipment sooner. Unfortunately, even if we make this a priori
substitution, the problem proves intractable.
Economically, it is clear that the embodied technical progress
is actually a burden to the entrepreneur, assuming that wages rise at an
equivalent rate. All the benefits of the technical progress are passed
on to the worker (as is also the case for disembodied labor-augmenting
teckmhnical progress); 3 6 however, since the fruits of technical progress
are not spread over all machines, the capitalist is thereby hurt due to
the technological obsolescence of some of his machines.37 Since an
increase in d, ceteris paribus, decreases the economic lifetime of
machines, it is to be expected that this lowers both Vk and Vg (Vkd,
3 5Presumably, these two methods will give the same result;
unfortunately, both methods prove intractable.
36This indicates that the Kennedy-Samuelson model relies
crucially upon the assumption that firms decide alone what type of
tecmhnological progress to choose. If there were collusive behavior
(for example, pooling research funds), and if they realized the effect
of their decision on wages (but could not wholly offset it with
monopsony power), they may instead choose capital-augmenting technical
progress, even for a < 1.
3 7It is clear that the value of the firm (68) is less than the
value of the firm for the case in which no technical progress occurs.
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Vgd < 0). Thus, it would appear that either K or g (or both) will
decrease as a result of the occurrence of embodied labor-augmenting
technical progress (and the consequent increase in wages).
Unfortunately, we have not been able to take the analysis much
further. We have seen that, with embodied labor-augmenting technical
progress, the faster growing companies will tend to discard their
machines sooner than slower growing companies (other things being
equal). However, due to the complexity of the analysis, we have been
able to conclude little else.
As the final model we present an optimal control formulation of
the Solow firm (with constant technology). We shall see that the only
steady-state path satisfying the equations of motion corresponds to a
case already discussed - that of the owner-oriented firm (Vk--m, V =0).
VII. The Solow Firm and Optimal Planning
In the preceding sections we have investigated how the Solow
firm would respond to various changes in parameters, and we have
demonstrated how this firm chooses its optimal size and growth rate
under two different criteria. Alternatively, it is possible to formu-
late this problem as an optimal control problem, and to investigate how
the firm should behave, assuming that it seeks to maximize the
discounted. value of the flow of dividends. As we shall see, if the
firm starts with a very particular initial capital stock, it will
choose to behave exactly the same as does the owner-oriented firm that
we studied earlier in this chapter.
Thus, suppose that we choose the basic Solow model, except
that we allow prices to change over time. Letting g be the rate of
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increase in demand due to advertising, we can write:
71) (Q/Q) = [g - n(P/P)]
Assuming that there are no excess machines (that is, the initial stock
of capital is sufficiently small), and that there is no technical
progress:
72) (Q/Qi) implies K = [(Q/Q)(Q/b)]
But, due to investment, we know:
73) mK = s[TPQ - a(Q/b) - mf(Q/b)] ,
where the term in brackets is the amount of funds available for net
investment after advertising expenses, workers, and depreciation have
38been paid. Therefore:
74) (Q/Q) = [(sb)/m][TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)]
75) (P/P) = [l/nl[g - s(b/m){TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)}]
76) Dividends = (1-s)[TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)]Q
Allowing A1 and X2 to represent the shadow prices, we can formulate
the Hamiltonian as follows:
77) H = {(l-s)[TP-(a/b)-m(f/b)]Q + Als(b/m)[TP-(a/b)-m(f/b)]Q
+ A2(P/n)[g - s(b/m){TP-(a/b)-m(f/b)}]}eit
The control variables are s and g; the state variables are
Q and P. For s we find:
38If [TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)]Q S O, then s = 0. In that case, 72)
should read: m = s'[TPQ - a(Q/b)] - fK , where s' is now the gross
savings rate. However, we are only interested in problems where K is
small initially, so this problem need not concern us here.
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s maximizes [(l-s) + s(b/m){A
= 0
This implies: s E (0,1) as
= 1
Therefore,
1 - [(AsP ) / ( nQ) ]} ];39
{(b/m)[l - {(X2P)/(nQ)}]} 1
Max[(l-s) + s(b/m){l - [(12P)/(nQ)]}](S) ~ ~ ~ (2 )/n)} Y
Y = Max[l,{(b/m)[l
Next, choosing g to maximize 76), we find:
80) T'(g) = [(-A2)/(nyQ)]
FDinally, there are the two Euler equations:
81) [TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)][(l-s) + sl(b/m)] +
82) (TQ[(l-s) + s(b/m){A1 - [(A2P)/(nQ)]}]
1-1
= 0
+ ( 2/n)[g - s(b/m){TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)}] + 2 - iA2 ) = 0
In addition, we also have the differential equations for P and Q
thetaselves. To summarize, we have the following equations:
i) y = Max[l,{(b/m)[A 1 - ((X2P)/(nQ))]}]
ii) T' = [(-A2)/(nyQ)]
iii) (A1 /A1 ) = i - [TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)][{(l-s)/Al} + s(b/m)]
iv) ( 2/X2 ) = i - [(TQy)/X2] - (1/n)[g - s(b/m){TP-(a/b)-m(f/b)}]
v) (Q/Q) =
vi) (P/P) =
s(b/m)[TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)]
(l/n)[g - s(b/m){TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)1]
We seek a stationary solution that satisfies these equations. Clearly,
39If [TP - (a/b) - m(f/b)] 0, then s = 0.
78)
79)
- M 2,P)(nc21]1]
iAl
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s = 1 is not a solution unless the growth rate exceeds i (in which case
the integral does not converge). Similarly, s = 0 is not a solution if
40
there is to be some positive growth rate. Thus, for 0 < s < 1:
83) [A - {(A2 P)/(nQ)] = (m/b)
Also, for g to be constant over time implies:
84) (A2/A2 ) = (/Q) (for y constant)
Using equations 83) and 84), plus the equations of motion, we can
derive:
85) 0
86) p -- (Q/Q) = (x2 / 2) = g = s(b/m)[TP-(a/b)-m(f/b)]
87) (12/A2) = g [T + n(i-g)T'] = 0, which determines g.
Using equations i) - vi), and assuming a steady-state solution, we can
derive the necessary initial conditions for each of the variables (as
well as their subsequent values over time):
88) Q= bKo = {[(im4'f+a)n]/[b(n-l)T] -n ; Q = Qoe
89) p = [Qo]-(ln)
90) s = {[g(n-l)]/[in+f+(a/m)]} < 1 (s is the net savings rate)
91) l = {[nm(i-g)+a+m(g+f)]/[b(n-l)(i-g)]}
OWithout knowledge of T(g) it is not possible to exclude such
a solution. However, we shall assume that T(g) is such that a solution
for g > 0 exists.
4lThis is the same equation found by Prof. Solow for the
owner--oriented firm; as before, it does not appear possible to
guarantee the uniqueness of the solution.
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92) A2 = {[(im+mf+a)n]/[b(n-l)T[(n+l)/n]]}-n[eegt/(i-g)]
These are the only values of the variables, given the values of the
parameters, that will generate a steady-state solution that satisfies
the equations i) - vi) (assuming that g, as determined from 87), is
unique); unfortunately, we have not been able to determine the optimal
path for the enterprise if the initial capital stock differs from the
optimaLl level as determined in 88).
Let us now return for a moment to the static Solow model:
93) V = [Tb K - a - m(f+g)Ko ]/(i-g)} ; Vk = m implies:
94) [eTbeK(l)] = [a + m(i+f)] ; and therefore, using Q = bK :
O 0 O
95) Qo = {[b(n-1)T]/[(mi+mf+a)n]}n 
which is the same value for Qo as we found in 88) for the control
problem. Therefore, the optimal control problem implicitly attributes
an opportunity cost to capital equal to its price. Consequently, the
steady-state solution to the optimal control problem is equivalent to
the optimal solution for the owner-oriented firm that was discussed
earlier in this chapter (assuming that there is no technical progress).
Finally, we can not readily determine the behavior of the firm if it
starts with a capital stock different from that found in 88).
VIII. Conclusion - The Solow Model and the Steady-State
In this chapter we have explored how various forms of
technical progress affect the behavior of a dynamic firm. We have
discussed how changes in various parameters affect the decisions made
by the! firm, and we have seen how different "types" of firms respond
to the same stimuli. Specifically, we have shown that:
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a) For "all" firms, the more elastic is the demand curve, the
slower the firm will choose to grow.
b) For all types of technical progress considered, the owner-
oriented firm will choose a larger growth rate than the firm that
disregards the opportunity cost of the initial stock of capital.
c) The growth rate chosen by the firm will be larger (and the
initial size smaller) if technical progress is embodied, rather than
disembodied (and capital-augmenting).
d) In general, the firm will not choose a constant price
strategy if there is any capital-augmenting technical progress.
e) The optimal growth rate chosen by the firm depends upon all
of the parameters of the model (unless there is no technical progress
and the firm is owner-oriented).
f) For the management-oriented firm, an increase in the rate
of disembodied, capital-augmenting technical progress might lead to a
decli:ne in the growth rate chosen by the firm. If the firm (country)
has a very high rate of time preference, this result is likely.
g) For the owner-oriented firm, an increase in the rate of
technical progress (for small values of the rate of technical progress)
will increase the growth rate chosen by the firm.
h) If technical progress is embodied and labor-augmenting, and
if wages increase at the rate of technical progress, then the quicker
growing the firm is, the sooner it will discard capital as being
econamically obsolete.
i) Embodied labor-augmenting technical progress, if accompa-
nied by wages that increase at the same rate as technical progress,
actually decreases the value of the firm. This, we feel, sheds some
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doubt on the Kennedy-Samuelson results if it is assumed (recognized?)
that decisions on types of technological progress are made by large
corporations that are cognizant of their effect on wages.
There are other results that could be listed; we feel, however, that
the major results have been enumerated above.
The model of the growing firm formulated by Prof. Solow, and
extended in this chapter, though simplistic in style, is an important
contribution because it focuses on what we consider a major factor in
influencing a firm's dynamic behavior - the need to expend a significant
part of its resources to ensure a growing demand for its product. How-
ever, when one attempts to extend the results of this chapter to apply
to the economy as a whole, several weaknesses of the model become
evident:
a) The assumption of Fixed Coefficients - though this
assumption simplifies the analysis, it is not really an important one,
and it could readily be dropped.
b) The Steady-State assumption - clearly, the model is aimed at
providing a picture of a firm that is essentially unchanging over time,
as is the steady-state economy. However, this assumption has been seen
to be quite dubious when we allow the firm (that has capital-augmenting
technical progress) to vary prices.
c) The "Long-Run" - in the Solow model, a firm (and, implicitly,
all firms) may grow at a faster rate than the economy as a whole over
the relevant planning period. This stems from the fact that the long
run is "not that long". Also, the model implicitly assumes that firms'
plans (in terms of expanding demand) are always fulfilled. This brings
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us to our final point.
d) The Partial-Equilibrium Approach - obviously, this model is
a partial equilibrium one - no concern is given to the larger wages
that presumably will occur if a firm grows faster than the economy as a
whole (for an extended period of time), and no attention is focused on
the market structure of the economy.
The fact that the model is partial equilibrium in nature is not
a criticism of the model itself, since its purpose was to analyze how
different firms respond to various exogenous changes. However, if the
model is to be adapted to help explain the growth behavior of an
econcmy (and the demand for investment in that economy), it is our
feeling that it must be embedded in a more general equilibrium approach.
For example, the assumption that the firm faces a demand curve that is
not completely elastic implicitly recognizes the existence of market
power; the logical extension would seem to be to formulate a model
that explicitly recognizes the oligopolistic structure of the market.
In that model, growth might serve to increase market power (and hence
profits) - this is in contrast to asking how the growth rate responds
to anl exogenous change in market structure.
Unfortunately, it is easier to talk of such a model than to
construct it. Nevertheless, it is our feeling that greater understand-
ing of the growth behavior of an economy can only be obtained by
disaggregating the growth model and by attempting to explain how firms
within this growing economy might behave.
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IX. Appendix - Responses of the Firm's Growth Rate
to Parameter Changes
In the main part of this chapter we have shown how changes in
the rate of technological progress affect the growth decisions made by
the firm, for very low levels of technical progress (c 0). In this
Appendix we hope to show that these comparative static results can be
extended. Specifically, we ask:
1) Will the firm with some technical progress always choose a
larger growth rate than the firm with no technical progress (for the
owner-oriented and the management-oriented firm)?
2) How does a change in the price of labor or capital affect
the growth decisions made by the firm?
In addition to attempting to answer these questions for the
owner-oriented and the management-oriented firms, we shall attempt to
answer them for the case of embodied, as well as disembodied, technical
progress.
Consider first how the presence of technological change
affects the growth decisions. We have seen that the firm chooses the
growth rate at which the Vk=O (Vk=m) and V =0 curves intersect,
assuming that they have the "proper" slope. For c = 0, these curves
will (might) intersect at some growth rate - call it g. The onset of
technological change causes both of these curves to shift; if, in the
presence of this new technology, the Vk=0 curve lies above the V =0
curve at the old growth rate g, then the new growth rate (g') must be
greater than g, since the V =0 curve must have a greater slope (in
absolute value) at the maximum.
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As an example, consider the case of disembodied technical
progress (it is capital-augmenting) for the management-oriented firm
(Vk=O). In that case we have:
96) Vk = 0 + [eT(g)beK(e-1)] = {ta+m(i-g)(f+g-c)]/(i+c-g)}
V = 0 + {[T+(i-g)T']b K( - 1) } = {[a+m(i-g)2(i+f)]/(i+c-g)2}g 0
Let g, Ko represent the optimal solution for the case c=O; let K1
represent the value of Ko such that Vk(Kl,g,c) = 0 for c > 0; let K2
be chosen such that V (K2,g,c) = 0 for c > 0. Then, if g' represents
the new optimal growth rate:42
97) ' >-g as
From 96) we find:
I,^ -, 
98) [K/o 0 t-u' =
[K2 /K ] i
[a + [m(i-g)(f+g-c)]/(i+c-g)}
(a + m(f+g)] J
(e-i) 
[a + {[m(i-g):(f+g-c)]/(i+c-g)' ;
[a + m(i+f)]
Therefore,
99) [K2 /K1 ] 1 as I [a+{[m(i-g)(f+g-c)]/(i+c-g)}][a+ m(i+f)] 1
< 2 2 <
Eta+{[m(i-g) (i+f)]/(i+c-g) }][a+m(g+f)] 1
Without knowledge of the value of the parameters, we can not determine
the value of the ratios in 99); however, if [(f+2g) > (i+c)], this
suffices to guarantee that the growth rate with technical progress will
42As usual, the possibility of multiple roots exists. In that
case, we may talk about the largest such root, which must be a relative
maximum.
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be larger (g' > g)3 (note that for a = O, this is also a necessary
condition).4
However, in the case of embodied technical progress for the
management-oriented firm we find that we can show that the firm with
some positive rate of technical progress will always choose the
larger growth rate. In this case we find:
100) [K2/Ki] 1 as [a+([m(f+g)(i-g)]/(i+c-g)}]a+m(i+f)] 
[a+{[m(i+c+f)(i-g)2 /(i+c-g) }I[a+m(g+f)]
By expanding 100) we can show that [K2/K] > 1; therefore, the firm
with some embodied, capital-augmenting technical progress will choose
a larger growth rate than a comparable firm with no technical progress.
Using the same technique, we can readily show that the owner-
oriented firm which possesses some capital-augmenting technical
progress will choose a larger growth rate than a comparable firm that
receives no advances in technique (this is true for both embodied and
disembodied technical progress). Note that this result does not imply
that an even larger rate of growth of technical progress will lead to
even larger growth rates for the firm; it merely tells us that a firm
43Note that the larger is i (the rate of discount), the less
likely it is that the firm with technical progress will choose a larger
growth rate than the firm with no technical progress.
Observe that if m=0, there is no change in the optimal
growth rate due to capital-augmenting technical progress. This is true
in all cases (of capital-augmenting technical progress) and is obvious,
since if capital is free, it is irrelevant to the firm how much capital
must be "purchased". By continuity, it seems plausible to argue that
the smaller m, ceteris paribus, the less important capital-augmenting
technical progress will be to the decisions made by the owner or
manager. Thus, we would expect the onset of capital-augmenting
technical progress to have a larger effect on decisions in an under-
developed country, where capital costs are high relative to labor costs,
than in a capital rich country.
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with scue (any) positive rate of capital-augmenting technical progress
will choose a larger growth rate than the firm that is technologically
stagnant (except, perhaps, for the manager-oriented, disembodied case).
In summary, in all cases except the disembodied, management-
oriented case, we can conclude that the presence of capital-augmenting
technical progress will lead the firm to choose a larger growth rate
than it otherwise would if there were no technical progress. For the
case of' disembodied technical progress in the management-oriented firm,
no definitive results can be stated without further knowledge of the
relevant parameters.
Next, let us consider how a change in cost conditions affects
the growth decisions made by the firm. Specifically, we would like to
know how an increase in the wage rate (a) or in capital costs (m) will
affect the growth rate chosen by the firm. Since an increase in a (or
in m) leads to a decrease in Vk and Vg (ceteris paribus), it follows
that either the optimal g or the optimal K (or both) must decrease.
O
Therefore:
101) [dg/da] > 0 + [dKo/da] < 0 ; similarly for [dg/dm].
Fortunately, it is relatively simple to calculate [dg/da] and
[dg/dm] using the technique discussed earlier. If we assume (for
example) an owner-oriented firm, for a = a, we have:
102) Vk ( g K a ) = m; V(g a) = 0
at a maximum. Now let a (or m) increase to a' > a, and define K1 , K2
as follows:
Vk(g,K,a') = m ; Vg(gK 2 ') = ok 9 9 9 'a' 103)
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As before, if g' represents the new growth rate chosen by the firm,
then:
o10) g' g as K2 I E
Clearly, the same technique can be used for changes in capital costs.
As an example, consider the case of an owner-oriented firm
facing disembodied, capital-augmenting technical progress. For a
maximum we have:
105) [eTbeK(e l)] = a + [{m(i+f)(i-g)}/(i+c-g)]0
[T + (i-g)T']beK( 8-l ) = a + [{m(i+f)(i-g) 2 /(i+c-g) 2 ]0
Using the notation defined above, at g we find:
106) g'; g as K2 K1 , and K2 K as:
107) [a'+{[m'(i+f)(i-g)]/(ic-g)}]la+{[m(i+f)(i-g)2]/(i+c-g)2 ] 1
[a+{Ilm(if) (i-g) ]/(i+c-g) ] at+{ [m(i+f) (i-g)2]/(i+c-g)2} ]
Let as consider changes in capital costs only (m' > m, a' = a ); from
107) we can readily see that:
108) K2 > and thus [dg/dm] > 0 , for c > 0.
(Note that if c = O, then K2 = K1 , regardless of the values of a and m;
this corresponds to Prof. Solow's observation that, in this case, the
growth rate of the firm depends only upon the rate of discount and the
elasticity of demand, in addition to the shape of T(g)). Similarly,
letting a' a, m' = m , we find for this case:
109) K2 < K1 and therefore [dg/da] < 0 for c > 0.
Therefore, in the case of the owner-oriented firm with dis-
embodlied capital-augmenting technical progress, an increase in capital
230
costs actually leads to a larger growth rate, though a smaller initial
size, for the firm. This may be rationalized by realizing that, due to
the technical progress, capital costs in the future (for a given growth
rate) are lower than present capital costs, and thus the decrease in
size as a result of the larger capital costs makes it profitable to
expand the growth rate of the firm. On the other hand, technical
progress, since it is only capital-augmenting, does not offset (in the
future) the larger labor costs, so there is no reason to expect the
firm to choose a larger growth rate as a result of increased labor costs.
We have seen in 108) and 109) above that increased labor
costs have exactly the opposite effect (qualitatively) on the growth
rate as does an increase in capital costs. When we consider all
possible cases we find that this result still holds:
110) sign[dg/da] - sign[dg/dm]
The table on the following page summarizes the effects of changes in
capital or labor costs on both the size of the firm and its growth
rate for all cases.
From the table we can see that, for the owner-oriented firm,
an increase in capital costs actually leads to a more rapidly growing
firm, while for the management-oriented firm, no definitive results are
available (though it can readily be seen that an increase in capital
costs is more likely to lead to a larger growth rate for the firm with
embodied technical progress than for the firm with disembodied technical
progress). If i (the discount rate) is sufficiently large, then
[dg/dm] < 0 - in this case, the high rate of time preference makes
growth more costly, and thus "overcomes" the benefits of capital-
i I
0
, k --
· U,
H 0
+ 0
-'
U)
I
C- I
I O
0
II I
°0 e
u > >
_ 10
0o
bD 4)0
>* *H
0
> H
'- H
H
r-.
Ct
0
.
Cri
Wl
231
0
Al
""
Cd )
bD.
-a 4)
r4 0
I C-I --
r"I
4C
11
tzao
_.
*,i
bD
-1
VAl
O
Al
cn
.Q
O
U
00
0
0
+e
.4.
P4
0
4
CP4
U
0O,4
4r
0
·rl4)
CrH
10
CS
0
Al
4)
'4 c
0 
I e-I e-
5-'
'CI"-ql
W-
I
'alI1-1
1
I
+
0
C
b0
*II
+
.r4
-
.l
..,
aa1
0
II
laII
Wd
H ,1-i 4W
Cd
+
0
II
bD
:,
J::,
,O
tqv4
-I
H
II
i
>t
i I
I I
232
augmenting technical progress (in terms of lowering future capital
costs). Hovever, as is apparent from the table, [dg/da] is positive
in that case.
There appears to be little else that can be said about the
table, so we shall let it "speak for itself".
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